Abstract
The successful implementation of public policy often requires the cooperation of many individuals including those who can affect and those who are to be affected by the proposed policy. In this paper, the structure of such cooperation is modeled by combining multiobjective programming and solution techniques for n-person cooperative games.
An integer programming model, choses among the many possible configurations of coalitions the configuration that is optimal given the structure of the game. A linear programming model is then developed from the rationality postualtes of n-person game theory to induce participants to join the proper coalition in the optimal configuration. This inducement model apportions the cost savings realized by the formation of coalitions to the participants of the action in an economically efficient manner.
Evaluation of the shortcomings of the single objective inducement model leads to the formulation of a multiobjective inducement model that utilizes the economic efficiency objective as well as an objective designed to measure the equitable allocation of costs to the participants of the action. The stability of the bargaining situation is assessed at each noninferior solution to the multiobjective model. The multiobjective solutions thus derived are compared to and evaluated against conventional game theoretic solutions designed to equitably allocate “payoffs” to the participants of n-person bargaining games. The results of such a comparison demonstrate that a considerable amount of useful information can be generated by such multiobjective techniques.
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Ratick, S.J., Cohon, J., ReVelle, C. (1981). Multiobjective Programming Solutions to N-Person Bargaining Games. In: Morse, J.N. (eds) Organizations: Multiple Agents with Multiple Criteria. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 190. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-45527-8_27
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-45527-8_27
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