Abstract
Can the outcome of bargaining between two rational parties be determined? Although much of the discussion in bargaining literature revolves around this question, no satisfactory answer has been found. As pointed out by e. g. Coddington (1973) all theories presented so far either do not lead to a determinate solution for any situation of interest or involve some kind of erroneous expectations as regards the opponent’s behavior.
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References
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Ståhl, I. (1977). An N-Person Bargaining Game in the Extensive Form. In: Henn, R., Moeschlin, O. (eds) Mathematical Economics and Game Theory. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 141. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-45494-3_12
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-45494-3_12
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