Abstract
The stable matching problem has many applications to real world markets and efficient centralized algorithms are known. However, little is known about the decentralized case. Several natural randomized algorithmic models for this setting have been proposed but they have worst case exponential time in expectation. We present a novel structure associated with a stable matching on a matching market. Using this structure, we are able to provide a finer analysis of the complexity of a subclass of decentralized matching markets.
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Hoffman, M., Moeller, D., Paturi, R. (2013). Jealousy Graphs: Structure and Complexity of Decentralized Stable Matching. In: Chen, Y., Immorlica, N. (eds) Web and Internet Economics. WINE 2013. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 8289. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-45046-4_22
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-45046-4_22
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-45045-7
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-45046-4
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