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A Constructive Perspective on Key Encapsulation

  • Sandro Coretti
  • Ueli Maurer
  • Björn Tackmann
Chapter
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 8260)

Abstract

A key-encapsulation mechanism (KEM) is a cryptographic primitive that allows anyone in possession of some party’s public key to securely transmit a key to that party. A KEM can be viewed as a key-exchange protocol in which only a single message is transmitted; the main application is in combination with symmetric encryption to achieve public-key encryption of messages of arbitrary length.

The security of KEMs is usually defined in terms of a certain game that no efficient adversary can win with non-negligible advantage. A main drawback of game-based definitions is that they often do not have clear semantics, and that the security of each higher-level protocol that makes use of KEMs needs to be proved by showing a tailor-made security reduction from breaking the security of the KEM to breaking the security of the combined protocol.

We propose a novel approach to the security and applications of KEMs, following the constructive cryptography paradigm by Maurer and Renner (ICS 2011). The goal of a KEM is to construct a resource that models a shared key available to the honest parties. This resource can be used in designing and proving higher-level protocols; the composition theorem guarantees the security of the combined protocol without the need for a specific reduction.

Keywords

Constructive Perspective Symmetric Encryption Honest Party Composition Theorem Security Notion 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Sandro Coretti
    • 1
  • Ueli Maurer
    • 1
  • Björn Tackmann
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Computer ScienceETH ZürichSwitzerland

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