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When Should an Implementation Attack Be Viewed as Successful?

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Number Theory and Cryptography

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNTCS,volume 8260))

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Abstract

In this paper we address the problem when a side-channel attack or a fault attack should be counted successful in case the attack does not reveal all bits of the secret key but provides only partial information. Many interesting questions arise in this context, which demand advanced mathematical methods. The topic is illustrated by three well-known examples. The credo of this paper is that there is broad room and the need for fruitful collaboration between researchers dealing with implementation attacks and researchers from mathematical (algorithm-oriented) cryptography.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI), Godesberger Allee 185–189, 53175, Bonn, Germany

    Werner Schindler

  2. CASED (Center for Advanced Security Research Darmstadt), Mornewegstraße 32, 64289, Darmstadt, Germany

    Werner Schindler

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  1. Werner Schindler
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Technische Universität Darmstadt & CASED, Mornewegstraße 30, 64293, Darmstadt, Germany

    Marc Fischlin

  2. Technische Universität Darmstadt & CASED, Mornewegstraße 32, 64293, Darmstadt, Germany

    Stefan Katzenbeisser

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Schindler, W. (2013). When Should an Implementation Attack Be Viewed as Successful?. In: Fischlin, M., Katzenbeisser, S. (eds) Number Theory and Cryptography. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 8260. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-42001-6_11

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-42001-6_11

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-42000-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-42001-6

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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