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Roles and Teams Hedonic Game

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Algorithmic Decision Theory (ADT 2013)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 8176))

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Abstract

We introduce a new variant of hedonic coalition formation games in which agents have two levels of preference on their own coalitions: preference on the set of “roles” that makes up the coalition, and preference on their own role within the coalition. We define several stability notions and optimization problems for this model. We prove the hardness of the decision problems related to our optimization criteria and show easiness of finding individually stable partitions. We introduce a heuristic optimizer for coalition formation in this setting. We evaluate results of the heuristic optimizer and the results of local search for individually stable partitions with respect to brute-force MaxSum and MaxMin solvers.

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Spradling, M., Goldsmith, J., Liu, X., Dadi, C., Li, Z. (2013). Roles and Teams Hedonic Game. In: Perny, P., Pirlot, M., Tsoukiàs, A. (eds) Algorithmic Decision Theory. ADT 2013. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 8176. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-41575-3_27

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-41575-3_27

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-41574-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-41575-3

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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