Abstract
One of the most fundamental and ubiquitous problems in microeconomics and operations research is how to assign objects to agents based on their individual preferences. An assignment is called popular if there is no other assignment that is preferred by a majority of the agents. Popular assignments need not exist, but the minimax theorem implies the existence of a popular random assignment. In this paper, we study the compatibility of popularity with other properties that have been considered in the literature on random assignments, namely efficiency, equal treatment of equals, envy-freeness, and strategyproofness.
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Aziz, H., Brandt, F., Stursberg, P. (2013). On Popular Random Assignments. In: Vöcking, B. (eds) Algorithmic Game Theory. SAGT 2013. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 8146. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-41392-6_16
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-41392-6_16
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