Abstract
EAX is a mode of operation for blockciphers to implement an authenticated encryption. The original paper of EAX proved that EAX is unforgeable up to O(2n/2) data with one verification query. However, this generally guarantees a rather weak bound for the unforgeability under multiple verification queries, i.e., only (2n/3) data is acceptable.
This paper provides an improvement over the previous security proof, by showing that EAX is unforgeable up to O(2n/2) data with multiple verification queries. Our security proof is based on the techniques appeared in a paper of FSE 2013 by Minematsu et al. which studied the security of a variant of EAX called EAX-prime. We also provide some ideas to reduce the complexity of EAX while keeping our new security bound. In particular, EAX needs three blockcipher calls and keep them in memory as a pre-processing, and our proposals can effectively reduce three calls to one call. This would be useful when computational power and memory are constrained.
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Minematsu, K., Lucks, S., Iwata, T. (2013). Improved Authenticity Bound of EAX, and Refinements. In: Susilo, W., Reyhanitabar, R. (eds) Provable Security. ProvSec 2013. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 8209. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-41227-1_11
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-41227-1_11
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
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