Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

On Modeling Terrorist Frauds

Addressing Collusion in Distance Bounding Protocols

  • Conference paper
Provable Security (ProvSec 2013)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 8209))

Included in the following conference series:

Abstract

Quite recently, distance-bounding protocols received a lot of attention as they offer a good solution to thwart relay attacks. Their security models at still unstable, especially when considering terrorist fraud. This considers the case where a malicious prover would try to bypass the protocol by colluding with an adversary without leaking his credentials. Two formal models appeared recently: one due to Fischlin and Onete and another one by Boureanu, Mitrokotsa, and Vaudenay. Both were proposed with a provably secure distance-bounding protocols (FO and SKI, respectively) providing security against all state-of-the-art threat models. So far, these two protocols are the only such ones.

In this paper we compare both notions and protocols. We identify some errors in the Fischlin-Onete results. We also show that the design of the FO protocol lowers security against mafia frauds while the SKI protocol makes non-standard PRF assumptions and has lower security due to not using post-authentication. None of these protocols provide reasonable parameters to be used in practice with a good security. The next open challenge consists in providing a protocol combining both approaches and good practical parameters.

Finally, we provide a new security definition against terrorist frauds which naturally inspires from the soundness notion for proof-of-knowledge protocols.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. Avoine, G., Bingöl, M., Kardas, S., Lauradoux, C., Martin, B.: A Framework for Analyzing RFID Distance Bounding Protocols. Journal of Computer Security 19(2), 289–317 (2011)

    Google Scholar 

  2. Boureanu, I., Mitrokotsa, A., Vaudenay, S.: On the Pseudorandom Function Assumption in (Secure) Distance-Bounding Protocols - PRF-ness alone Does Not Stop the Frauds! In: Hevia, A., Neven, G. (eds.) LatinCrypt 2012. LNCS, vol. 7533, pp. 100–120. Springer, Heidelberg (2012)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  3. Boureanu, I., Mitrokotsa, A., Vaudenay, S.: Secure & Lightweight Distance-Bounding. In: Avoine, G., Kara, O. (eds.) LightSec 2013. LNCS, vol. 8162, pp. 97–113. Springer, Heidelberg (2013)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  4. Boureanu, I., Mitrokotsa, A., Vaudenay, S.: Practical & Provably Secure Distance-Bounding. IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive 2013/465. IACR (2013), http://eprint.iacr.org/2013/465.pdf

  5. Boureanu, I., Mitrokotsa, A., Vaudenay, S.: Towards Secure Distance Bounding. In: The Proceedings of FSE 2013 (to appear, 2013)

    Google Scholar 

  6. Brands, S., Chaum, D.: Distance-Bounding Protocols (Extended Abstract). In: Helleseth, T. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 1993. LNCS, vol. 765, pp. 344–359. Springer, Heidelberg (1994)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  7. Bryc, W.: A Uniform Approximation to the Right Normal Tail Integral. Applied Mathematics and Computation 127, 365–374 (2002)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  8. Cremers, C.J.F., Rasmussen, K.B., Schmidt, B., Čapkun, S.: Distance Hijacking Attacks on Distance Bounding Protocols. In: IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy S&P 2012, San Francisco CA, USA, pp. 113–127. IEEE Computer Society (2012)

    Google Scholar 

  9. Desmedt, Y.: Major Security Problems with the “Unforgeable” (Feige-)Fiat-Shamir Proofs of Identity and How to Overcome Them. In: Congress on Computer and Communication Security and Protection Securicom 1988, pp. 147–159. SEDEP, Paris (1988)

    Google Scholar 

  10. Dürholz, U., Fischlin, M., Kasper, M., Onete, C.: A Formal Approach to Distance-Bounding RFID Protocols. In: Lai, X., Zhou, J., Li, H. (eds.) ISC 2011. LNCS, vol. 7001, pp. 47–62. Springer, Heidelberg (2011)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  11. Fischlin, M., Onete, C.: Subtle Kinks in Distance-Bounding: an Analysis of Prominent Protocols. In: ACM Conference on Security and Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks WISEC 2013, Budapest, Hungary, pp. 195–206. ACM (2013)

    Google Scholar 

  12. Fischlin, M., Onete, C.: Terrorism in Distance Bounding: Modelling Terrorist-Fraud Resistance. In: Jacobson, M., Locasto, M., Mohassel, P., Safavi-Naini, R. (eds.) ACNS 2013. LNCS, vol. 7954, pp. 414–431. Springer, Heidelberg (2013)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  13. Hancke, G.P.: Distance Bounding for RFID: Effectiveness of Terrorist Fraud. In: Conference on RFID-Technologies and Applications RFID-TA 2012, Nice, France, pp. 91–96. IEEE (2012)

    Google Scholar 

  14. Hancke, G.P., Kuhn, M.G.: An RFID Distance Bounding Protocol. In: Conference on Security and Privacy for Emerging Areas in Communications Networks SecureComm 2005, Athens, Greece, pp. 67–73. IEEE (2005)

    Google Scholar 

  15. Kim, C.H., Avoine, G., Koeune, F., Standaert, F.-X., Pereira, O.: The Swiss-Knife RFID Distance Bounding Protocol. In: Lee, P.J., Cheon, J.H. (eds.) ICISC 2008. LNCS, vol. 5461, pp. 98–115. Springer, Heidelberg (2009)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. EPFL, Lausanne, Switzerland

    Serge Vaudenay

Authors
  1. Serge Vaudenay
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Centre for Computer and Information Security Research, School of Computer Science and Software Engineering, University of Wollongong, Northfields Ave, NSW 2522, Wollongong, Australia

    Willy Susilo

  2. École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne, IC LASEC, Bâtiment INF, Station 14, 1015, Lausanne, Switzerland

    Reza Reyhanitabar

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2013 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

About this paper

Cite this paper

Vaudenay, S. (2013). On Modeling Terrorist Frauds. In: Susilo, W., Reyhanitabar, R. (eds) Provable Security. ProvSec 2013. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 8209. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-41227-1_1

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-41227-1_1

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-41226-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-41227-1

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation