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International Conference on Security, Privacy, and Applied Cryptography Engineering

SPACE 2013: Security, Privacy, and Applied Cryptography Engineering pp 75–94Cite as

A Time Series Approach for Profiling Attack

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 8204))

Abstract

The goal of a profiling attack is to challenge the security of a cryptographic device in the worst case scenario. Though template attack is reputed as the strongest power analysis attack, they effectiveness is strongly dependent on the validity of the Gaussian assumption. This led recently to the appearance of nonparametric approaches, often based on machine learning strategies. Though these approaches outperform template attack, they tend to neglect the potential source of information available in the temporal dependencies between power values. In this paper, we propose an original multi-class profiling attack that takes into account the temporal dependence of power traces. The experimental study shows that the time series analysis approach is competitive and often better than static classification alternatives.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Quality and Security of Information Systems, Département d’informatique, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Belgium

    Liran Lerman & Olivier Markowitch

  2. Machine Learning Group, Département d’informatique, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Belgium

    Liran Lerman, Gianluca Bontempi & Souhaib Ben Taieb

Authors
  1. Liran Lerman
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  2. Gianluca Bontempi
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  3. Souhaib Ben Taieb
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  4. Olivier Markowitch
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. ESAT/SCD-COSIC, KU Leuven, Kasteelpark Arenberg 10, 3001, Heverlee, Belgium

    Benedikt Gierlichs

  2. COMELEC Department, Crypto Group (SEN), 46 rue Barrault, Institut MINES-TELECOM, TELECOM-ParisTech, CNRS LTCI, 75013, Paris, France

    Sylvain Guilley

  3. Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Indian Institute of Technology, 721302, Kharagpur, India

    Debdeep Mukhopadhyay

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Lerman, L., Bontempi, G., Ben Taieb, S., Markowitch, O. (2013). A Time Series Approach for Profiling Attack. In: Gierlichs, B., Guilley, S., Mukhopadhyay, D. (eds) Security, Privacy, and Applied Cryptography Engineering. SPACE 2013. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 8204. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-41224-0_7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-41224-0_7

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-41223-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-41224-0

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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