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Intermediaries, Trust and Efficiency of Communication: A Social Network Perspective

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Networked Governance, Transnational Business and the Law

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Abstract

Shinto Teramoto and Paulius Jurčys examine in their contribution Intermediaries, Trust and Efficiency of Communication: A Social Network Perspective how social network analysis might contribute to legal scholarship and discuss some key concepts used by proponents of this methodology. In particular, they discuss how the establishment of trust-based relationships facilitates the transfer of values and resources within the context of regulatory networks.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Hobbes (2004), p. 29.

  2. 2.

    Basedow (2000), pp. 2–4; Rodin-Hardy (2013), Chaps. 1 and 6; Easley and Kleinberg (2010), Chap. 1.

  3. 3.

    Gilroy (1993), pp. 41–99; Kobrin (2001); Wilkins (2001).

  4. 4.

    Kjaer et al. (2011).

  5. 5.

    A number of interdisciplinary studies have been carried out in order to explore the role of intermediaries OECD (2010); Seng (2012).

  6. 6.

    Gambetta (1993, 2009).

  7. 7.

    Posner (2012); Cooter and Ulen (2012); Landes and Posner (2003).

  8. 8.

    Although recent studies in the field of behavioural economics have shown the shortcomings of the assumption that humans behave rationally. See e.g. Sunstein (2000).

  9. 9.

    Holmes (1897), p. 459.

  10. 10.

    Cf. Miceli (2009), p. 3.

  11. 11.

    See e.g. Friedman (2000), Chap. 2; and Polinsky (2011).

  12. 12.

    See Bentham (1988) and Bentham (1996) where he refers to the “principle of utility” as well as “the greatest happiness principle”; see also Mill (1907).

  13. 13.

    See Coase (1937) and Coase (1960).

  14. 14.

    See Buccirossi (2008) or Dnes and Rowthorn (2005).

  15. 15.

    See e.g. a path-breaking contribution by North (1990).

  16. 16.

    Groenewegen et al. (2010), pp. 24–38.

  17. 17.

    See Williamson (1981); Williamson (1996); Williamson (2002) and Williamson (2010).

  18. 18.

    See Ostrom (2005) and Ostrom (2010).

  19. 19.

    Komesar (2001) and Komesar (1994).

  20. 20.

    Scott (2000); Watts (2004).

  21. 21.

    But see e.g. Teramoto (2010, 2012a, 2012b, 2012c).

  22. 22.

    For a more elaborate explanation see Easley and Kleinberg (2010), Chap. 1 who explain that game theory could be applied as a helpful mean in examining the relationship between actors.

  23. 23.

    Kadushin (2012), p. 18.

  24. 24.

    Lazarsfeld and Merton (1978).

  25. 25.

    For a recent exposition see Mattioli (2012), p. 103 et seq.; Branscomb (2004); Meurer (2008).

  26. 26.

    Kadushin (2012), p. 21.

  27. 27.

    Kadushin (2012), p. 22; Easley and Kleinberg (2010), Chap. 3.

  28. 28.

    Kadushin (2012), pp. 22–23.

  29. 29.

    The notion of “installation costs” was used by Bala and Goyal (2000).

  30. 30.

    Coleman (1988), pp. 95–97.

  31. 31.

    Ibid., p. 98.

  32. 32.

    See e.g. Coleman (1990); Dasgupta and Serageldin (2000); Dasgupta (2005); Bourdieu (1983); Bourdieu (1986).

  33. 33.

    See Coleman (1990); Dasgupta and Serageldin (2000); Dasgupta (2005); Williamson (1993).

  34. 34.

    See e.g. Gilroy (1993), pp. 138–161; Fink (2006) and Fairfax (2010).

  35. 35.

    See de Tocqueville (2004); Madison (1961). It is often indicated that the term “social capital” was firstly used in 1916 by Hanifan (1916).

  36. 36.

    Putnam et al. (1993), p. 167.

  37. 37.

    Bowles and Gintis (2002), p. F419.

  38. 38.

    Dasgupta (2005), p. 3.

  39. 39.

    Coleman (1988), pp. 101–105.

  40. 40.

    See three works of Niklas Luhmann: Luhmann (1979, 2000a, b).

  41. 41.

    Luhmann (1979), p. 6.

  42. 42.

    Jones (2001), p. 15917.

  43. 43.

    Luhmann (1979), p. 11–12.

  44. 44.

    Jones (1996).

  45. 45.

    Baier (1986).

  46. 46.

    Hardin (1998).

  47. 47.

    Luhmann (2000b), p. 95.

  48. 48.

    Luhmann (1979), pp. 19–21.

  49. 49.

    It could be noted that Luhmann did not place much emphasis on various possible forms of trust in his discussion; we aim to contribute to the discussion be introducing two forms of deemed and actual trust in Sect. 4 Building Actual Trust in Transnational Setting below and Sect. 5 The Role of Intermediaries below.

  50. 50.

    Luhmann (2000b), pp. 97–98.

  51. 51.

    Helliwell and Putnam (2000), pp. 253–268; and Putnam et al. (1993).

  52. 52.

    Putnam (2001); Putnam (2003).

  53. 53.

    Putnam (1995), p. 70.

  54. 54.

    Ostrom (1990).

  55. 55.

    See Gambetta (1993). Some scholars also have argued that in some cases the existing social capital may lead to social inequality and stratification; see Bourdieu (2010).

  56. 56.

    See Granovetter (1985).

  57. 57.

    See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, as revised by the Stockholm Revision Conference, 14 July 1967, 828 UNTS 303.

  58. 58.

    Patent Cooperation Treaty (“PCT”), 9 International Law Materials 978 (1970); Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 15 April 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C (1994) 33 International Law Materials 1197 as well as a number of regional instruments such as the Convention on the Grant of European Patents (European Patent Convention) of 5 October 1973 as revised by the Act revising Article 63 EPC of 17 December 1991 and the Act revising the EPC of 29 November 2000.

  59. 59.

    From 1,625,511 patent applications in 2010, only 166,456 come from blocs other than IP5; see IP5 Offices 2012.

  60. 60.

    Drahos (2010), pp. 153–154.

  61. 61.

    Ibid., p. 165.

  62. 62.

    See ibid., p. 177 and Chap. 6 for a more detailed exposition.

  63. 63.

    See ‘The 30th Anniversary: A Brief History of the Trilateral Cooperation’. http://trilateral.net/index/30anniversarybrochure.pdf. Accessed 30 July 2013.

  64. 64.

    See e.g. Arts. 184-3–184-20 of the Japanese Patent Act and Section 35 U.S.C. 371 which deal with applications under the PCT as well as provide for a starting legal basis for closed cooperation among the patent offices.

  65. 65.

    Drahos (2010), p. 160.

  66. 66.

    Ibid., pp. 172–173.

  67. 67.

    For a more thorough overview of so-called trans-governmental regulatory networks see Fenwick (2013).

  68. 68.

    Drahos (2010), pp. 160–161 and 174–175.

  69. 69.

    Fenwick (2013).

  70. 70.

    Wilson (2010).

  71. 71.

    According to the conventional understanding, intellectual property rights make sure that creators get compensated for their creative endeavours. In this regard, intellectual property rights facilitate creativity in the society and make sure that society can access the creative products. See Fisher (2001).

  72. 72.

    We would like to thank Mark Fenwick who suggested this notion.

  73. 73.

    Stiglitz (2010).

  74. 74.

    Mendoza (2009), pp. 286–287.

  75. 75.

    Ibid.

  76. 76.

    Grant (2007).

  77. 77.

    Kelleher (2007).

  78. 78.

    Nuttall (2006).

  79. 79.

    Blackwell (2009).

  80. 80.

    Bowers (2005).

  81. 81.

    http://londonstockexchange.com/companies-and-advisors/aim/advisers/aim-notices/aim-rules-for-companies-2007.pdf. Accessed 30 July 2013.

  82. 82.

    londonstockexchange.com/companies-and-advisors/aim/publications/aim-rules-for-nominated-advisers.pdf. Accessed 30 July 2013.

  83. 83.

    Luhmann (1979), p. 43 who similarly wonders how it is possible to make the processes of trust generation the object of norms.

  84. 84.

    Cf. Sztompka (2001), pp. 15922–15923.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Graduate School of Law, Kyushu University, 6-19-1 Hakozaki, Higashi-ku, Fukuoka, 812-8581, Japan

    Shinto Teramoto & Paulius Jurčys

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  1. Shinto Teramoto
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  1. Graduate School of Law, Kyushu University, Fukuoka, Japan

    Mark Fenwick

  2. Graduate School of Law, Kyushu University, Fukuoka, Japan

    Steven Van Uytsel

  3. Graduate School of Law, Kyushu University, Fukuoka, Japan

    Stefan Wrbka

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Teramoto, S., Jurčys, P. (2014). Intermediaries, Trust and Efficiency of Communication: A Social Network Perspective. In: Fenwick, M., Van Uytsel, S., Wrbka, S. (eds) Networked Governance, Transnational Business and the Law. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-41212-7_6

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