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Evolving Hierarchies in Transnational Financial Networked Governance: The Relationship Between the International Accounting Standards Board, the Financial Stability Board and the G-20

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Abstract

Karsten Nowrot focusses in his contribution, Evolving Hierarchies in Transnational Financial Networked Governance: The Relationship between the International Accounting Standards Board, the Financial Stability Board and the G-20, on the structural features of and in particular the interrelationships between a number of influential transnational steering networks in one notable segment of the international financial architecture, namely the international standard-setting activities in the realm of financial reporting; an area of economic and business law that is frequently and rightly considered to be of central importance for transnational business. Following an introductory discussion of the functions as well as limits of the network concept as an analytical tool for the description and conceptualization of transnational steering regimes in the international economic system, the main part of the contribution is devoted to an analysis of the recently emerging hierarchical relationships between three transboundary steering networks, the private International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), the intermediate Financial Stability Board (FSB) as well as the intergovernmental Group of 20 (G-20). On the basis of the findings made in this section, the final part is devoted to an evaluation of the underlying reasons for and motives behind the evolution of these hierarchical structures, prominently among them the efforts by state actors to establish—or rather re-establish—governmental steering capacity vis-à-vis the activities of private international standard-setting bodies, thereby providing, on the basis of mechanisms of public accountability, for a certain remedy to the legitimacy challenges these non-governmental networks are frequently confronted with.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See e.g. Tietje (2009), pp. 3 et seq. On the underlying sociological concept of the “international system” in general see for example Hoffmann (1961), pp. 207 et seq.; Bull (1977), pp. 9 et seq.

  2. 2.

    From the numerous contributions on this issue, see e.g. Delbrück (2001), pp. 1 et seq.; Higgins (1999), pp. 78 et seq.

  3. 3.

    Generally on the controversially discussed definition of international economic law see also, e.g., Herdegen (2013), pp. 3 et seq.; Aksar (2011), pp. 5 et seq.

  4. 4.

    This view is taken, e.g., by Schwarzenberger (1966), pp. 7 et seq.; VerLoren van Themaat (1981), pp. 9 et seq.

  5. 5.

    On this perception see for example Ortino and Ortino (2008), p. 89; as well as already Erler (1956), p. 16.

  6. 6.

    For a comprehensive analysis of this phenomenon, see e.g. De Ly (2001), pp. 159 et seq.; Kassis (1984), pp. 271 et seq.

  7. 7.

    Generally on the notion of ‘law-realization’ as being distinct from the considerably narrower term ‘law-enforcement’ see Tietje (2001), pp. 264 et seq., with further references.

  8. 8.

    See thereto especially Tietje (2002a), pp. 404 et seq.; for an overview see also Tietje and Nowrot (2004), pp. 341 et seq.

  9. 9.

    Tietje (2004), pp. 5 et seq.

  10. 10.

    See for example Brummer (2011), pp. 305 et seq.; Abbott and Snidal (2000), pp. 421 et seq.

  11. 11.

    See also already Calliess and Zumbansen (2010), pp. 11 et seq.; Tietje and Nowrot (2006), pp. 19 et seq.; Vesting (2004a), pp. 252 et seq.; Berman (2005), pp. 492 et seq.

  12. 12.

    Generally on the processes of globalization, see e.g. Delbrück (2001), pp. 1 et seq.; Tietje (2001), pp. 164 et seq., each with further references.

  13. 13.

    With regard to the increasing need for these kinds of cooperative regulatory efforts, see e.g. Delbrück (2004), pp. 32 et seq.; Reinisch (2001), pp. 271 et seq.; Sassen (2000), pp. 110 et seq.

  14. 14.

    On the previous understanding of foreign policy as an exclusive prerogative of the government as the head of the executive branch, see e.g. Cottier and Hertig (2003), pp. 265 et seq.

  15. 15.

    Concerning the transnational cooperation of administrative units see for example Tietje (2011a), pp. 21 et seq.; Möllers (2005a), pp. 351 et seq.; Raustiala (2002), pp. 17 et seq.

  16. 16.

    On this perception see especially Slaughter (2004), pp. 12 et seq.; Slaughter (2005), pp. 35 et seq.

  17. 17.

    On the Global Reporting Initiative see for example Nowrot (2009a), pp. 117 et seq.; Dingwerth (2007), pp. 99 et seq.

  18. 18.

    For a more detailed account of the International Air Transport Association, see e.g. Havel and Sanchez (2009), pp. 755 et seq., with further references.

  19. 19.

    For a more comprehensive analysis of this transnational steering regime see Tamm Hallström and Boström (2010), pp. 61 et seq.; Nowrot (2009b), pp. 705 et seq., with further references.

  20. 20.

    For this observation see already Tietje (2002b), p. 503.

  21. 21.

    On this perception see for example Petersmann (2012), p. 298 (‘Intergovernmental ‘networks’ […] have become one of the defining characteristics of multilevel economic governance.’). Generally on the emergence of networks as a new independent category of actors in the international economic system see also Nowrot (2009c), pp. 81 et seq., with numerous further references.

  22. 22.

    Nickel (2006), pp. 167 et seq.

  23. 23.

    On this perception see Peters (2006), p. 601 (‘currently en vogue in various disciplines’); as well as for example Ladeur (2011), p. 639; Eifert (2002), p. 90; Jansen (2006), p. 11.

  24. 24.

    See thereto for example Schweizer (2003), pp. 152 et seq.; Pappi (1987), p. 11; Weyer (2000), p. 1. Generally on the term and concept of scientific paradigms Kuhn (1996), pp. 43 et seq.

  25. 25.

    See e.g. Peters (2001), pp. 217 et seq.; Powell (1996), pp. 214 et seq.; Waschkuhn (2005), p. 22; Kappelhoff (2000), p. 25.

  26. 26.

    On this perception see for example Craig (2011), pp. 84 et seq.; Bignamini (2005), pp. 809 et seq.

  27. 27.

    Raustiala (2002), pp. 4 et seq.; Slaughter (2004), pp. 36 et seq.; Tietje (2011a), pp. 23 et seq.; Oeter (2011), pp. 239 et seq.

  28. 28.

    Ladeur (2009), pp. 1357 et seq.; Ladeur (1997), pp. 46 et seq.; Slaughter and Burke-White (2006), p. 337; Peters (2001), pp. 215 et seq.

  29. 29.

    See for example Tietje (2011b), pp. 8 and 10.

  30. 30.

    Slaughter (2004), pp. 65 et seq.; Slaughter (2000), pp. 204 et seq.

  31. 31.

    See thereto Teubner (2012), pp. 42 et seq., 158 et seq.; Teubner (2004), pp. 3 et seq.; Fischer-Lescano and Teubner (2004), pp. 1017 et seq.

  32. 32.

    Generally on the United Nations Global Compact, see e.g. Braun and Pies (2009), pp. 253 et seq.; Nowrot (2005), pp. 5 et seq., each with further references. Specifically on the characterization of this transnational regulatory regime as a network see for example Ruggie (2001), pp. 371 et seq.

  33. 33.

    For a more detailed description and analysis of the Forest Stewardship Council see Dingwerth (2007), pp. 144 et seq.; Nowrot (2009d), pp. 865 et seq.; Tamm Hallström and Boström (2010), pp. 44 et seq. On the qualification of this organization as a network, see e.g. Pattberg (2005), p. 185.

  34. 34.

    On the term and concept of the ‘international financial architecture’ see for example, e.g., Tietje (2011c), pp. 11 et seq., with numerous further references.

  35. 35.

    Generally on the characteristics and legal status of international governmental organizations see for example Crawford (2012), pp. 120 et seq., 166 et seq.

  36. 36.

    Generally on these developments see for example Norton (2010), pp. 263 et seq.; Tietje (2011c), pp. 18 et seq.; Buckley and Arner (2011), pp. 73 et seq.; Arner (2011a), pp. 241 et seq.; Brummer (2012), pp. 60 et seq.

  37. 37.

    On this perception see for example Eernisse (2012), p. 253 (‘TRNs [transnational regulatory networks] – including the FSB, BCBS, IOSCO, and IASB – have come to dominate the field of international financial law.’); Arner and Taylor (2009), p. 489 (‘Policy networks have been at the centre of the new forms of cooperation and coordination that nationally based regulatory agencies have used to adapt to the realities of the global financial system in the past thirty years, with international standard-setting bodies being at the core of their response.’). Generally on the network structures in the institutional regulatory framework of global financial markets see also, e.g., Levit (2005), pp. 182 et seq.; Alexander et al. (2006), pp. 34 et seq.; Marcussen (2006), pp. 180 et seq.; Zaring (2005), pp. 578 et seq.

  38. 38.

    See thereto, e.g., Rost (2009a), pp. 319 et seq.; Barr and Miller (2006), pp. 15 et seq.; Alexander et al. (2006), pp. 37 et seq.

  39. 39.

    On this non-governmental organization see for example Baker and Mathews (2009), pp. 377 et seq.; Alexander et al. (2006), pp. 61 et seq.; Brummer (2012), pp. 78 et seq.

  40. 40.

    For further details on this regulatory institution, see e.g. Alexander (2009), pp. 439 et seq.; Alexander et al. (2006), pp. 55 et seq.; Rost (2007), pp. 137 et seq.

  41. 41.

    Generally on the importance of international accounting standards for transboundary business activities see for example Sharma (2010), pp. 141 et seq.; Herdegen (2013), pp. 334 et seq.; Weber (2012), 164. Specifically on the role of accounting standards in the recent global financial crisis see Arner (2011b), pp. 1604 et seq.

  42. 42.

    See thereto, e.g., Krücken and Meier (2003), p. 75; Jansen (2006), p. 11; Peters (2006), p. 601; Ladeur (2011), p. 639; Eifert (2002), p. 90.

  43. 43.

    On the last mentioned observation see only Tietje (2011c), p. 33 (‘the network concept, which is already quite popular in international law’).

  44. 44.

    Nohria (1992), p. 3.

  45. 45.

    Compare for example Börzel (1998), pp. 253 et seq.; Marin and Mayntz (1991), pp. 11 et seq.; Röhrle (1994), p. 2; Weyer (2000), p. 1.

  46. 46.

    See e.g. von Bogdandy and Dann (2010), p. 890; Walter (2007), pp. 201 et seq.; Mager (2008), pp. 394 et seq.

  47. 47.

    Generally on this perception see already Möllers (2005b), pp. 285 et seq.; Schuppert (2012), § 16, paras. 134 et seq.; Vesting (2004b), p. 64; Nowrot (2007a), pp. 6 et seq.

  48. 48.

    See thereto, e.g., Kenis and Schneider (1991), p. 44; Chiti (2000), p. 330; Nowrot (2007a), pp. 9 et seq.; Poto (2007), p. 646.

  49. 49.

    Franzius (2006), p. 197.

  50. 50.

    See also for example already Ziller (2004), pp. 280 et seq.; Messner (2000), pp. 38 et seq.; Nowrot (2011), pp. 258 et seq.

  51. 51.

    Nowrot (2007b), pp. 124 et seq.

  52. 52.

    See for example Shaw and Wiener (2000), pp. 65 et seq.; Schmitter (1996), pp. 132 et seq.; Luhmann (1971), p. 14.

  53. 53.

    Teubner (2003), p. 46.

  54. 54.

    Schuppert (2012), § 16, para. 134 et seq.; Vesting (2004b), pp. 64 et seq.

  55. 55.

    See e.g. Schütze (2012), pp. 48 and 67; MacCormick (1999), p. 142; Dann (2006a), p. 55.

  56. 56.

    See thereto in particular von Bogdandy (2006), p. 10 (‘Yet this demand clashes with the very nature of legal thinking, which, at its heart, is comparative and dependent on the repertoire of established doctrines of viable institutions.’); Nowrot (2007a), pp. 17 et seq.; as well as generally also Alexy (2010), p. 18 (‘This more than suffices to qualify comparison as a third basic operation in law.’).

  57. 57.

    Generally on this approach see for example von Bogdandy (2010), pp. 735 et seq.; Nowrot (2007a), pp. 18 et seq., with further references.

  58. 58.

    Specifically on the ‘complexity inherent in network structures’ see for example Easley and Kleinberg (2010), p. 4.

  59. 59.

    Generally thereto, e.g., Raustiala (2002), p. 5; Vesting (2004a), pp. 259 et seq.; Kadushin (2012), pp. 14 et seq.; Möllers (2006), p. 331; Verdier (2009), pp. 117 et seq.

  60. 60.

    See for example Witte et al. (2000), pp. 179 and 184.

  61. 61.

    On this perception see also, e.g., Warning (2006), pp. 322 et seq.; Möllers (2005a), p. 371.

  62. 62.

    See thereto Nowrot (2005), pp. 18 et seq.; Nowrot (2007a), pp. 19 et seq.; Nowrot (2011), pp. 260 et seq.

  63. 63.

    See The G20 Los Cabos Summit Leaders’ Declaration, 19 June 2012, para. 43, available on the Internet under http://www.g20.org/documents. Accessed 30 July 2013.

  64. 64.

    See IFRS Foundation Constitution, para. 1, last updated December 2010, available on the Internet under: http://www.ifrs.org/The-organisation/Governance-and-accountability/Constitution/Documents/ConstitutionDec2010.pdf. Accessed 30 July 2013.

  65. 65.

    On the origins and development of the IASC and the IASB see for example Rost (2009b), pp. 366 et seq.; Tamm Hallström (2004), pp. 75 et seq.

  66. 66.

    See IFRS Foundation Constitution, paras. 24 et seq., last updated December 2010, available on the Internet under: http://www.ifrs.org/The-organisation/Governance-and-accountability/Constitution/Documents/ConstitutionDec2010.pdf. Accessed 30 July 2013.

  67. 67.

    On the qualification of the IASB as a network see e.g. Pan (2010), p. 262; Zaring (2012), p. 699; Eernisse (2012), p. 253.

  68. 68.

    For the current version of the IFRS of 1 January 2012, see the information available on the Internet under http://www.ifrs.org/IFRSs/Pages/IFRS.aspx. Accessed 30 July 2013.

  69. 69.

    See Richardson and Eberlein (2011), p. 220.

  70. 70.

    See on this issue for example Huber (2008), pp. 390 et seq.; Richardson and Eberlein (2011), pp. 217 et seq.

  71. 71.

    On these concerns and challenges, see e.g. Bradley (2011), pp. 480 et seq.; Arner and Taylor (2009), p. 494; Ruddigkeit (2011), pp. 18 et seq.; Richardson and Eberlein (2011), pp. 217 et seq.; Jordan (2011), pp. 333 et seq.; Huber (2008), pp. 390 et seq.

  72. 72.

    See IFRS Foundation Constitution, paras. 34 et seq., last updated December 2010, available on the Internet under: http://www.ifrs.org/The-organisation/Governance-and-accountability/Constitution/Documents/ConstitutionDec2010.pdf. Accessed 30 July 2013; see also, e.g., Rost (2007), pp. 177 et seq.; Richardson and Eberlein (2011), pp. 224 et seq.

  73. 73.

    For details on the DPOC see the information available on the Internet under http://www.ifrs.org/DPOC/Pages/DPOC.aspx. Accessed 30 July 2013. See also more recently, e.g., Report of the Due Process Oversight Committee Meeting of 22 January 2013, available on the Internet under http://www.ifrs.org/Alerts/Governance/Documents/2013/DPOC-Report-January-2013.pdf. Accessed 30 July 2013.

  74. 74.

    See thereto Memorandum of Understanding to Strengthen the Institutional Framework of the International Accounting Standards Committee Foundation, 1 April 2009, available on the Internet under http://www.ifrs.org/The-organisation/Governance-and-accountability/Documents/Monitoring_Board_Mou080110.pdf. Accessed 30 July 2013; and the Charter of the IASCF Monitoring Board, 1 April 2009, available on the Internet under http://www.ifrs.org/The-organisation/Governance-and-accountability/Documents/Monitoring_Board_Charter.pdf. Accessed 30 July 2013.

  75. 75.

    See IFRS Foundation Constitution, para. 21, last updated December 2010, available on the Internet under http://www.ifrs.org/The-organisation/Governance-and-accountability/Constitution/Documents/ConstitutionDec2010.pdf. Accessed 30 July 2013.

  76. 76.

    Ibid., para. 18. On the comparable governance structures in U.S. accounting standardization see e.g. Mattli and Büthe (2005), pp. 237 et seq.

  77. 77.

    Concerning the characterization of the FSB as a transnational governance network see for example Pan (2010), p. 253; Catá Backer (2011), p. 797; Eernisse (2012), p. 253; Zaring (2010), p. 486.

  78. 78.

    See Declaration on Strengthening the Financial System, G-20 London Summit, 2 April 2009, available on the Internet under http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/g20_summit/2009-1/annex2.html. Accessed 30 July 2013.

  79. 79.

    On the origins and development of the FSF and the FSB see for example Carrasco (2010), pp. 203 et seq.; Porter (2009), pp. 345 et seq.; Manger-Nestler (2011), pp. 187 et seq., 215 et seq.; Ruddigkeit (2011), pp. 5 et seq.

  80. 80.

    See Articles of Association of the Financial Stability Board of 28 January 2013, available on the Internet under http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_130128aoa.pdf. Accessed 30 July 2013. See thereto also The G20 Los Cabos Summit Leaders’ Declaration, 19 June 2012, para. 46, available on the Internet under http://www.g20.org/documents/. Accessed 30 July 2013. (‘We endorse the recommendations and the revised FSB Charter for placing the FSB on an enduring organizational footing, with legal personality, strengthened governance, greater financial autonomy and enhanced capacity to coordinate the development and implementation of financial regulatory policies, while maintaining strong links with the BIS. […].’); as well as Communiqué of Ministers of Finance and Central Bank Governors of the G20, Mexico City, 4–5 November 2012, para. 18, available on the Internet under http://www.g20.org/documents/. Accessed 30 July 2013. (‘We welcome the FSB’s progress in implementing the measures endorsed at Los Cabos to strengthen its capacity, resources and governance. We look forward to its establishment as a legal entity by our next meeting and its full implementation by September 2013. […].’).

  81. 81.

    Charter of the Financial Stability Board, last amended on 19 June 2012, Annex A, available on the Internet under http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_120809.pdf. Accessed 30 July 2013.

  82. 82.

    For a complete list of current FSB members see Charter of the Financial Stability Board, last amended on 19 June 2012, Annex A, available on the Internet under http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_120809.pdf. Accessed 30 July 2013.

  83. 83.

    On this perception see e.g. Tietje (2011c), p. 38; Manger-Nestler (2011), p. 169; as well as the contributions in Griffith-Jones et al. (2010).

  84. 84.

    See Article 1 of the Charter of the Financial Stability Board, last amended on 19 June 2012, available on the Internet under http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_120809.pdf. Accessed 30 July 2013.

  85. 85.

    On the distinction between agenda-setters and mere standard-setters in the international financial architecture see Brummer (2012), pp. 67 et seq.; Brummer (2011), pp. 275 et seq.

  86. 86.

    On this observation see also already Catá Backer (2011), pp. 784 et seq.; Ruddigkeit (2011), pp. 17 et seq.; as well as, albeit more cautious, Helleiner (2010), pp. 13 et seq.

  87. 87.

    See Catá Backer (2011), p. 793 (‘The FSB assumes the role of a bridge institution.’); Ruddigkeit (2011), pp. 23 et seq. From a broader perspective see also Farrar and Parsons (2012), p. 386 (‘It [the FSB] has been positioned by the G20 to be at the centre of both international and national dialogue, and it provides a point of connection for governments and international bodies of experts […] as well as institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank.’).

  88. 88.

    On the qualification of the Group of Twenty as a governance network see for example Wouters and Ramopoulos (2012), p. 764; Lovett (2011), p. 49.

  89. 89.

    See in this connection for example Arner (2011b), p. 1594 (‘The FSB can therefore be seen as the central organization responsible for coordinating detailed development of the G-20 international regulatory reform agenda and also for monitoring its implementation.’); Ruddigkeit (2011), pp. 21; Zaring (2012), p. 698 (‘the reporter to the G20 and the enforcer of its schedule’).

  90. 90.

    On the origins and development of the G-7 (now G-8) starting from the so-called “Library Group” of 1973, see e.g. Brouder (2009), pp. 95 et seq., with numerous further references.

  91. 91.

    For a more detailed account of the emergence and subsequent activities of the G-20 see Norton (2010), pp. 275 et seq.; Wouters and Ramopoulos (2012), pp. 763 et seq.; Manger-Nestler (2011), pp. 212 et seq.; Eernisse (2012), pp. 241 et seq.

  92. 92.

    See thereto Brouder (2009), p. 114.

  93. 93.

    G-20 Leaders‘ Statement, The Pittsburgh Summit, 24–25 September 2009, para. 50, available on the Internet under http://www.g20.org/documents/. Accessed 30 July 2013.

  94. 94.

    On this perception see e.g. Tietje (2011c), p. 31.

  95. 95.

    Arner and Buckley (2010), p. 24.

  96. 96.

    Napolitano (2011), p. 316; see also, e.g., Farrar and Parsons (2012), p. 386 (‘the lead player in the international conversation during and in the aftermath of the GFC [global financial crisis]’); Brummer (2012), p. 70 (‘perhaps today’s most visible body for international economic coordination’).

  97. 97.

    Wouters and Ramopoulos (2012), p. 764; in this connection see also for example the observations made by Manger-Nestler (2011), p. 214 (‘Since the beginning of the crisis, the G20 has impressively demonstrated that this forum has the ability to act quickly and unconventionally and to develop ‘global’ solutions, […].’); and Napolitano (2011), p. 316 (‘The establishment of the G-20 as the ‘premier forum of economic global governance’ was fundamental in transfusing new blood into multilateralism, overcoming the limits to the authority and legitimacy of the Group of Seven (G-7) industrialized countries.’).

  98. 98.

    Moravcsik (2005), p. 212.

  99. 99.

    Generally thereto for example Delbrück (2003), pp. 29 et seq.; Krisch (2006), pp. 247 et seq., each with further references.

  100. 100.

    Picciotto (1996/1997), p. 1047; see also, e.g., Möllers (2005a), p. 380.

  101. 101.

    For a more comprehensive assessment see for example Slaughter (2004), pp. 217 et seq.; Möllers (2005a), pp. 378 et seq.; Cashore (2002), pp. 515 et seq.; Hamann and Ruiz Fabri (2008), pp. 481 et seq., each with further references.

  102. 102.

    For such an approach see for example Böckenförde (2004), § 24, paras. 9 et seq.

  103. 103.

    On this perception see e.g. Kingsbury et al. (2005), pp. 48 et seq.; Delbrück (2003), p. 30.

  104. 104.

    Scharpf (1972), pp. 21 et seq.

  105. 105.

    See for example Held (1995), pp. 221 et seq.

  106. 106.

    See thereto for example Zürn and Leibfried (2005), p. 22; Delbrück (2003), p. 40; Peters (2001), pp. 750 et seq.

  107. 107.

    See e.g. Peters (2001), pp. 580 et seq.

  108. 108.

    On this perception see for example Krisch (2006), pp. 247 et seq.; Schliesky (2004), pp. 588 et seq.

  109. 109.

    See e.g. Trute (2012), § 6, paras. 56 et seq.; Schliesky (2004), p. 719.

  110. 110.

    Schliesky (2004), p. 719.

  111. 111.

    On this perception see e.g. Schuppert (2003), p. 416; Trute (2012), § 6, para. 53; Schliesky (2004), p. 691.

  112. 112.

    See e.g. Krisch (2006), pp. 247 et seq.; Cassese (2005), pp. 688 et seq.; Delbrück (2003), pp. 40 et seq.; Charnovitz (2012), pp. 218 et seq.

  113. 113.

    See also, in particular with regard to the function of the FSB, Catá Backer (2011), pp. 783 et seq.; Ruddigkeit (2011), pp. 20 et seq.; Brummer (2012), pp. 192 et seq.

  114. 114.

    See e.g. Richardson and Eberlein (2011), pp. 217 et seq.; Mattli and Büthe (2005), pp. 225 et seq.; Huber (2008), pp. 390 et seq.

  115. 115.

    On this perception see also already Pan (2010), p. 283; Tietje (2011c), pp. 40 and 43; as well as for example Manger-Nestler (2011), p. 186 (“The ‘groups’ are gubernative committees, […].”), p. 198 (‘informal ‘gubernative’ formations, like the G20’); p. 202 (‘At present, the G20 represents gubernative structures of a global financial regulatory framework, […].’); Wouters and Ramopoulos (2012), p. 764 (‘overtly political – rather than technocratic – imperatives at the top of the international system of economic governance’).

  116. 116.

    See also for example Dann (2006b), p. 2 note 1 (‘The notion of the “gubernative” is not very common, but captures more precisely than the notions of “executive”, “government” or “administration” what is meant here. The notion is based on the distinction between the politically responsible leadership of the executive branch (the gubernative) and the hierarchically subordinated administration or bureaucracy. Both together form the executive branch. The term “government”, which is often used to name the political pinnacle of the executive branch, is too vague, since it can also mean all branches of government and the process of governing.’). For a more detailed account on the gubernative and the distinction between gubernative and administrative structures, see e.g. von Bogdandy (2000), pp. 107 et seq.; Tietje (2001), pp. 188 et seq., each with further references.

  117. 117.

    For a rather critical evaluation of the G-20 in this regard see in particular Charnovitz (2012), p. 218 et seq.; as well as for example Manger-Nestler (2011), pp. 214 et seq.

  118. 118.

    See in this connection for example on the proposal to establish a “Global Economic Coordination Council” brought forward by the Stiglitz Commission in September 2009, Report of the Commission of Experts of the President of the United Nations General Assembly on Reforms of the International Monetary and Financial System, 21 September 2009, paras. 21 et seq., available on the Internet under http://www.un.org/ga/econcrisissummit/docs/FinalReport_CoE.pdf. Accessed 30 July 2013.

  119. 119.

    Concerning the legitimacy of the G-20 and other so-called “G-Groups” see for example Brouder (2009), pp. 104 et seq.; Tietje (2011c), p. 43; Napolitano (2011), pp. 315 et seq.

  120. 120.

    On this perception see also in particular already Tietje (2011c), pp. 31 et seq., 43 et seq.

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Correspondence to Karsten Nowrot .

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Nowrot, K. (2014). Evolving Hierarchies in Transnational Financial Networked Governance: The Relationship Between the International Accounting Standards Board, the Financial Stability Board and the G-20. In: Fenwick, M., Van Uytsel, S., Wrbka, S. (eds) Networked Governance, Transnational Business and the Law. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-41212-7_11

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