Abstract
This paper tackles some conceptual problems in the epistemic foundations of classical game theory. Focus is placed on the discussions of the asymmetry of different epistemic standpoints in modeling a game and the thesis of no subjective probability for self-action in games.
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Liu, Y. (2013). A Note on Bayesian Games. In: Grossi, D., Roy, O., Huang, H. (eds) Logic, Rationality, and Interaction. LORI 2013. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 8196. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-40948-6_27
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-40948-6_27
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-40947-9
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-40948-6
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