20 Years After Marrakesh: Reconsidering the Effects of Preferential Rules of Origin and Anti-Circumvention Rules on Trade in Inputs and Global Production Networks

Puccio, Laura

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-40913-4_8

Laura Puccio⁷

Part of the book series: European Yearbook of International Economic Law ((EUROYEAR,volume 5))

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Abstract

In a world of increasing globalisation and liberalisation, production and value chains become global with inputs sourced from all over the world and production processes being scattered across countries. This tendency renders more difficult the definition of origin of a good. However, being trade liberalisation still far from non-discriminatory, the concept of origin becomes cardinal for the granting of benefits, as well as for sanctioning unfair trade practices. Globalisation has therefore brought forward a multiplication of varieties of domestic contents regulations imposed by States or groups of States (in bilateral or regional regimes) in order to discriminate between the goods receiving benefits and those whose exports are subject to trade remedies. We are going to consider here two regimes that involve, inter alia, the use of domestic content rules, preferential trade regimes and their preferential rules of origin regimes, and anti-dumping circumvention rules. Very few authors (if none) have treated jointly the question of WTO regulation of preferential rules of origin and anti-circumvention rules. However, both regulations, albeit being different and occurring in different contexts, have similarities in their objectives and in the challenges they create to the WTO legal system. Through the analysis of preferential rules of origin and anti-dumping circumvention measures, the article’s main objective is also to have a broader reflection on the concept of circumvention at large and its discipline within the WTO system.

The current article is partly inspired from reflections included in the author’s PhD thesis. Puccio, Building Bridges between Regionalism and Multilateralism: enquiries on the ways and means to regulate preferential rules of origin and their impact on the systemic problems of FTA, EUI PhD thesis (Cadmus repository), 2013.

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Notes

1.
See WTO Panel, WT/DS339/R/WT/DS340/R, China-Measures Affecting Imports of Automobile Parts and Add.1 and Add.2, paras. 7.332-7.334; see also the definition found in the Glossary of Terms: ‘Getting around commitments in the WTO such as commitments to limit agricultural export subsidies. Includes: avoiding quotas and other restrictions by altering the country of origin of a product; measures taken by exporters to evade anti-dumping or countervailing duties.’ http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/glossary_e/circumvention_e.htm.
2.
On an extensive elaboration of the costs of trade deflection, see Jakob/Fiebiger, Preferential rules of origin – a conceptual outline, Intereconomics 38 (2003) 3, p. 138–146.
3.
See, in particular, the examples given on EC non-preferential rules and GSP rules in Vermulst/Dracko, Rules of origin in the European Union: Practical Aspects, in: Vermulst/Graasfma (eds), Customs and trade laws as tools of protection – selected essays, 2005, p. 145–146; on differences across rules: Vermulst, Rules of origin as commercial policy instruments – revisited, in: Vermulst/Graasfma (eds), Customs and trade laws as tools of protection – selected essays, 2005; Vermulst, Rules of origin as commercial policy instruments – the swan song of à la Carte Justice, in: Vermulst/Graasfma (eds), Customs and trade laws as tools of protection – selected essays, 2005; Inama, Rules of Origin in International Trade, 2009.
4.
Often, the second definition of substantial transformation consists of an exception introduced for textile and apparel goods. See the example of US agreements given below.
5.
EAC has a single rule. UEMOA, ECOWAS, and COMESA have a single rule with list of exceptions.
6.
US–Israel, US–Jordan, and US–Egypt have a single rule with exception for textile and apparel goods. US–Morocco, US–Oman, and US–Bahrain have a single rule, plus a limited list of product-specific exceptions.
7.
All goods are indeed classified in tariff classifications in order to determine the duties to apply to them. Tariff classifications are in many countries (and at least in WTO countries) based on the Harmonised System of Classification of Goods and National Tariff Lines, often called HS. The HS classifies goods under chapter, HS 2-digit level; heading, HS 4-digit level; and subheading, HS 6-digit level; beyond the 6-digit level, we have item levels, which differ across countries. The level of the change required in rules of origin might be the chapter, heading, or subheading level (sometimes even item level, even though it is rather rare).
8.
We insist on the fact that all the types of rules function in similar fashion as there has been a tendency to over-focus attention on value added, and in particular economic literature has overlooked protectionism from change of classification rules, while change of classification that requires local physical content can also be particularly problematic. This is an aspect on which I would like to focus.
9.
Originally mentioned by Palmeter. See Palmeter, Rules of Origin in Regional Trade Agreements, in: Demaret/Bellis/Garcià Jimenez (eds.), Regionalism and Multilateralism after the Uruguay Round – Convergence, Divergence and Interaction, 1997.
10.
Rule requires both a change of heading and that all non-originating materials do not exceed 40% of the ex-price value. Alternatively, the rule requires that non-originating materials do not exceed 25% of the ex-price value of the product.
11.
Herin, Rules of origin and differences between tariff levels in EFTA and EC, Occasional Paper No 13, 1986, Geneva: EFTA Secretariat for Economic Affairs Department.
12.
In European agreements, the main rule for electronic circuit under HS 8542 requires, aside from non-originating materials not exceeding 40% of the ex-price value, that all non-originating materials from HS 8542 and HS 8541 (diodes, transistors…) do not exceed 10% of the ex-price value of the product. See, for example: Protocol 4 of the EEA agreement or Appendix 2 to Decision No 2/2000 of the EC-Mexico Joint Council of 23 March 2000, OJ 2000L 157.
13.
As well as from other rules, such as cumulation rules.
14.
This was first analysed in economics in Grossman, The theory of domestic content and content preference, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 96 (1981) 4, p. 583–603. Recent case law of the WTO facing domestic contents in investment promotion programmes has reached this same conclusion. See India-Autos and Indonesia-Autos.
15.
Rodriguez, Rules of origin with Multistage Production, World Economy 24 (2001) 4.
16.
Panagariya, Regionalism in Trade Policy: essays on preferential trading, 1999, pp. 15–16.
17.
Panagariya does not only refer to transport costs but also considers that indirect trade deflection transforming de facto the FTA into a CU would be able to minimise diversion. He does not mention transport costs as those are often assumed in classical theory to be low and negligible. Panagariya, Regionalism in Trade Policy: essays on preferential trading, 1999, pp. 15–16.
18.
Panagariya, Regionalism in Trade Policy: essays on preferential trading, 1999; Krishna, Understanding Rules of Origin, in: Cadot/Estevadeordal/Suwa-Eisenmann/Verdier (eds.), The Origin of Goods – Rules of Origin in Regional Trade Agreements, 2006; see also: Falvey/Reed, Economics effects of rules of origin, Review of world economics 134 (1998) 2, pp. 209–229.
19.
Panagariya, Regionalism in Trade Policy: essays on preferential trading, 1999, pp. 15–16.
20.
Panagariya, Regionalism in Trade Policy: essays on preferential trading, 1999, pp. 15–16.
21.
Estevadeordal/Suominen, Gatekeepers of global commerce – rules of origin and international economic integration, 2008.
22.
Bhagwati, Termites in the trading system: how preferential agreements undermine free trade, 2008, pp. 61–70.
23.
Krueger, Free Trade Agreements as Protectionist Devices: Rules of Origin, in: Pomfret (ed.), Economic Analysis of Regional Trading Arrangements, 2003; Ju/Krishna, Firm Behaviour and Market Access in a FTA with rules of origin, Canadian Journal of Economics 38 (2005) 1, pp. 290–308; Panagariya, Regionalism in Trade Policy: essays on preferential trading, 1999, pp. 15–16; Chase, Economic Interests and Regional Trading Arrangements: the case of NAFTA, International Organisation 57 (2003) 1; Chase, Protecting Free Trade: The Political Economy of Rules of Origin, International Organisation 62 (2008) 3.
24.
Hirsh, International trade law, political economy and rules of origin – a plea for a reform of the WTO regime on rules of origin, Journal of World Trade 36 (2002) 2.
25.
Destler, Rules of origin and US trade policy, in: Cadot/Estevadeordal/Suwa-Eisenmann/Verdier (eds), The Origin of Goods – Rules of Origin in Regional Trade Agreements, 2006.
26.
Krueger, Free Trade Agreements as Protectionist Devices: Rules of Origin, in: Pomfret (ed.), Economic Analysis of Regional Trading Arrangements, 2003; see also Flatters’ literature on SADC to see how rules of origin may be used as barriers to preferential trade within the area: Flatters, Rules of origin and AGOA: hard choices for textile and clothing in SADC, 2002; Erasmus/Flatters, Rent-seeking in SADC Trade Liberalisation: Rules of origin and other barriers to trade in wheat products, 2003; Brenton/Flatters/Kalenga, Rules of origin and SADC – The case for change in mid term review of the Trade protocol, Africa Region Working Paper Series (2005) 83.
27.
See, for example, India, Brazil, Argentina, China and SACU. Brazil cases: http://www.mdic.gov.br/sitio/interna/noticia.php?area=1&noticia=10047; http://www.baptista.com.br/news/Texto.aspx?Texto=613; http://antidumping.vn/news/2011-11-06/brazil-%E2%80%93-footwear-suspected-circumvention-antidumping-measures; India: http://www.lakshmisri.com/News-and-Publications/Archives/Publication/India-tightens-anti-dumping-law-Anti-circumvention-rules-introduced; Argentina: http://www.globaltradealert.org/measure/argentina-determination-circumvention-antidumping-duties-applied-certain-type-footwear-china; see also: Nakagawa, Antidumping Laws and Practices of the New Users, 2007. Australia has also new rules on anti-circumvention (Section 269ZDBC of the Customs Act 1901).
28.
Wu, Anti-dumping Law and Practice of China, 2009, pp. 270–271.
29.
On the different positions held, see, inter alia: Vermulst/Waer, Anti-diversion rules in anti-dumping procedures: interface or short circuit for the management of interdependence?, in: Vermulst/Graafsma (eds), Customs and Trade Laws as Tools of Protection: Selected Essays, 2005.
30.
Van Bael/Bellis, Anti-Dumping and Other Protection Laws of the EC, 2011.
31.
Main literature: Van Bael/Bellis, Anti-Dumping and Other Protection Laws of the EC, 2011; Vermulst/Waer, EC Antidumping Law and Practice, 1996; Vermulst/Waer, Anti-diversion rules in anti-dumping procedures: interface or short circuit for the management of interdependence?, in: Vermulst/Graafsma (eds.), Customs and Trade Laws as Tools of Protection: Selected Essays, 2005 (reprint 2007); Ostoni, Anti-dumping Circumvention in the EU and the US: is there a future for Multilateral Provisions under the WTO, Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law 10 (2005) 2; Yu, Circumvention and anti-circumvention in anti-dumping practice: a new problem in China’s outbound trade, Journal of World Trade 41 (2007) 5.
32.
See, argumentation of the EU in GATT Panel, L/6657 - 37S/132, EEC – Regulation on imports of parts and components, para. 3.73.
33.
This is also the main focus of the book by Yu (the author had access only to the small overview given on Google E-Book): Yu, Circumvention and Anti-circumvention Measures – the Impact on Anti-dumping Practice in International Trade, 2008.
34.
GATT Panel, L/6657, EEC – Regulation on Imports of Parts and Components, BISD 37S/132.
35.
ECJ, C-49/76, Gesellschaft für Überseehandel MBH v. Handelskammer Hamburg, [1977] ECR, 00041, paras. 5–6.
36.
ECJ, C-26/88, Brother International GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Gießen, [1989] ECR, 04253.
37.
ECJ, C-26/88, Brother International GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Gießen, [1989] ECR, 04253, para. 8.
38.
Council Regulation (EC) No. 1225/2009 of November 2009 on the protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the EU, [2009] OJ L 343/51.
39.
Article 13(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1225/2009 of November 2009 on the protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the EU, [2009] OJ L 343/51.
40.
Article 13 (2) of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1225/2009 of November 2009 on the protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the EU, [2009] OJ L 343/51.
41.
Article 13 (2) of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1225/2009 of November 2009 on the protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the EU, [2009] OJ L 343/51.
42.
Globe Metallurgical Inc. v. United States, 722 Fed. Supp. 2nd 1372 (CIT, 2010).
43.
See: Globe Metallurgical Inc. v. United States, 722 Fed. Supp. 2nd 1372 (CIT, 2010); Peer Bearing Company-Changshan v. United States, 884 F. Supp.2d 1313 (CIT 2012).
44.
Peer Bearing Company-Changshan v. United States, 884 F. Supp.2d 1313 (CIT 2012).
45.
Nitta Industries Corps v. United States, 997 F. 2d 1459, 1464 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
46.
Smith Corona Corp. v. United States, 915 F. 2d 863, 687 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
47.
Ericsson GE Mobile Communications, Inc. v. United States, 60 F.3d 778, 782 (Fed.Cir.1995).
48.
Ericsson GE Mobile Communications, Inc. v. United States, 60 F.3d 778, 782 (Fed.Cir.1995); Smith Corona Corp. v. United States, 915 F.2d 683, 686 (Fed.Cir.1990).
49.
Wheatland Tube Co. v. United States, 161 F3d 1365, 1370 (Fed.Cir.1998): To conduct a minor alterations inquiry, Commerce would have had to conclude that section 1677j(c) and section 353.29 of the regulations authorise it to interpret the scope of an anti-dumping order to cover an Article that the order expressly and unambiguously excludes from the kind or class of Article covered by it. The Final Scope Determination shows that Commerce was aware of the limitations on its authority to interpret the scope of an order. See 61 Fed.Reg. at 11,612. Although Commerce “enjoys substantial freedom to interpret and clarify its antidumping duty orders”, it can neither “change them,” Ericsson GE Mobile Communications, Inc. v. United States, 60 F.3d 778, 782 (Fed.Cir.1995), nor interpret them “in a way contrary to [their] terms”, Smith Corona Corp. v. United States, 915 F.2d 683, 686 (Fed.Cir.1990). See also Alsthom Atlantique v. United States, 787 F.2d 565, 571 (Fed.Cir.1986) (The International Trade Administration “cannot change the scope of an underlying anti-dumping determination [to exclude an Article] when Treasury has specifically included [that] Article within the scope of its underlying determination” (emphasis in original)).’
50.
Wheatland Tube Co. v. United States, 161 F3d 1365, 1370 (Fed.Cir.1998).
51.
Target Corporation USA v. United States, 609 F. 3d 1352 (June 21, 2010).
52.
Target Corporation USA v. United States, 609 F. 3d 1352 (June 21, 2010).
53.
Target Corporation USA v. United States, 609 F. 3d 1352 (June 21, 2010).
54.
Article 13 (2) of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1225/2009 of November 2009 on the protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the EU, [2009] OJ L 343/51.
55.
Article 13 (2) of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1225/2009 of November 2009 on the protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the EU, [2009] OJ L 343/51.
56.
Peer Bearing Company-Changshan v. United States, 884 F. Supp.2d 1313 (CIT 2012), Dec. 21, 2012.
57.
See the case: WTO Panel, WT/DS108/R, United-States – Tax treatment for Foreign Sales Corporation, as modified by WTO Appellate Body, WT/DS108/AB/R, DSR 2000:IV, 1675, paras. 7.134-7.143.
58.
WTO Panel, WT/DS243/R and corr.1, United States – Rules of Origin for Textiles and Apparel Products, DSR 2003:VI, 2309.
59.
GATT Panel, L/6657, EEC – Regulation on Imports of Parts and Components, BISD 37S/132.
60.
GATT Panel, L/6657, EEC – Regulation on Imports of Parts and Components, BISD 37S/132, paras. 3.56-3.100 (for EEC and Japan position) and paras. 5.12-5.24 (for the panel analysis).
61.
WTO Panel, WT/DS339/R/WT/DS340/R and Add.1 and Add.2, China-Measures Affecting Imports of Automobile Parts, upheld (WT/DS339/R) and as modified (WT/DS340/R/WT/DS342/R) by WTO Appellate Body, WT/DS339/AB/R/WT/DS340/AB/R/WT/DS342/AB/R, DSR 2009:I, 119-DSR 2009:II, 625. For a more detailed analysis of the case, see Wauters/Van den Bussche, China-Measures Affecting Imports of Automobile Parts, in: Horn/Mavroidis (eds.), WTO Case-Law of 2008, 2010.
62.
WTO Panel, WT/DS339/R/WT/DS340/R and Add.1 and Add.2, China-Measures Affecting Imports of Automobile Parts, upheld (WT/DS339/R) and as modified (WT/DS340/R/WT/DS342/R) by WTO Appellate Body, WT/DS339/AB/R/WT/DS340/AB/R/WT/DS342/AB/R, DSR 2009:I, 119-DSR 2009:II, 625, paras. 7.482-7.507.
63.
WTO Panel, WT/DS339/R/WT/DS340/R and Add.1 and Add.2, China-Measures Affecting Imports of Automobile Parts, upheld (WT/DS339/R) and as modified (WT/DS340/R/WT/DS342/R) by WTO Appellate Body, WT/DS339/AB/R/WT/DS340/AB/R/WT/DS342/AB/R, DSR 2009:I, 119-DSR 2009:II, 625, para. 7.498.
64.
WTO Panel, WT/DS339/R/WT/DS340/R and Add.1 and Add.2, China-Measures Affecting Imports of Automobile Parts, upheld (WT/DS339/R) and as modified (WT/DS340/R/WT/DS342/R) by WTO Appellate Body, WT/DS339/AB/R/WT/DS340/AB/R/WT/DS342/AB/R, DSR 2009:I, 119-DSR 2009:II, 625, para. 7.499.
65.
GATT Panel, L/6657, EEC – Regulation on Imports of Parts and Components, BISD 37S/132, para. 5.17.
66.
In the EU, the administration can however make some adjustments if needed. Article 13 (2) of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1225/2009 of November 2009 on the protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the EU, [2009] OJ L 343/51.
67.
Mavroidis/Bermann/Wu, The Law of the World Trade Organization (WTO) – Documents, Cases & Analysis, 2010, p. 441-442; Wolfrum/Stoll/Koebele, WTO – Trade Remedies, 2008, p. 246-249.
68.
Article 1 of the Agreement on Rules of Origin would foresee application of the harmonised non-preferential rules of origin to anti-dumping proceedings. However, as we explained earlier in this article, non-preferential rules of origin cannot deal with discriminatory objective. For this reason, delegations have asked not to apply the harmonised non-preferential rules to anti-dumping.
69.
ECJ, C-114/78, Yoshida GmbH v. Industrie-und Handelskammer Kassel, [1979] ECR, 00151, para. 12.
70.
WTO Panel, WT/DS243/R and corr.1, United States – Rules of Origin for Textiles and Apparel Products, DSR 2003:VI, 2309.
71.
‘Turkey could adopt rules of origin for textile and clothing products that would allow the European Communities to distinguish between those textile and clothing products originating in Turkey, which would enjoy free access to the European Communities under the terms of the customs union, and those textile and clothing products originating in third countries, including India’, WTO Appellate Body, WT/DS34/AB/R, Turkey – Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products, DSR 1999:IV, 2345, para. 62.
72.
Kim, The Evolution of Preferential Rules of Origin in ASEAN’s RTAs: a Guide to Multilateral Harmonization, Journal of World Trade 46 (2012) 6, p. 1355.
73.
Under Article 2(b) of the Agreement on Rules of Origin, non-preferential rules of origin cannot be used as instruments to pursue trade objectives directly or indirectly. This was analysed by the WTO Panel in United States – Rules of Origin for Textiles and Apparel Products as prohibition to use rules of origin in order to pursue trade objectives such as protection of domestic industry and/or as in the case at hand in this Article favouring of imports of some countries over imports from another. See WTO Panel, WT/DS243/R and corr.1, United States – Rules of Origin for Textiles and Apparel Products, DSR 2003:VI, 2309, paras. 6.111-6.112.
74.
Pauwelyn, Comment – Nothing dramatic (…regarding administration of customs laws), World trade review 8 (2009) 1, p. 47.
75.
Negative rules of origin are rules that specify what does not confer origin and are therefore unpredictable.
76.
WTO Appellate Body, WT/DS34/AB/R, Turkey – Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products, DSR 1999:IV, 2345, para. 43.
77.
WTO Appellate Body Report, WT/DS34/AB/R, Turkey – Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products, DSR 1999:IV, 2345, paras. 45-46.
78.
WTO Appellate Body, WT/DS34/AB/R, Turkey – Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products, DSR 1999:IV, 2345, para. 47.
79.
WTO Panel, WT/DS34/R, Turkey – Restrictions on Imports of Textiles and Clothing Products, as modified by WTO Appellate Body, WT/DS34/AB/R, DSR 1999:VI, 2363, para. 9.105.
80.
WTO Appellate Body Report, WT/DS34/AB/R, Turkey – Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products, DSR 1999:IV, 2345, para. 44.
81.
WTO Appellate Body, WT/DS34/AB/R, Turkey – Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products, DSR 1999:IV, 2345, para. 57.
82.
WTO Appellate Body, WT/DS34/AB/R, Turkey – Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products, DSR 1999:IV, 2345, para. 58; Rivas tried at first to reapply this test to rules of origin, but he used it as a test to compare changes in rules from a previous preferential agreement to a new one, taking the example of rules of origin changes from the US–Canada FTA to NAFTA: Rivas, Do rules of origin in Free Trade Agreements comply with Article XXIV GATT?, in: Bartels/Ortino (eds), Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO Legal system, 2006.
83.
Rivas tried at first to reapply this test to rules of origin, but he used it as a test to compare changes in rules from a previous preferential agreement to a new one, taking the example of rules of origin changes from the US–Canada FTA to NAFTA: Rivas, Do rules of origin in Free Trade Agreements comply with Article XXIV GATT?, in: Bartels/Ortino (eds), Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO Legal system, 2006.
84.
The ‘at least with respect to substantially all the trade in products originating in such territories’ within the CU rule seems to account for CU that still would have in force rules of origin defining the ‘originating product’ concept.
85.
This question was analysed first by: Mathis, Regional Trade Agreements in the GATT/WTO – Article XXIV and the Internal Trade Requirement, 2002.
86.
It is contested whether the list of exceptions is limited or not and whether safeguards are or not excluded from the exception. However, further analysis of this discussion would be beside the point of this thesis, and so it is not necessary to look more deeply into this issue. For further reading, refer to Gobbi Estrella/Horlick, Mandatory abolition of anti-dumpings, countervailing duties and safeguards in Customs Unions and Free Trade Areas constituted between World Trade Organisation Members: revisiting a long-standing discussion in light of the Appellate Body’s Turkey-Textiles ruling, Journal of World Trade 40 (2006) 5.
87.
Synopsis of “Systemic” Issues related to regional trade agreements, March 2000, WT/REG/W/37, p. 55; Compendium of issues related to regional trade agreements, August 2002, TN/RL/W/8/Rev.1, para. 69.
88.
J. Brum Kim/J. Kim, The role of rules of origin to provide discipline to the GATT Article XXIV exception, Journal of International Economic Law 14 (2011) 3, pp.621-626.
89.
J. Brum Kim/J. Kim, The role of rules of origin to provide discipline to the GATT Article XXIV exception, Journal of International Economic Law 14 (2011) 3, p.626.
90.
WTO Panel, WT/DS34/R, Turkey – Restrictions on Imports of Textiles and Clothing Products, as modified by WTO Appellate Body, WT/DS34/AB/R, DSR 1999:VI, 2363, para. 9.120.
91.
WTO Panel, WT/DS34/R, Turkey – Restrictions on Imports of Textiles and Clothing Products, as modified by WTO Appellate Body, WT/DS34/AB/R, DSR 1999:VI, 2363, para. 9.120.
92.
WTO Panel, WT/DS34/R, Turkey – Restrictions on Imports of Textiles and Clothing Products, as modified by WTO Appellate Body, WT/DS34/AB/R, DSR 1999:VI, 2363, para. 9.120.
93.
Synopsis of “Systemic” Issues related to regional trade agreements, March 2000, WT/REG/W/37, para. 62.
94.
Compendium of issues related to regional trade agreements, August 2002, TN/RL/W/8/Rev.1, para. 78.
95.
Compendium of issues related to regional trade agreements, August 2002, TN/RL/W/8/Rev.1, para. 78.
96.
Indonesia – Autos and India – Autos.
97.
Herin, Rules of origin and differences between tariff levels in EFTA and EC, Occasional Paper No 13, 1986, Geneva: EFTA Secretariat for Economic Affairs Department.

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ITN Marie Curie Visiting Researcher (DISSETTLE network) at ECARES, Université Libre de Bruxelles, via Cassia 929, 00189, Roma, Italy
Laura Puccio

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European Law, European and International Economic Law, University of Passau Chair for Constitutional and Administrat, Passau, Germany
Christoph Herrmann
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Markus Krajewski
Chair for Public Law, European and International Law, Leuphana University Lüneburg, Lüneburg, Germany
Jörg Philipp Terhechte

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Puccio, L. (2013). 20 Years After Marrakesh: Reconsidering the Effects of Preferential Rules of Origin and Anti-Circumvention Rules on Trade in Inputs and Global Production Networks. In: Herrmann, C., Krajewski, M., Terhechte, J. (eds) European Yearbook of International Economic Law 2014. European Yearbook of International Economic Law, vol 5. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-40913-4_8

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