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Private Liability Rule Regimes

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Liability Rules in Patent Law

Part of the book series: Munich Studies on Innovation and Competition ((MSIC,volume 1))

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Abstract

In Chap. 2, several indications were found that there is basically an inefficient overuse of property rules in current German law and hypothetically also in the regulation on the European Patent with Unitary Effect; relying so intensively on property rules is also not mandatory from other perspectives such as distributional preferences and higher-ranking law. Another question, which has not been answered until now and should be addressed specifically in the following discussion, is whether private liability rules sufficiently reduce the overuse of property rules. An additional question will be whether it is possible to support even more efficient use of those mechanisms than is currently the case.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Section A.2.c.(3)(b) in Chap. 2.

  2. 2.

    There may be even constellations where not one of them is the optimal solution because not a liability rule mechanism is the best solution; for instance, sometimes open source models may be considered as being better. These are, however, not taken into account here.

  3. 3.

    See above, Sect. A in Chap. 1.

  4. 4.

    EPO (2011).

  5. 5.

    JPO (2009), p. 20.

  6. 6.

    Rogge (1985), pp. 734 et seq.; Rogge (2006), m.n. 5.

  7. 7.

    Kraßer and Bernhardt (2009), p. 817; Rogge argues that with respect to an exclusive licence: Rogge (2006), m.n. 9.

  8. 8.

    Piehler (1938), p. 65; Mes (2011), § 23, m.n. 5.

  9. 9.

    BPatG, GRUR 1992, 44.

  10. 10.

    JPO (2009), p. 21.

  11. 11.

    Section A.2.c.(3)(b) i in Chap. 2.

  12. 12.

    Rogge (2006), m.n. 4.

  13. 13.

    See also Article 86(1), EPC for EPO patent applications for which a declaration of the willingness to license is currently not possible [see Sect. 1.a.(1)].

  14. 14.

    The declaration of the willingness to license is only possible for German patents; According to the Schedule of Fees and Expenses of the EPO (see EPO 2010) the renewal fees for European patent applications amount to zero in the first 2 years, too, but are significantly higher than the German fees afterwards. However, one has to note that patent applicants who file their application with the EPO would normally apply in several countries.

  15. 15.

    JPO (2009), p. 21; Rogge (2006), m.n. 10a.

  16. 16.

    JPO (2009), p. 20.

  17. 17.

    German Upper Regional Court (Oberlandesgericht) Nürnberg, GRUR 1996, 48.

  18. 18.

    JPO (2009), p. 20.

  19. 19.

    Piehler (1938), p. 67.

  20. 20.

    LG Düsseldorf, Instanzgerichtsentscheidung 1, 33—Mehrfachkontaktanordnung; Mes (2011), § 23, m.n. 10; Rogge (2006), m.n. 11.

  21. 21.

    Kraßer and Schmid (1982), p. 332; Kraßer and Bernhardt (2009), p. 940.

  22. 22.

    PA, BlPMZ 1942, 141.

  23. 23.

    LG Mannheim, GRUR 1956, 412; Mes (2011), § 23, m.n. 18.

  24. 24.

    Cf., inter alia, Vorwerk (1973); Rogge (2006), m.n. 16.

  25. 25.

    The published decisions are: BGH, GRUR 1967, 655; German Patent Office, BlPMZ 1988, 324 and BPatG, BlPMZ 1990, 329; BPatG, 06.12.2000, 5 W (pat) 430/99.

  26. 26.

    BGH, GRUR 1967, 655, 657; BPatG, 06.12.2000—5 W (pat) 430/99 23.

  27. 27.

    BGH, GRUR 1967, 655, 657 et seq.; Rogge (2006), m.n. 16.

  28. 28.

    BGH, GRUR 1967, 655, 657; Sect. A.1.c.(2) in Chap. 4.

  29. 29.

    Rogge (2006), m.n. 16.

  30. 30.

    BGH, GRUR 1967, 655, 657; BPatG, 06.12.2000, 5 W (pat) 430/99 24.

  31. 31.

    BGH, GRUR 1967, 655, 657 et seq.; BPatG, 1990 BlPMZ 329, 331.

  32. 32.

    BGH, GRUR 1967, 655, 658; BPatG, 06.12.2000, 5 W (pat) 430/99 29.

  33. 33.

    BGH, GRUR 1967, 655, 659.

  34. 34.

    BPatG, 06.12.2000, 5 W (pat) 430/99 33; BPatG, BlPMZ 1990, 329, 331.

  35. 35.

    BGH, GRUR 1967, 655, 658.

  36. 36.

    BPatG, 06.12.2000, 5 W (pat) 430/99 31.

  37. 37.

    This was Section 14 in 1936.

  38. 38.

    Law Gazette of the German Reich (Reichsgesetzblatt) II 1936, 120.

  39. 39.

    Ex-Section 14 in 1936.

  40. 40.

    Piehler (1938), pp. 63 et seq.

  41. 41.

    BlPMZ (1936), p. 103.

  42. 42.

    Ibid.

  43. 43.

    Ibid., p. 107.

  44. 44.

    Rogge (2006), m.n. 1.

  45. 45.

    BlPMZ (1936), p. 106.

  46. 46.

    Ibid., p. 107.

  47. 47.

    Gesetzblatt der Verwaltung des Vereinigten Wirtschaftsgebiets 1949, 175; BGBl. I 1961, 552; BGBl. I 1967, 954; BGBl. I 1981, 6; BGBl. I 1998, 1827; BGBl. I 2001, 3672.

  48. 48.

    BGBl. II 1991, 1356.

  49. 49.

    Bundesrat Printed Paper (Bundestagsdrucksache) 12/632, 22.

  50. 50.

    Ibid.

  51. 51.

    Ibid.

  52. 52.

    Oppenländer (1977), p. 370.

  53. 53.

    Eggert (1972), p. 231; Eggert wrote his article before Section 23 Patent Act was amended in 1992. His arguments are still relevant as far as he did not refer to the situation where the patent owner wants to withdraw his declaration.

  54. 54.

    Ibid.

  55. 55.

    Reinelt (1985), p. 178.

  56. 56.

    Eggert (1972), p. 231.

  57. 57.

    Busse (2013), m.n. 11.

  58. 58.

    Eggert (1972), pp. 231 et seq.

  59. 59.

    Section A.2.b in Chap. 2.

  60. 60.

    Mes (2011), § 23, m.n. 12.

  61. 61.

    LG Düsseldorf, Instanzgerichtsentscheidung 1, 33—Mehrfachkontaktanordnung; likewise, Rogge (2006), m.n. 11.

  62. 62.

    Roth (2012), m.n. 197 et seqq.

  63. 63.

    In 2012, 69 requests for arbitration were presented to the patent office; 2011: 72; 2010: 65; 2009: 65; 2008: 66; 2007: 52; 2006: 59, DPMA (2013), p. 49.

  64. 64.

    For employee inventions, this is determined in the Guideline to the German Employees’ Invention Act (ArbnErfRL): see especially 6 et seq. ArbnErfRL.

  65. 65.

    This section was written in cooperation with Ilja Rudyk; see above, Sect. A in Chap. 1. and Rudyk (2012), pp. 39 et seqq.

  66. 66.

    Cohen et al. (2000), pp. 17 et seq.

  67. 67.

    For all these definitions, see ibid.

  68. 68.

    Harhoff et al. (2003a), p. 1346.

  69. 69.

    Ibid.

  70. 70.

    Ibid.

  71. 71.

    Ibid., p. 1348.

  72. 72.

    Teece (1986), p. 288.

  73. 73.

    Ibid., p. 289.

  74. 74.

    Ibid.

  75. 75.

    Harhoff et al. (2003b), p. 1757.

  76. 76.

    Allen (1983), pp. 20 et seq.; Harhoff et al. (2003b), p. 1757.

  77. 77.

    The term is used in contrast to before (Chap. 1), in a more narrow sense here.

  78. 78.

    Gassmann and Enkel (2006), p. 134.

  79. 79.

    Ibid., p. 132.

  80. 80.

    Ibid., p. 134.

  81. 81.

    Farrell and Gallini (1988).

  82. 82.

    Arora and Fosfuri (2003), pp. 278 et seq. and 290.

  83. 83.

    Ibid., pp. 278 et seq.

  84. 84.

    Page 102.

  85. 85.

    Giuri et al. (2007), p. 1118.

  86. 86.

    Ibid.

  87. 87.

    Kim and Vonortas (2006), p. 239.

  88. 88.

    Section a.(1).

  89. 89.

    Section a.(2).

  90. 90.

    A settlement in opposition proceeding may not always make sense; see also above, Sect. D.2.c in Chap. 2.

  91. 91.

    Lanjouw and Schankerman found a correlation while investigating data from US Patent Office and the US federal court system: Lanjouw and Schankerman (2001), p. 147.

  92. 92.

    In this section, which was written in cooperation with Ilja Rudyk, only those results of the empirical analysis are presented and discussed which are considered having important relevance for the rather legal analysis here; for a more detailed data analysis and an explanation of the empirical model, see Rudyk (2012); all calculations and figures in this paragraph were made by Ilja Rudyk; see above, Sect. A in Chap. 1 and Rudyk (2012), pp. 15 et seqq.

  93. 93.

    The number of declarations in 2008 is not complete.

  94. 94.

    Article 10, 27(1), German Budget Reorganisation Act (Haushaltssanierungsgesetz) and appendix.

  95. 95.

    Bundesrat Printed Paper (Bundestagsdrucksache) 437/99.

  96. 96.

    BGBl. I 1999, 2534 et seq.

  97. 97.

    Applications from 2007 to 2008 are not taken into account because most of them were still pending.

  98. 98.

    This is the so-called ISI-INIPI-OST classification which was elaborated by the German Fraunhofer Institute of Systems and Innovation Research, the French National Institute of Industrial Property and the Observatoire des Science et des Techniques.

  99. 99.

    Gambardella et al. (2008), p. 79.

  100. 100.

    For the semiconductor and electronics industry, see Grindley and Teece (1997); Hall and Ziedonis (2001), p. 109.

  101. 101.

    All these variables seem to span different dimensions of value: Gambardella et al. (2008), p. 71; van Zeebroeck (2011), p. 33; Harhoff et al. argue that the successful defence against opposition is a strong predictor for patent value: Harhoff et al. (2003a).

  102. 102.

    An unofficial English translation of the CPI can be found here: JPO (2006).

  103. 103.

    Mustergesetz für Entwicklungsländer zum Schutz von Erfindungen (1967), p. 248.

  104. 104.

    Institute of Intellectual Property (2009), pp. 26 et seq.

  105. 105.

    A long time before the discussion about the EU-Patent began, it was proposed to introduce a provision about the willingness of licence in the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property: cf. Piehler (1938), p. 64.

  106. 106.

    European Commission (2000b).

  107. 107.

    Council of the European Union (2003).

  108. 108.

    Reboul and Basire (2009), m.n. 25.

  109. 109.

    JPO (2006), p. 50.

  110. 110.

    Ibid., p. 46.

  111. 111.

    Ibid., p. 44.

  112. 112.

    Le Stanc (2005).

  113. 113.

    In France, the annual patent fees amounted to €36 in 2013 from the second to the 5th year, started rising with the 6th year and amounted to €760 in the 20th year; the total sum for 20 years is €5,608: cf. Institut National de la Propriété Intellectuel (2009), p. 2.

  114. 114.

    JPO (2006), p. 50.

  115. 115.

    The owner of a non-exclusive licence may only be allowed to institute infringement proceedings if the owner can claim to have an own interest and the patent proprietor authorises him: cf. Rogge and Grabinski (2006), m.n. 17 et seq.; Mes (2011), § 139, m.n. 49.

  116. 116.

    JPO (2006), p. 50.

  117. 117.

    JPO (2006), pp. 44 et seq.

  118. 118.

    Gouvernement Francais (2005).

  119. 119.

    Ibid.

  120. 120.

    Ibid.

  121. 121.

    For a more intensive comparison between these two provisions regarding the situation in 1938, which differs only in some aspects from the current situation, see Piehler (1938), pp. 62 et seq.

  122. 122.

    In the UK the annual fees, which have augmented significantly in April 2010, amount currently £70 for the 5th year and rise up to £600 for the 20th year; the total sum for 20 years is around €5,760 (assuming that £1.00 = €0.80): cf. UKIPO (2010).

  123. 123.

    Section 1.b.(3)(a).

  124. 124.

    Thorley et al. (2006), m.n. 11–119.

  125. 125.

    Jones and Cole (2009), m.n. 11–119.

  126. 126.

    Allen & Hanburys v. Generics, Reports of Patent Cases (RPC) 203 British House of Lords (1986); ibid., m.n. 46.08.

  127. 127.

    The following selection of judgements is based on lists given by Thorley and others, respectively Bainbridge, Thorley et al. (2006), m.n. 11–123 et seq.; Bainbridge (2009), pp. 460 et seq.; ECJ, 03.03.1988, 434/85—Allen and Hanburys; ECJ, 27.10.1992, 4-191/90—Generics/Smith Kline and French Laboratories.

  128. 128.

    “Shiley’s Patent” (1988) RPC 97.

  129. 129.

    “Allen & Hanburys v. Generics” (1986) RPC 203, British House of Lords.

  130. 130.

    “Allen & Hanbury’s Patent” (1987) RPC 327, British Court of Appeals.

  131. 131.

    “Syntex’s Patent” (1986) RPC 585.

  132. 132.

    Per Lord Diplock in: Allen & Hanbury v. Generics (1986) RPC 203, 249 et seq.

  133. 133.

    “Syntex’s Patent” (1986) RPC 585.

  134. 134.

    “Du Pont Patent” (1988) RPC 479; “Cabot Safety’s Patent” (1992) RPC 39.

  135. 135.

    Cf., also, White and Anthony (1980), m.n. 6-303; Thorley et al. (2006), m.n. 11–122 et seqq.; Jones and Cole (2009), m.n. 46.14 et seq.

  136. 136.

    “American Cyanamid’s Patent” (1990) RPC 309; (1991) RPC 409.

  137. 137.

    “Cabot Safety’s Patent” (1992) RPC 39.

  138. 138.

    Cf., also, Thorley et al. (2006), m.n. 11–126.

  139. 139.

    Jones and Cole (2009), m.n. 46.04; Bainbridge (2009), p. 460.

  140. 140.

    Bainbridge (2009), p. 460.

  141. 141.

    They mention a number of 0.5 % of patent renewals, Her Majesty’s Treasury (the UK’s economics and finance ministry) (2006), p. 90; this number is, however, not very precise and one should be careful deriving a concrete conclusion from it.

  142. 142.

    Ibid.

  143. 143.

    See Kur and Schovsbo (2011), pp. 439 et seq.; Schovsbo (2009), pp. 614 et seq.

  144. 144.

    Cowan et al. (2007), p. 40.

  145. 145.

    This problem was also indicated in the Gower’s “Review of Intellectual Property”: cf. Her Majesty’s Treasury (the UK’s economics and finance ministry) (2006), p. 90.

  146. 146.

    See especially Sect. C.2.c.

  147. 147.

    As suggested here: Her Majesty’s Treasury (the UK’s economics and finance ministry) (2006), p. 90.

  148. 148.

    Rudyk (2012).

  149. 149.

    IBM (2007); see also Krempl (2007).

  150. 150.

    The proposal seems to contain a solution with which all licensing terms could be settled: cf. IBM (2007), p. 2.

  151. 151.

    For a more detailed description, see ibid., pp. 1 et seq.

  152. 152.

    Ibid., p. 1.

  153. 153.

    Ibid.

  154. 154.

    Ibid., p. 2.

  155. 155.

    Ibid.

  156. 156.

    Ibid.

  157. 157.

    Section A.2.c.(3)(b) ii Chap. 2.

  158. 158.

    van Overwalle et al. (2006), p. 144.

  159. 159.

    Kur and Schovsbo (2011), p. 439.

  160. 160.

    Note: The 3G Patent Platform Arrangement, on which the formation is based, aimed at creating five separate pools.

  161. 161.

    Serafino (2007), p. 1.

  162. 162.

    Ibid., p. 2.

  163. 163.

    Engelke and Stahlmann (2010), p. 32.

  164. 164.

    Serafino (2007), pp. 2 et seq.

  165. 165.

    At http://www.mpegla.com/main/Pages/PoolBenefitsUsers.aspx.

  166. 166.

    At http://www.sipro.com/g7291_about.php.

  167. 167.

    Serafino (2007), p. 31.

  168. 168.

    At https://www.ip.philips.com/licensing/licensingpolicy.html.

  169. 169.

    At http://www.bluetooth.com/Pages/About-Us.aspx.

  170. 170.

    At http://www.vialicensing.com/about/index.aspx.

  171. 171.

    Verbeure (2009), p. 8; see also http://www.3gpp.org/FAQ.

  172. 172.

    At http://www.vialicensing.com/about/index.aspx.

  173. 173.

    Serafino (2007), p. 18.

  174. 174.

    At http://www.vialicensing.com/licensing/ocap-fees.aspx.

  175. 175.

    Para. 5 of https://www.bluetooth.org/DocMan/handlers/DownloadDoc.ashx?doc_id=67.

  176. 176.

    Layne-Farrar and Lerner (2008), pp. 11 et seq.

  177. 177.

    Para. 5 of https://www.bluetooth.org/DocMan/handlers/DownloadDoc.ashx?doc_id=67.

  178. 178.

    At http://www.sipro.com/g7291_faq.php.

  179. 179.

    Serafino (2007), p. 23.

  180. 180.

    Heyers (2011).

  181. 181.

    Lampe and Moser (2009), p. 4.

  182. 182.

    This effect with complementary monopolies was already demonstrated by Cournot in 1838: cf. Shapiro (2001), p. 123.

  183. 183.

    Carlson (1999), p. 380; van Zimmeren (2006), p. 28.

  184. 184.

    European Commission (2004), p. 229.

  185. 185.

    Shapiro (2003), p. 408.

  186. 186.

    Heyers (2011), p. 214.

  187. 187.

    What is more likely is that a large pool may reflect either the fact that the incentives for individual enforcement in large pools are smaller or that large pools are more likely to include small players with limited enforcement capabilities: Lerner et al. (2003), p. 22.

  188. 188.

    van Zimmeren (2006), p. 27.

  189. 189.

    Heyers (2011), p. 213.

  190. 190.

    Clark et al. (2000), p. 10.

  191. 191.

    Lerner et al. (2003), p. 22.

  192. 192.

    van Zimmeren (2006), p. 28.

  193. 193.

    Aoki (2009), p. 358.

  194. 194.

    It was shown that the possibility of pooling of patents appears to have a positive impact on research and development activity; the exact effect may depend on the prospective size of the pool: Dequiedt and Versaevel (2007), p. 24.

  195. 195.

    Merges (1999), p. 11; Shapiro (2001), pp. 134 et seq.; Colangelo (2004), p. 61.

  196. 196.

    Carlson (1999), pp. 379 and 381.

  197. 197.

    Section D.3 in Chap. 2.

  198. 198.

    Lerner and Tirole (2003), p. 29.

  199. 199.

    Clark et al. (2000), p. 10.

  200. 200.

    van Zimmeren (2006), p. 27.

  201. 201.

    Shapiro (2001), p. 150.

  202. 202.

    Heyers (2011), p. 215.

  203. 203.

    Verbeure (2009), p. 9.

  204. 204.

    Heyers (2011), p. 215.

  205. 205.

    Gilbert (2010), p. 11.

  206. 206.

    Empirical evidence from the nineteenth century sewing machine industry suggests that this may actually be the case: Lampe and Moser (2009), pp. 15 et seq.

  207. 207.

    Heyers (2011), p. 215.

  208. 208.

    Lin (2002), p. 309.

  209. 209.

    Lampe and Moser (2009), p. 26.

  210. 210.

    van Zimmeren (2006), p. 27.

  211. 211.

    Carlson (1999), p. 386; van Zimmeren (2006), p. 28.

  212. 212.

    Choi (2008), pp. 1 et seq.

  213. 213.

    Section B.4.b.(2) in Chap. 2.

  214. 214.

    Gilbert (2010), p. 15.

  215. 215.

    Commission Regulation (EC) No. 772/2004 of 27 April 2004 on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to Categories of Technology Transfer Agreements.

  216. 216.

    European Commission (2004), p. 212.

  217. 217.

    Remember that the relationship between pool and licensees was not qualified as a liability rule, Sect. A.2.c.(3)(b) ii and iv in Chap. 2.

  218. 218.

    Ibid., p. 215.

  219. 219.

    Ibid., p. 216.

  220. 220.

    Ibid., p. 219.

  221. 221.

    Ibid., p. 220.

  222. 222.

    Ibid., p. 221.

  223. 223.

    Ibid., p. 222.

  224. 224.

    Ibid., p. 224.

  225. 225.

    Ibid., p. 225.

  226. 226.

    Ibid., p. 226.

  227. 227.

    Ibid., p. 227.

  228. 228.

    Ibid., p. 228.

  229. 229.

    Ibid., p. 229.

  230. 230.

    Ibid., pp. 230 et seq.

  231. 231.

    Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the Implementation of the Rules on Competition Laid Down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty.

  232. 232.

    van Zimmeren (2006), p. 32.

  233. 233.

    European Commission (2000a).

  234. 234.

    European Commission (2002).

  235. 235.

    European Commission (2006).

  236. 236.

    European Commission (2006).

  237. 237.

    European Commission (2000a).

  238. 238.

    European Commission (2002).

  239. 239.

    European Commission (2006).

  240. 240.

    Lerner and Tirole (2003), p. 2.

  241. 241.

    European Commission (2004), pp. 217 and 219.

  242. 242.

    Shapiro (2001), pp. 122 et seq.

  243. 243.

    Lerner et al. (2003), p. 22.

  244. 244.

    European Commission (2004), p. 218.

  245. 245.

    Lerner and Tirole (2003), p. 3.

  246. 246.

    Lerner and Tirole (2008), p. 163.

  247. 247.

    Lerner and Tirole argue that patents covering a technology to be adopted by users often are complements at low prices and substitutes at higher prices, ibid.

  248. 248.

    Heyers (2011), p. 219.

  249. 249.

    Ibid., p. 220.

  250. 250.

    Kato (2004).

  251. 251.

    Heyers (2011), p. 220.

  252. 252.

    Ibid., p. 219.

  253. 253.

    Ibid., pp. 222 and 224.

  254. 254.

    Lerner and Tirole (2003), p. 28.

  255. 255.

    As argued by Gilbert (2010), p. 12.

  256. 256.

    As proposed by Lerner and Tirole (2008), pp. 165 et seq.; see below Sect. e.

  257. 257.

    Fröhlich (2008), pp. 305 et seq.

  258. 258.

    Gilbert (2010), p. 11.

  259. 259.

    European Commission (2004), p. 221.

  260. 260.

    Heyers (2011), p. 221.

  261. 261.

    See generally Lavine comparing also the US and the European practice: Lavine (2008).

  262. 262.

    Nelson (2007), p. 567 et seq.; Gilbert (2010), p. 10.

  263. 263.

    With reference to the mobile phone industry, see Bekkers et al. (2006), pp. 5 et seq.

  264. 264.

    Heyers (2011), p. 221.

  265. 265.

    Section 1.

  266. 266.

    Lerner and Tirole (2008), p. 171.

  267. 267.

    Aoki (2009), p. 359.

  268. 268.

    Ibid.

  269. 269.

    Lerner and Tirole (2008), p. 171; Heyers (2011), p. 224.

  270. 270.

    This was shown empirically by Layne-Farrar and Lerner (2008), pp. 2 and 24.

  271. 271.

    Sections 2.a. and 2.b.

  272. 272.

    European Commission (2004), p. 228.

  273. 273.

    Lerner and Tirole (2008), p. 168.

  274. 274.

    Gilbert (2010), p. 13.

  275. 275.

    Section B.4.b in Chap. 2.

  276. 276.

    Lerner et al. (2007), p. 613.

  277. 277.

    Gilbert (2010), p. 13.

  278. 278.

    Lerner et al. (2007), p. 611.

  279. 279.

    Lerner and Tirole (2008), pp. 167 et seq.

  280. 280.

    Gilbert (2010), p. 13.

  281. 281.

    Heyers (2011), p. 224.

  282. 282.

    Lerner et al. (2007), p. 613.

  283. 283.

    Ibid.

  284. 284.

    Lerner discussed this issue intensively; for an overview see Lerner and Tirole (2008), pp. 166 et seq.

  285. 285.

    Heyers (2011), p. 224.

  286. 286.

    Choi (2008), pp. 23 et seq.

  287. 287.

    See, e.g., the propositions discussed in Hilty (2009), pp. 98 et seq.

  288. 288.

    Section 2.b.

  289. 289.

    Heyers (2011), pp. 222 et seq.

  290. 290.

    Section 2.a.

  291. 291.

    It was shown empirically that a more intense awareness of antitrust concerns can lead to a situation in which more important patents are selected for pools: Lerner et al. (2003), p. 26.

  292. 292.

    Heyers (2011), p. 213.

  293. 293.

    Lerner and Tirole (2008), p. 171.

  294. 294.

    Potentially including endowment effects: Sect. B.4.b.(5) in Chap. 2.

  295. 295.

    Lerner and Tirole (2008), p. 171.

  296. 296.

    This was shown empirically by Layne-Farrar and Lerner (2008), p. 24.

  297. 297.

    Section B in Chap. 2.

  298. 298.

    Gilbert (2010), pp. 29 et seq.

  299. 299.

    Verbeure (2009), p. 7.

  300. 300.

    For the area of biotechnology it was suggested that organisations like the World Health Organization could do that task: Goldstein (2009), p. 56.

  301. 301.

    This shall depend on a cost-benefit analysis, Dequiedt and Versaevel (2007), p. 25.

  302. 302.

    Verbeure (2009), p. 9.

  303. 303.

    Heyers (2011), p. 214.

  304. 304.

    Section A.2.c.(3)(b) iii in Chap. 2.

  305. 305.

    Cf. DPINFO operated by the DPMA, https://register.dpma.de or the international database Espacenet developed by the EPO, http://www.espacenet.com.

  306. 306.

    Aoki and Schiff (2008b), p. 196.

  307. 307.

    Aoki (2007), p. 1.

  308. 308.

    Aoki and Schiff (2008c), p. 3.

  309. 309.

    Aoki and Schiff (2010), p. 218.

  310. 310.

    Aoki and Schiff (2008c), p. 3.

  311. 311.

    For the description of these terms and the advantages of specific open innovation processes, see above, Sect. A.2.a.(2).

  312. 312.

    Spence points out that in areas where patents are rarely enforced, setting up a clearinghouse fostering enforcement can be disadvantageous, resulting in the end in higher transaction costs: Spence (2009), p. 163.

  313. 313.

    Graff and Zilberman (2001b); Graff and Zilberman (2001a); Krattiger (2004); van Zimmeren (2006); van Zimmeren et al. (2006); Aoki (2007).

  314. 314.

    Aoki and Schiff (2008a), p. 27.

  315. 315.

    Section B.4.a.(4) in Chap. 2.

  316. 316.

    Ullrich made this point, however, by referring generally to clearinghouses, not specifically royalty collection clearinghouses: Ullrich (2009), pp. 346 et seq.

  317. 317.

    The clearinghouse having control over the patents would normally enter negotiations as owner and not as user: Spence (2009), p. 165.

  318. 318.

    van Overwalle et al. (2006), p. 146; Aoki and Schiff (2008c), p. 25.

  319. 319.

    van Zimmeren et al. (2006), pp. 355 et seq.

  320. 320.

    Aoki and Schiff (2008c), p. 4.

  321. 321.

    Aoki and Schiff (2008b), p. 199.

  322. 322.

    Aoki and Schiff (2008a), p. 74.

  323. 323.

    Aoki and Schiff (2008c), p. 3.

  324. 324.

    van Overwalle et al. (2006), p. 146.

  325. 325.

    Spence (2009), p. 162.

  326. 326.

    Aoki and Schiff (2008c), p. 3.

  327. 327.

    van Zimmeren et al. (2006), p. 355.

  328. 328.

    van Overwalle et al. (2006), p. 146.

  329. 329.

    Aoki and Schiff (2008b), p. 197.

  330. 330.

    Aoki and Schiff (2008c), p. 4.

  331. 331.

    Aoki and Schiff (2008c), p. 24; van Zimmeren (2009), pp. 101 et seq.

  332. 332.

    Section A.2.a.

  333. 333.

    Aoki and Schiff (2008c), p. 4.

  334. 334.

    Graff and Zilberman (2001b), p. 9.

  335. 335.

    Ibid.

  336. 336.

    Graff and Zilberman (2001b), p. 9; Aoki and Schiff (2008c), p. 6.

  337. 337.

    van Zimmeren et al. (2006), p. 355.

  338. 338.

    Aoki and Schiff (2008c), pp. 6 and 12.

  339. 339.

    Spence (2009), p. 162.

  340. 340.

    Aoki and Schiff (2008b), p. 196.

  341. 341.

    Graff and Zilberman (2001b), p. 9.

  342. 342.

    Aoki and Schiff (2008b), p. 197.

  343. 343.

    Graff and Zilberman (2001b), p. 9.

  344. 344.

    van Zimmeren (2009), p. 102.

  345. 345.

    van Zimmeren et al. (2006), p. 355.

  346. 346.

    Aoki and Schiff (2008c), p. 3.

  347. 347.

    Ibid., p. 4.

  348. 348.

    Ibid., p. 8.

  349. 349.

    Cf. the economic consideration by Aoki and Schiff, ibid., pp. 17 et seq.

  350. 350.

    Section B.2.a in Chap. 2.

  351. 351.

    van Zimmeren et al. (2006), p. 355.

  352. 352.

    Aoki and Schiff (2008c), p. 10.

  353. 353.

    Aoki and Schiff (2007), p. 5.

  354. 354.

    Merges (1996), pp. 1328 et seq.

  355. 355.

    Handke and Towse (2007), pp. 937 and seq.

  356. 356.

    Hansen and Schmidt-Bischoffshausen (2007), pp. 462 and 469 et seq.

  357. 357.

    Handke and Towse (2007), p. 939.

  358. 358.

    Ibid., pp. 940 et seq.

  359. 359.

    For collecting societies, see Hansen and Schmidt-Bischoffshausen (2007), pp. 462 and 470.

  360. 360.

    Mestmäcker and Schweitzer (2004), § 30, m.n. 7.

  361. 361.

    For collecting societies, see Handke and Towse (2007), pp. 945 et seq.

  362. 362.

    For collecting societies, see ibid., p. 946.

  363. 363.

    Mestmäcker and Schweitzer (2004), § 30, m.n. 6.

  364. 364.

    Spence (2009), p. 167.

  365. 365.

    van Zimmeren (2009), p. 102; see also above Sect. 1.f.

  366. 366.

    Spence (2009), p. 167.

  367. 367.

    Aoki and Schiff (2007), p. 5.

  368. 368.

    Hansen and Schmidt-Bischoffshausen (2007), p. 472.

  369. 369.

    Section A.5.

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Krauspenhaar, D. (2015). Private Liability Rule Regimes. In: Liability Rules in Patent Law. Munich Studies on Innovation and Competition, vol 1. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-40900-4_3

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