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Overuse of Exclusivity in Patent Law

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Liability Rules in Patent Law

Part of the book series: Munich Studies on Innovation and Competition ((MSIC,volume 1))

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Abstract

Nowadays, the main purpose of a patent law system is predominantly, while balancing private and public interests, to govern economic decisions, to encourage innovation and, in general, to reach economic efficiency. On the one hand, the question is, therefore, whether the current German patent law system (including German and European antitrust laws), as it is currently applied, and the future system under the regulation on the European Patent with Unitary Effect, as it is designed, contain too many exclusive elements to be efficient. On the other hand, because the choice between the two options may not be purely economic, it must also be investigated whether other factors could be taken into account or—more importantly for an analysis that focuses on the economic effects of the patent system—make it necessary to use either exclusive or non-exclusive elements. Two additional perspectives may be relevant: distributional preferences and other justice considerations. Although these two categories and economic efficiency may not be strictly distinguished from each other, the additional perspectives should be understood here as limitations on economic efficiency. Also, due to the present focus on a concrete legal system, at least shortsighted legal reasons (i.e., higher-ranking law and multilateral contracts) may play a role.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Calabresi and Melamed (1972), p. 1093.

  2. 2.

    Ibid., pp. 1089 et seq.

  3. 3.

    Bell and Parchomovsky (2002), p. 12 et seq.

  4. 4.

    Calabresi and Melamed (1972), pp. 1115 et seq.

  5. 5.

    Ibid., p. 1090.

  6. 6.

    Ibid.

  7. 7.

    Ibid.

  8. 8.

    Ibid.

  9. 9.

    Ibid., p. 1092.

  10. 10.

    Ibid.

  11. 11.

    Ibid., p. 1093.

  12. 12.

    Ibid., p. 1092.

  13. 13.

    Merges names, therefore, property rules as “absolute permission rules”: cf. Merges (1996), p. 1302, see also Epstein (1997), p. 2091; the terms property rule and exclusive right are used synonymously in the following.

  14. 14.

    Calabresi and Melamed (1972), p. 1092.

  15. 15.

    Ibid.

  16. 16.

    Merges describes the situation under a liability rules as “take now, pay later”: cf. Merges (1996), p. 1302.

  17. 17.

    Calabresi and Melamed (1972), p. 1092.

  18. 18.

    Kaplow and Shavell (1996), p. 756 et seq.; punitive damages are commonly identified as an implementation of a property rule: cf. Calabresi and Melamed (1972), p. 1126; Kaplow and Shavell (1996), p. 724.

  19. 19.

    Calabresi and Melamed (1972), p. 1092.

  20. 20.

    They are relevant, e.g., if a person is incapable of contracting: cf. 104 German Civil Code; another example is that German copyrights shall not be transferable according to Section 29, Subsection 1, German Copyright Act, as a consequence to the monistic theory where proprietary rights and personal rights form a unity: cf. Schulze (2008), p. 1. This theory is not applicable in the field of patent law due to the lower importance of the personal rights component; a patent is negotiable, the personal rights of the inventor not: cf. Mes (2011), § 15, m.n. 3.

  21. 21.

    Cf., inter alia, Bell and Parchomovsky (2002), p. 21; Krier and Schwab (1995), p. 441. Based on a constellation in a nuisance dispute with two parties involved, rule one describes the situation in which the resident is the owner of the entitlement protected by a property rule; rule two in which it is enforced by a liability rule; rule three describes the situation in which the polluter is the owner of the entitlement protected by a property rule; and rule four is in which it is enforced by a liability rule. Cf. Krier and Schwab (1995), p. 444; of course, this categorization is of minor importance in the field of IP because only the inventor may be entitled.

  22. 22.

    Ayres (1998), p. 797; Bell and Parchomovsky (2002), p. 21.

  23. 23.

    Krier and Schwab (1995), p. 471.

  24. 24.

    Ayres (1998).

  25. 25.

    Morris (1993), p. 854 et seq.

  26. 26.

    Levmore (1997), p. 2173.

  27. 27.

    Bell and Parchomovsky (2002), p. 26.

  28. 28.

    Ibid., pp. 26 et seq.

  29. 29.

    Ibid., p. 27.

  30. 30.

    Levmore (1997), p. 2161.

  31. 31.

    Burk argues that they might be worth exploring in the context of IP: Burk (2009), p. 305.

  32. 32.

    Calabresi and Melamed (1972), p. 1093.

  33. 33.

    Calabresi explained this in an article which was published in the context of a 25 year retrospective on property rules, liability rules and inalienability: cf. Calabresi (1997), p. 2202.

  34. 34.

    Cf., inter alia, Kieff (2001), p. 697; Lemley and Weiser (2007), p. 783; Depoorter (2008); Kur and Schovsbo (2011), p. 408; Crane (2009), p. 253; Burk (2009).

  35. 35.

    Even Calabresi and Melamed indicated this: cf. Calabresi and Melamed (1972), pp. 1128 et seq.

  36. 36.

    Likewise, Lemley and Weiser (2007), p. 786.

  37. 37.

    One could, of course, think about subsidising inventions instead of granting patents. For a comparison between these two possibilities, see, inter alia, Schankerman (1998), p. 95 et seq.

  38. 38.

    A single patent (and therefore also a single entitlement in patent law) can be owned by one individual person or alternatively, by multiple persons, what may be described as a case of collective or joint ownership: Peukert (2010), p. 13.

  39. 39.

    JPO (2009), p. 7.

  40. 40.

    Cf. Rule 29(1), Implementing Regulations to Part I of the Convention.

  41. 41.

    Cf. Article 53(a) EPC.

  42. 42.

    JPO (2009), pp. 7 et seq.

  43. 43.

    United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 23.07.1998, 149 F.3d 1368—State Street Bank & Trust v. Signature Financial Group.

  44. 44.

    Asendorf and Schmidt (2006), m.n. 4.

  45. 45.

    Wagner (2006), p. 22; see also Riederer (2007), p. 402.

  46. 46.

    About the optimal patent duration, see, inter alia, Scherer (1972); Nordhaus (1972); Gilbert and Shapiro (1990); Denicolò (1996); Christie and Rotstein (2008).

  47. 47.

    The patent term of the European Patent with Unitary Effect is 20 years, Art. 63(1) EPC.

  48. 48.

    JPO (2009), p. 17.

  49. 49.

    Bell and Parchomovsky (2002), p. 6.

  50. 50.

    Bishop (2004), p. 263.

  51. 51.

    JPO (2009), p. 14.

  52. 52.

    Klett et al. (2008), pp. 148 et seq.

  53. 53.

    As it was argued by Peukert who does, however, not follow the framework that is provided here: Peukert (2010), pp. 5 et seq.

  54. 54.

    Issues about the optimal patent breadth are, therefore, not part of the analysis, but see regarding this topic, inter alia, Gilbert and Shapiro (1990); Klemperer (1990); Denicolò (1996).

  55. 55.

    Cf. Section 903 German Civil Code: “The owner of a thing may, to the extent that a statute or third-party rights do not conflict with this, deal with the thing at his discretion and exclude others from every influence.” (Mussett (2013), Section 903).

  56. 56.

    JPO (2009), p. 12.

  57. 57.

    Mussett (2013), Section 1004.

  58. 58.

    Klett et al. (2008), p. 223.

  59. 59.

    Mes (2011), § 139, m.n. 47.

  60. 60.

    Ibid., § 139, m.n. 49 et seq.

  61. 61.

    Gruber (2013), m.n. 34.

  62. 62.

    Calabresi and Melamed: they see the role of criminal law not in the protection of individual rights but rather in the deterrence of “attempts to convert property rules in liability rules”, Calabresi and Melamed (1972), p. 1126.

  63. 63.

    This section is applicable for EPO-Patens with effect for Germany [Article 2(2), EPC] and would also be applicable for European Patents with Unitary Effect: cf. Rogge and Grabinski (2006), m.n. 1.

  64. 64.

    The German Federal Supreme Court has never decided in a case about Section 142 German Patent Act: cf. ibid., m.n. 1.

  65. 65.

    Cf., e.g., Merges (1996), pp. 1293 et seq.; Kieff (2006), pp. 327 and 328 et seq.; Devlin (2009), p. 64 et seq.

  66. 66.

    Such a system will be discussed below under the heading, “Compulsory Patent Buyout” (Sect. B.4) in Chap. 4.

  67. 67.

    Merges (1996), p. 1340; Kur and Schovsbo (2011), p. 435.

  68. 68.

    Merges (1996), p. 1340; Merges (1999), p. 15.

  69. 69.

    Mechanisms inverse to the first group do not make sense because basically no one besides the owner would have incentives to transform a non-exclusive right to an exclusive one.

  70. 70.

    This will be explained in the following chapters.

  71. 71.

    Fuchs (2007), m.n. 1; de Bronett (2008), m.n. 47 et seq.; Klees (2012), m.n. 49 et seq.

  72. 72.

    Klett et al. (2008), p. 149.

  73. 73.

    Kraßer and Bernhardt (2009), p. 840.

  74. 74.

    An unofficial English translation of the GWB is available here: Bundeskartellamt (2011), pp. 790–798.

  75. 75.

    Nägele and Jacobs (2009), p. 1063 et seq.; where these provisions apply is a question which will be addressed in Chap. 4.

  76. 76.

    Rogge (2006b), m.n. 33.

  77. 77.

    Scharen (2006), m.n. 16.

  78. 78.

    For instance, compulsory licensing had a big importance in Canada, certain in the US and also some in the UK; for an overview, see Liu (2008), p. 758 et seq.; regarding other variants of compulsory liability rule regimes further examples are provided below; see especially Sect. B in Chap. 4.

  79. 79.

    Buhrow and Nordemann (2005), p. 409.

  80. 80.

    The German Federal Patent Court was founded in 1961; between 1949 and 1961 the DPA was responsible for the evaluation of applications for compulsory licences.

  81. 81.

    BPatG, GRUR 1994, 98.

  82. 82.

    BGH, GRUR 1996, 190.

  83. 83.

    Kraßer and Bernhardt (2009), p. 834.

  84. 84.

    Keukenschrijver (2013a), m.n. 3.

  85. 85.

    Nägele and Jacobs (2009), pp. 1068 et seq.

  86. 86.

    Cf., especially, ECJ, 29.04.2004, C-418/01—IMS Health v. NDC Health; European Commission, 24.03.2004, COMP/C-3/37.792—Microsoft; CFI, 17.09.2007, T-201/04—Microsoft v. European Commission.

  87. 87.

    Buhrow and Nordemann (2005), p. 409; Rogge (2006b), m.n. 4; Kur and Schovsbo (2011), p. 436.

  88. 88.

    Beier (1999), p. 260, Fn. 27.

  89. 89.

    Hilty made this argument while referring to compulsory licensing for dependent innovations [Article 31 (l) TRIPS]: Hilty (2009a), p. 181.

  90. 90.

    Beier (1999), p. 260; Böttger argues against this thesis by referring to the field of public health and particularly to the situation in developing countries: Böttger (2008), p. 881.

  91. 91.

    The patent buyout mechanism briefly explained below could be categorized as a compulsory liability rule mechanism: see Sect. B.4 in Chap. 4; the use of special liability rule regimes (rather referring to trade secrets) is also suggested by Rai et al. for accelerating drug discovery: Rai et al. (2009), pp. 247 et seqq.; both are not considered in this work due to several reasons and especially because they are not suited for a broad application.

  92. 92.

    Cf. Article 8 Regulation (EU) No. 1257/2012 where the same mechanism is called licence of right.

  93. 93.

    JPO (2009), pp. 20 et seq.

  94. 94.

    Section b.

  95. 95.

    If the patent is not yet granted, there is a liability rule regime. If the patent applicant declares the willingness to license at that stage and the DPMA grants the patent, only the way of liability rule protection changes.

  96. 96.

    Section A in Chap. 3.

  97. 97.

    van Overwalle et al. (2006), p. 144.

  98. 98.

    For an overview of the legal evaluation of cross-licensing agreements according to German law, cf. Wündisch and Bauer (2010), p. 641.

  99. 99.

    Meges calls them private liability rules: Merges (1996), p. 1340; cf. also Kur and Schovsbo (2011), p. 439.

  100. 100.

    Merges (1996), p. 1340.

  101. 101.

    Ibid, also with reference to Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 171 (1931).

  102. 102.

    Verbruggen and Lõrincz (2002), p. 827.

  103. 103.

    Merges (1999), p. 10.

  104. 104.

    Why this can usually not be qualified as a liability rule is explained below, Sect. iv “FRAND-Declaration?”.

  105. 105.

    Merges (1996), p. 1342.

  106. 106.

    Merges (1999), p. 13.

  107. 107.

    Ibid.

  108. 108.

    Ibid., p. 18.

  109. 109.

    Section B in Chap. 3.

  110. 110.

    van Overwalle et al. (2006), p. 145, with reference to Krattiger (2004).

  111. 111.

    There are other ways and variants of categorizing clearinghouses: cf., for instance, Aoki and Schiff (2008), p. 196.

  112. 112.

    van Overwalle et al. (2006), p. 146.

  113. 113.

    Ibid., p. 145, with reference to Krattiger (2004).

  114. 114.

    van Overwalle et al. (2006), p. 145, with reference to Graff and Zilberman (2001); Krattiger (2004).

  115. 115.

    van Overwalle et al. (2006), p. 145, with reference to Merges (1996).

  116. 116.

    van Zimmeren et al. (2006), p. 355.

  117. 117.

    Section C in Chap. 3.

  118. 118.

    Fröhlich (2008), p. 211 et seq.; Maaßen (2009), p. 279796.

  119. 119.

    LG Mannheim, 27.02.2009, 7 O 94/08, Beck Rechtsprechung 2009, 08150.

  120. 120.

    Fröhlich (2008), p. 216.

  121. 121.

    See also Article II, Section 1a, German International Patent Convention Code for patent applications filed with the EPO.

  122. 122.

    This work does not contain any details about the 18 month publication regime, for further information see, inter alia, Webman (1995); Kraßer (1990); Pahlow (2008).

  123. 123.

    JPO (2009), p. 30.

  124. 124.

    BGH, IIC 1990, 241; Neuhaus (1990), pp. 526 and 528; Krieger (2001), p. 966; Keukenschrijver (2013b), m.n. 3.

  125. 125.

    Keukenschrijver (2013b), m.n. 16.

  126. 126.

    The process took place according to (the then existing) Article 23 GG: cf. Zippelius (1991), p. 23.

  127. 127.

    For further information about this topic, see Brändel (1992).

  128. 128.

    Osterrieth (2010), 53; Wirtschaftspatente were, therefore, entitlements protected with a liability rule by default.

  129. 129.

    The possibility that a patent may be revoked is not taken into account.

  130. 130.

    Some variants for definitions are provided below.

  131. 131.

    Bishop (2004), p. 83.

  132. 132.

    Cf., similarly, Kur and Schovsbo (2011), p. 412.

  133. 133.

    Williamson (1987), p. 19.

  134. 134.

    Ibid., p. 20.

  135. 135.

    Ibid., p. 21.

  136. 136.

    Ibid., pp. 20 et seq.

  137. 137.

    Picot (1982), p. 270.

  138. 138.

    Bishop (2004), p. 198.

  139. 139.

    Ibid., pp. 94 et seq.

  140. 140.

    Bell and Parchomovsky (2002).

  141. 141.

    The analysis is not limited to the area of property and IP law or at least not narrowed to an assumption that property should be protected as an exclusive right because it should be considered a mistake taking into account and comparing only these two fields of law and especially setting tangible property equal with IP without taking the economic differences into account. This is evident when taking a law and economic approach, but cf., for instance, the debate between Epstein and Menell: Menell (2007) and Epstein (2008).

  142. 142.

    Likewise, Heinemann (2008), p. 954.

  143. 143.

    Bishop (2004), p. 196.

  144. 144.

    Calabresi and Melamed (1972), p. 1094, with reference to Coase (1960).

  145. 145.

    Calabresi and Melamed (1972), p. 1096, and, inter alia, Farber (1997), p. 404 et seq.; Fox (2007), p. 387 et seq.; Coase also commented on the criticism regarding unrealistic assumptions later on: Coase (1990), p. 174.

  146. 146.

    Calabresi and Melamed (1972), p. 1093.

  147. 147.

    Ibid., pp. 1125 et seq.

  148. 148.

    Ibid., p. 1110.

  149. 149.

    Arguments which have obviously no relevance at all for the area of IP law are not mentioned, as, for example, the problem of reciprocal takings which may occur with liability rules and only tangible goods: cf. Ayres and Balkin (1996), p. 706.

  150. 150.

    See, inter alia, Kornhauser (1986), p. 712; Coleman and Kraus (1986), p. 1364.

  151. 151.

    The term information/assessment costs, as it is used here, is different from the term transaction costs and can be grouped into the broader category of enforcement costs. Whereas the latter are the parties’ costs for making an economic exchange, the former are costs to determine the compensation at an efficient point. If the parties have to bear the costs for determining a compensation these are, however, again transaction costs. This example also shows that the different cost-categories cannot be strictly distinguished from each other.

  152. 152.

    Polinsky (1980), p. 1111; Krier and Schwab (1995), p. 447; Krauss (1999), pp. 788 et seq.

  153. 153.

    Polinsky (1980), pp. 1111 et seq.

  154. 154.

    Krauss (1999), p. 788.

  155. 155.

    Krier and Schwab (1995), pp. 459 et seq.

  156. 156.

    Krier and Schwab (1995), p. 454; Krauss (1999), p. 789.

  157. 157.

    This idea was already indicated by Calabresi and Melamed: cf. Calabresi and Melamed (1972), p. 1093; however, it seems not being pursued later since they ask “why […] cannot society limit itself to the property rule? To do this it would need only to protect and enforce the initial entitlement from all attacks […].”, ibid., p. 1106.

  158. 158.

    Kaplow and Shavell (1996), pp. 741 et seq.

  159. 159.

    Article 19(4), German Basic Law contains such a guarantee: cf. Remmert (2013), m.n. 6; if there must be more than one instance is object of debate: cf., inter alia, Krugmann (2001), p. 306 et seq.

  160. 160.

    Cf. Section 303 German Criminal Code.

  161. 161.

    Cf. Section 242 German Criminal Code.

  162. 162.

    Kaplow and Shavell (1996), pp. 741 et seq.

  163. 163.

    Ayres and Talley (1995), p. 1037 et seq.

  164. 164.

    Ibid., p. 1033.

  165. 165.

    Ibid., p. 1038.

  166. 166.

    Ayres and Talley (1995), pp. 1032 et seq.; Ayres and Balkin (1996), pp. 706 et seq.

  167. 167.

    Ayres and Talley (1995), pp. 1043 et seq.

  168. 168.

    Kaplow and Shavell made this argument while focussing on situations where negative externalities arise: cf. Kaplow and Shavell (1996), pp. 723 et seq.; this should not be correct in the field of tangible goods because of possible repeated, reciprocal takings and correlated values: cf. ibid., pp. 767 et seq.

  169. 169.

    One should add: … and assessment/enforcement costs are low.

  170. 170.

    Kaplow and Shavell (1995), p. 233; Kaplow and Shavell (1996), pp. 723 et seq.

  171. 171.

    The traditional analysis is based on the standard, but probably wrong assumption, that the value of entitlement does not depend on ownership: Hoffman and Spitzer (1993), p. 98 et seq.; Korobkin (2003), p. 1283.

  172. 172.

    Kahneman et al. (1990), p. 1325; Lewinsohn-Zamir (2001), p. 250.

  173. 173.

    Hoffman and Spitzer (1993), p. 65.

  174. 174.

    Rachlinski and Jourden (1998), p. 1553 et seq.; Lewinsohn-Zamir (2001), p. 251.

  175. 175.

    Ayres and Talley (1995), pp. 1101 et seq.

  176. 176.

    Rachlinski and Jourdan find evidence for this argument in their behavioural study: cf. Rachlinski and Jourden (1998), p. 1572.

  177. 177.

    Ibid., p. 1574.

  178. 178.

    Epstein (1997), p. 2092.

  179. 179.

    Swope and Schmitt claim to have found empirical evidence for this behaviour in their experiment: Swope and Schmitt (2008), p. 13.

  180. 180.

    Lewinsohn-Zamir (2001), p. 247.

  181. 181.

    Haddock et al. (1990), p. 50.

  182. 182.

    Kaplow and Shavell (1995), pp. 228 et seq.

  183. 183.

    Kaplow and Shavell (1995), p. 232; Kaplow and Shavell (1996), pp. 35 et seq.

  184. 184.

    Haddock et al. (1990), p. 16; Lewinsohn-Zamir (2001), p. 249.

  185. 185.

    Lewinsohn-Zamir (2001), p. 249.

  186. 186.

    Haddock et al. (1990), p. 50.

  187. 187.

    Section B.2.a.

  188. 188.

    Section C.1.a.

  189. 189.

    Lewinsohn-Zamir (2001), p. 253.

  190. 190.

    Ibid., pp. 253 et seq.

  191. 191.

    This should especially be the case where no adequate substitutes exist (this argument is, of course, only applicable for tangible goods): cf. ibid.

  192. 192.

    Korobkin (2003), p. 1285.

  193. 193.

    Ibid., p. 1286.

  194. 194.

    Lewinsohn-Zamir (2001), p. 222.

  195. 195.

    See, inter alia, Bearden (2001).

  196. 196.

    Lewinsohn-Zamir (2001), p. 230.

  197. 197.

    Ibid., p. 232.

  198. 198.

    Kahneman and Tversky (1979), p. 263.

  199. 199.

    Lewinsohn-Zamir (2001), p. 238.

  200. 200.

    Stiglitz and Walsh (2010), p. 550.

  201. 201.

    This can already be seen with the design and application of patent laws, more specifically see, for instance, Machlup (1958), pp. 20 et seq.

  202. 202.

    Lemley (2005), p. 1031.

  203. 203.

    Lehmann (1989), p. 11 et seq.

  204. 204.

    Section 2.c.(2)(b).

  205. 205.

    Tandon (1982), p. 485.

  206. 206.

    Cohen et al. (2000), p. 20.

  207. 207.

    EPO (2007b), p. 95.

  208. 208.

    See Sect. 1.

  209. 209.

    Lemley and Weiser (2007), p. 832, with reference to Epstein (1997), pp. 16 et seq.

  210. 210.

    Elhauge (2008), p. 567; Depoorter (2008), pp. 62 et seq., with reference to Epstein (1997), pp. 16 et seq.

  211. 211.

    Kieff (2001), p. 732.

  212. 212.

    Ibid., pp. 733 and 727 et seq.

  213. 213.

    Ibid., p. 733, with reference to Haddock et al. (1990), pp. 16 et seq.

  214. 214.

    Sect. 2.c.(2)(d).

  215. 215.

    Kieff (2001), p. 732.

  216. 216.

    Kieff (2006), p. 328.

  217. 217.

    Ayres and Klemperer (1999), p. 1027 et seq.

  218. 218.

    Kieff (2001), pp. 734 et seq.

  219. 219.

    Kur and Schovsbo (2011), p. 417, with reference to Lemley (2005); Crane (2009), p. 271, with reference to Smith (2004), p. 1729.

  220. 220.

    Gilbert and Shapiro (1996), p. 12753.

  221. 221.

    Cugno and Ottoz (2006), p. 17.

  222. 222.

    Section 1.

  223. 223.

    Section 2.c.(2).

  224. 224.

    Merges (1994b), p. 2655; Merges (1996), pp. 1303 et seq.; Kur and Schovsbo (2011), p. 414.

  225. 225.

    Kur and Schovsbo (2011), p. 408.

  226. 226.

    Castro Bernieri (2010), p. 258.

  227. 227.

    Merges (1996), p. 1307.

  228. 228.

    von Bassewitz et al. (2004b), pp. 607 and 608.

  229. 229.

    von Bassewitz et al. (2004a), pp. 609 and 610.

  230. 230.

    Section 1.

  231. 231.

    Bessen and Meurer (2008), p. 46.

  232. 232.

    Depoorter (2008), p. 70.

  233. 233.

    Hilty (1990), p. 1.

  234. 234.

    Depoorter (2008), p. 70.

  235. 235.

    Lemley and Weiser (2007), pp. 793 et seq.

  236. 236.

    Ibid., p. 794.

  237. 237.

    Ibid., pp. 794 et seq.

  238. 238.

    Ibid., p. 785.

  239. 239.

    Depoorter (2008), p. 66.

  240. 240.

    Sterk (2008), p. 1285.

  241. 241.

    Castro Bernieri (2010), pp. 241 et seq. and 258.

  242. 242.

    Devlin (2009), pp. 75 and 82 et seq.

  243. 243.

    Gwartney (2009), p. 1406.

  244. 244.

    Lemley and Shapiro (2005), p. 75; Farrell and Shapiro (2008), p. 1347.

  245. 245.

    Heald (2007), p. 460.

  246. 246.

    Ibid.

  247. 247.

    Section 2.c.(1)(d).

  248. 248.

    Section 2.c.(2)(d).

  249. 249.

    Weeds (1999), p. 19.

  250. 250.

    Tandon (1982), p. 484.

  251. 251.

    The definition originates from van Overwalle: van Overwalle (2009), p. 390.

  252. 252.

    Kur and Schovsbo (2011), p. 414.

  253. 253.

    Frischmann and Lemley (2007), p. 292.

  254. 254.

    Depoorter (2008), p. 66.

  255. 255.

    Liu (2008), p. 757.

  256. 256.

    For an overview with further references, see Fischmann (2010), pp. 185 et seq.

  257. 257.

    Fröhlich (2008), p. 209; Fischmann (2010), p. 186.

  258. 258.

    Kur and Schovsbo (2011), p. 415.

  259. 259.

    Lemley and Weiser (2007), p. 795.

  260. 260.

    There may not be an infringement, but due to the uncertainty of the boundaries of a patent, the patentee may be successful in asking for licensing fees.

  261. 261.

    Shapiro (2006), p. 27.

  262. 262.

    Klees (2012), p. 90.

  263. 263.

    Kur and Schovsbo (2011), p. 415.

  264. 264.

    Lemley and Weiser (2007), p. 795.

  265. 265.

    For whatever reason.

  266. 266.

    See, inter alia, Depoorter (2008), pp. 78 et seq.; Schovsbo (2009), pp. 612 et seq.

  267. 267.

    Heller (1998), p. 621.

  268. 268.

    Heller (1998), p. 622; see especially also Hardin (1968), p. 1243.

  269. 269.

    Heller (1998), p. 622; Depoorter (2008), pp. 71 et seq.

  270. 270.

    Heller and Eisenberg (1998), pp. 625 et seq.

  271. 271.

    Buchanan and Yoon (2000), p. 3 et seq.

  272. 272.

    Schulz et al. (2002), p. 158.

  273. 273.

    Shapiro (2001), p. 119.

  274. 274.

    Like it was argued by van Overwalle (2009), p. 387.

  275. 275.

    Schovsbo (2009), pp. 611 et seq.

  276. 276.

    Depoorter (2008), p. 66.

  277. 277.

    Shapiro (2001), p. 119.

  278. 278.

    Schovsbo (2009), p. 612.

  279. 279.

    Lemley and Shapiro (2007), p. 1993.

  280. 280.

    Sections 2.c.(1)(c) and (2)(c).

  281. 281.

    Buccafusco and Sprigman (2010b), p. 39.

  282. 282.

    Depoorter (2008), p. 68.

  283. 283.

    Buccafusco and Sprigman (2010a), p. 34; Buccafusco and Sprigman (2010b), p. 39.

  284. 284.

    Buccafusco and Sprigman (2010a), p. 22.

  285. 285.

    Buccafusco and Sprigman (2010a), pp. 23 et seq.; Buccafusco and Sprigman (2010b), pp. 33 et seq.

  286. 286.

    Merges (1994a), p. 75.

  287. 287.

    Kur and Schovsbo (2011), p. 417.

  288. 288.

    One should agree with that statement which originates from Kur and Schovsbo (2011), p. 418.

  289. 289.

    McAfee (2002), p. 273.

  290. 290.

    Calabresi and Melamed (1972), pp. 1098 et seq.

  291. 291.

    Ibid., p. 1104.

  292. 292.

    Ibid., p. 1098.

  293. 293.

    Andel (1984), p. 648.

  294. 294.

    Calabresi and Melamed (1972), pp. 1102 et seq.

  295. 295.

    Polinsky (1980), p. 1111; cf. also Sect. 2.c.(1).

  296. 296.

    Ibid.

  297. 297.

    Section 2.c.(2).

  298. 298.

    Polinsky (1980), p. 1111.

  299. 299.

    Machlup (1958), pp. 20 et seq.

  300. 300.

    For all theories see ibid., p. 20.

  301. 301.

    For all theories see ibid.

  302. 302.

    Osterrieth (2010), p. 5; Kraßer and Bernhardt (2009), p. 37.

  303. 303.

    Kraßer and Bernhardt (2009), p. 37.

  304. 304.

    Arguments against the patent protection per se will not be mentioned; see Machlup (1958), pp. 22 et seq.

  305. 305.

    Machlup (1958), p. 22; Götting (2006), pp. 353 et seq.

  306. 306.

    Kraßer and Bernhardt (2009), pp. 37 et seq.

  307. 307.

    Ibid., p. 39; see also (regarding the situation in socialist states) Beier (1970), p. 3.

  308. 308.

    Mes (2011), § 24, m.n. 14.

  309. 309.

    von Bassewitz et al. (2004b), p. 608.

  310. 310.

    One may also argue that the idealistic reasons for a patent law system become less and less important: cf. Ann (2004), p. 603.

  311. 311.

    BGBl. II 1970, 391; BGBl. II 1984, 799.

  312. 312.

    Articles 20 and 21, Directive 2004/48/EC.

  313. 313.

    Bodenhausen (1968), p. 71.

  314. 314.

    van Zimmeren and van Overwalle (2011), p. 18.

  315. 315.

    Bodenhausen (1968), p. 70.

  316. 316.

    Footnote 6 in the official text.

  317. 317.

    Gervais (1998), pp. 293 and 297; Subramanian (2008), p. 446.

  318. 318.

    Subramanian (2008), p. 446.

  319. 319.

    World Trade Organisation Ministerial Conference Fourth Season (2001), p. 4.

  320. 320.

    Stern-Dombal (2007), p. 272 et seq.

  321. 321.

    van Zimmeren and van Overwalle (2011), p. 19.

  322. 322.

    Subramanian (2008), p. 447.

  323. 323.

    von Mühlendahl (2007), p. 377.

  324. 324.

    Osterrieth (2009), p. 545.

  325. 325.

    von Mühlendahl (2007), p. 380.

  326. 326.

    Article 5(3), EU and Protocol (No. 2) on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality.

  327. 327.

    Tomuschat and Currie (2010), p. 22.

  328. 328.

    Cf., inter alia, Schulte (1985), p. 772; Grzeszick (2007), p. 345 et seq.; Papier (2013), m.n. 198.

  329. 329.

    The situation where a liability rule by default applies directly after the patent grant is considered being equal with a situation where it applies at a later point in time.

  330. 330.

    Fechner (1999), p. 238.

  331. 331.

    Kraßer (1998), p. 519.

  332. 332.

    Bußmann (1977), p. 133; Timmann (2008), pp. 187 et seq.

  333. 333.

    Timmann (2008), pp. 191 et seq.

  334. 334.

    Kraßer and Bernhardt (2009), p. 42.

  335. 335.

    For an overview of the different arguments in favour and against this view, see Timmann (2008), pp. 182 et seq.

  336. 336.

    Timmann (2008), p. 183.

  337. 337.

    Timmann (2008), p. 179; Kraßer and Bernhardt (2009), pp. 26 et seq. and 41.

  338. 338.

    BVerfG NJW 1998, 3704.

  339. 339.

    Section B.2.c.

  340. 340.

    Papier (2013), m.n. 306.

  341. 341.

    Fechner (1999), p. 251.

  342. 342.

    Timmann (2008), p. 233; Kraßer and Bernhardt (2009), p. 833.

  343. 343.

    Rogge (2006b), m.n. 16; Timmann (2008), p. 236.

  344. 344.

    Hilty makes a similar argument while referring to the use of legal licences in the area of copyright law: Hilty (2005), p. 341.

  345. 345.

    Keukenschrijver (2013a), m.n. 5.

  346. 346.

    Acts concerning the past are basically not permitted: Grzeszick (2013), m.n. 27; relatively unproblematic would be if the patent was not filed yet.

  347. 347.

    Ibid., m.n. 88 and 92.

  348. 348.

    Meyer-Ladewig (2006), Prot. No. 1, Art. 1 m.n. 2.

  349. 349.

    Ibid., Prot. No. 1, Art. 1 m.n. 11.

  350. 350.

    Bernsdorff (2011), m.n. 1.

  351. 351.

    Jarass (2006), p. 1091; Depenheuer (2006), m.n. 30.

  352. 352.

    Bernsdorff (2011), m.n. 15.

  353. 353.

    Depenheuer (2006), m.n. 29.

  354. 354.

    Ibid., m.n. 21.

  355. 355.

    ECJ, 14.07.1981, C-187/80—Merck v. Stephar; ECJ, 09.07.1985, C-19/84—Pharmon v. Hoechst.

  356. 356.

    Depenheuer refers to the above-cited decisions and mentions several times the term “exclusivity” while explaining Article 17, Section 2, EU-Charter, Depenheuer (2006), m.n. 30.

  357. 357.

    Geiger makes this argument while using the example of copyright law; see Geiger (2006), p. 382 et seq.

  358. 358.

    Section B.4.b.(1).

  359. 359.

    World Intellectual Property Organization (2010), p. 1.

  360. 360.

    Allison and Lemley (2000), p. 2121.

  361. 361.

    Section B.4.b.(2).

  362. 362.

    Section 81, Subsection 2, PatG.

  363. 363.

    See also Harhoff (2009).

  364. 364.

    Harhoff and Reitzig (2004), p. 445.

  365. 365.

    The number of patent applications almost doubled from 1992 to 2005; also the number of patent grants rose significantly: cf. World Intellectual Property Organization (2010), pp. 37 and 40.

  366. 366.

    EPO (2010a), pp. 18 et seq.

  367. 367.

    EPO (2009), pp. 22 et seq.

  368. 368.

    DPMA (2013), p. 96.

  369. 369.

    For an overview see Harhoff (2009), pp. 27 et seq.

  370. 370.

    See generally inter alia, Graf (2007); Wissenschaftlicher Beirat beim Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie (2007), pp. 20 et seq.; Hilty (2009b), pp. 98 et seqq.

  371. 371.

    DPMA (2004).

  372. 372.

    EPO (2010b).

  373. 373.

    According to Kraßer, the EPO has a grant rate of around 74 % and the DPMA of almost 50 %: Kraßer and Bernhardt (2009), pp. 112 and 114. One must note, however, that figures vary in different publications—presumably due to different calculation methods. Moreover, one should be aware that the different grant rates may have several reasons, for instance one could expect that more important inventions are filed rather with the EPO than the DPMA.

  374. 374.

    DPMA (2004), p. 8.

  375. 375.

    Kinkeldey and Karamanli (2012), m.n. 16 et seq.; EPO (2010b), p. 353.

  376. 376.

    Mes (2011), § 4, m.n. 19 et seq.

  377. 377.

    Jestaedt (2001), p. 942.

  378. 378.

    For a summary of the criteria and indications named by the BGH, see Mes (2011), § 4, m.n. 33 et seqq.; Asendorf and Schmidt (2006), m.n. 50 et seq.

  379. 379.

    The Board 28 (2007), p. 7.

  380. 380.

    Astomio (2007), p. 251.

  381. 381.

    Harhoff and Wagner (2006), p. 23.

  382. 382.

    van Overwalle and Schovsbo (2007), p. 836.

  383. 383.

    Ernst & Young (2007), p. 10.

  384. 384.

    Sag and Rohde (2006), p. 16.

  385. 385.

    EPO (2007a).

  386. 386.

    One must note however that the EPO is viewed currently according to a survey among patent attorneys as having the best patent quality compared with the JPO, USPTO, the Korean and the Chinese patent office: Wild (2011), p. 72 et seq.

  387. 387.

    The counts relate to pendency until dispatch of the decisions: EPO et al. (2011), p. 57.

  388. 388.

    Gans et al. (2006), pp. 23 et seq.

  389. 389.

    Harhoff (2006), p. 24; more current figures were not published.

  390. 390.

    Ibid.

  391. 391.

    BPatG (2013), p. 140.

  392. 392.

    BGH (2012), p. 32; BGH (2013), p. 32.

  393. 393.

    Graham et al. (2003), p. 75; for the biotechnological and the pharmaceutical industry, see Harhoff and Reitzig (2004), p. 478.

  394. 394.

    EPO (2010c), Fee Code 010.

  395. 395.

    Appendix to Section 2, Subsection 1, PatKostG, Fee No. 313 600.

  396. 396.

    Harhoff and Reitzig mention that estimates from patent attorneys range between €15,000 and €25,000 for each party: Harhoff and Reitzig (2004), p. 450; according to van Pottelsberghe the costs including patent attorneys’ fees vary between €6,000 and €50,000: van Pottelsberghe (2009), p. 13.

  397. 397.

    BGH, GRUR 2009, 1100; in exceptional cases the value of the matter in dispute may be reduced (Section 144 PatG).

  398. 398.

    Rough estimates mention a range from €50,000 to €500,000: Harhoff and Reitzig (2004), p. 451; van Pottelsberghe mentions €50,000–250,000 for the first instance and €90,000–190,000 for the second instance: van Pottelsberghe (2009), p. 14.

  399. 399.

    Such behaviour is, of course, highly undesirable with regard to the general interest and the aim having certainty about the validity.

  400. 400.

    Mes (2011), § 81, m.n. 79 and 86.

  401. 401.

    Rogge (2006a), m.n. 39 et seq.; Halfmeier (2006), pp. 60 et seq.

  402. 402.

    Section B.4.b.(4).

  403. 403.

    Footnote 365.

  404. 404.

    von Graevenitz et al. (2008), p. 30, with reference to Kortum and Lerner (1998); Hall and Ziedonis (2001); Ziedonis (2004).

  405. 405.

    von Graevenitz et al. (2008), p. 30.

  406. 406.

    Cockburn et al. (2010), p. 920.

  407. 407.

    Siebert and von Graevenitz (2010), p. 240 et seq.

  408. 408.

    Cf., inter alia (the first two refer to the US system), Kortum and Lerner (1999); Hall (2004); Harhoff et al. (2007), pp. 65 et seq.

  409. 409.

    von Graevenitz et al. (2009).

  410. 410.

    von Graevenitz et al. (2008), p. 30, with reference to National Research Council of the National Academies (2007), pp. 1 et seq.

  411. 411.

    Heller and Eisenberg (1998); Goldstein (2009), p. 52.

  412. 412.

    Verbeure et al. (2006).

  413. 413.

    Schovsbo (2009), p. 612.

  414. 414.

    Section B.4.b.(3).

  415. 415.

    Siebert and von Graevenitz (2008), pp. 35 et seq.

  416. 416.

    Giuri et al. (2007), pp. 1107 et seq.

  417. 417.

    Ibid., p. 1118.

  418. 418.

    Chien (2003).

  419. 419.

    Some also use the term patent thicket; this does, however, not fit here because a situation is described where only one patent owner—and not several—files numerous applications.

  420. 420.

    This number consists of patent applications and granted patents in several EU member states; European Commission (2009), p. 521.

  421. 421.

    Ibid., pp. 520 et seq.

  422. 422.

    Many attempts for a definition were made: cf. Rubin (2007), p. 60.

  423. 423.

    Lemley (2008), p. 612.

  424. 424.

    Williams and Gardner (2006), p. 1.

  425. 425.

    Cf., inter alia, Luman and Dodson (2006), p. 12; Golden (2007), p. 2111 et seq.; Ohly (2008), p. 787.

  426. 426.

    Merges (2009), p. 1588.

  427. 427.

    Lemley and Shapiro (2007), p. 2009.

  428. 428.

    Niro and Greenspoon (2007), p. 14.

  429. 429.

    Repeatedly mentioned are especially the lawsuit between NPT and Research in Motion and United States Supreme Court, 15.05.2006, 547 U.S. 388—eBay v. MercExchange.

  430. 430.

    Schickedanz (2009), p. 901.

  431. 431.

    LG Mannheim, 27.02.2009, 7 O 94/08; LG Mannheim, GRUR Prax 2010, 318.

  432. 432.

    Ihlenfeld (2008).

  433. 433.

    http://www.ipcom-munich.com/home_en.html.

  434. 434.

    IPCom GmbH & Co. KG (2009).

  435. 435.

    Ihlenfeld (2008).

  436. 436.

    LG Mannheim, GRUR Prax 2010, 318.

  437. 437.

    Juve.de (2011).

  438. 438.

    LG Mannheim, 27.02.2009, 7 O 94/08.

  439. 439.

    German Upper Regional Court (Oberlandesgericht) Karlsruhe, GRUR-RR 2010, 120 et seq.

  440. 440.

    Osterrieth (2009), p. 543.

  441. 441.

    Schickedanz (2009), pp. 902 et seq.

  442. 442.

    See, especially, Fischmann (2010).

  443. 443.

    US Federal Trade Commission, 17.06.1996, C-3658, File No. 931 0097—Dell.

  444. 444.

    The case material can be found here: http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9305/index.shtm.

  445. 445.

    The case material can be found here: http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9302/index.shtm.

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  1. Munich, Germany

    Daniel Krauspenhaar

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Krauspenhaar, D. (2015). Overuse of Exclusivity in Patent Law. In: Liability Rules in Patent Law. Munich Studies on Innovation and Competition, vol 1. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-40900-4_2

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