Abstract
Brand advertising through web display ads, aimed at driving up brand awareness and purchase intentions, is the cornerstone of the Internet economic ecosystem. The ever increasing penetration of the Internet and recent technological advances allow for cost effective targeting and gave rise to an array of new interconnected entities - e.g., the pivotal Ad Exchange (AdX) - offering added value to publishers and advertisers.
We propose a new game for the Trading Agent Competition (TAC), to be launched in 2013, reflecting the challenges faced by an Ad Network (AdN) as it bids for display ads opportunities. Those settings are new and conceptually different than those modeled by existing TAC games: the key conflict that AdNs face is to fulfill advertising contracts at minimum cost while sustaining and attracting advertisers by achieving high quality targeting. Therefore, efficient marketing effectiveness is the main concern of an agent implementing the AdN strategy.
In our proposed AdX game, which significantly differs from the TAC Ad Auctions (TAC-AA) game setting, we also consider the following key elements of the AdX setting: the method in which reserve prices are set by publishers, the mechanism for discovering the value of cookie matching services, and the ways the targeting quality of ad networks effects their long term earnings prospects.
This research was supported in part by the Google Inter-university center for Electronic Markets and Auctions, by a grant from the Israel Science Foundation, by a grant from United States-Israel Binational Science Foundation (BSF), by a grant from the Israeli Ministry of Science (MoS), and by the Israeli Centers of Research Excellence (I-CORE) program, (Center No. 4/11).
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsPreview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Muthukrishnan, S.: Ad exchanges: Research issues. In: Leonardi, S. (ed.) WINE 2009. LNCS, vol. 5929, pp. 1–12. Springer, Heidelberg (2009)
Chakraborty, T., Even-Dar, E., Guha, S., Mansour, Y., Muthukrishnan, S.: Selective call out and Real-time Bidding. In: Saberi, A. (ed.) WINE 2010. LNCS, vol. 6484, pp. 145–157. Springer, Heidelberg (2010)
Balseiro, S., Feldman, J., Mirrokni, V., Muthukrishnan, S.: Yield Optimization of Display Advertising with Ad Exchange. In: ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (2011)
Feldman, J., Mirrokni, V., Muthukrishnan, S., Pai, M.M.: Auctions with intermediaries. In: Proceedings of the 11th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (2010)
Magna Global, 2011 Advertising Forecast (2011), http://www.magnaglobal.com
Jordan, P.R., Wellman, M.P.: Designing an ad auctions game for the trading agent competition. In: David, E., Gerding, E., Sarne, D., Shehory, O. (eds.) AMEC 2009. LNBIP, vol. 59, pp. 147–162. Springer, Heidelberg (2010)
The Ad Exchange Game - Specification, http://www.cs.tau.ac.il/~marianos/Research.html
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2013 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Schain, M., Mansour, Y. (2013). Ad Exchange – Proposal for a New Trading Agent Competition Game. In: David, E., Kiekintveld, C., Robu, V., Shehory, O., Stein, S. (eds) Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce. Designing Trading Strategies and Mechanisms for Electronic Markets. AMEC TADA 2012 2012. Lecture Notes in Business Information Processing, vol 136. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-40864-9_10
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-40864-9_10
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-40863-2
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-40864-9
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)