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Heterogeneous Agents’ Interactions in a Double Auction Virtual Stock Market

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Computational Collective Intelligence. Technologies and Applications (ICCCI 2013)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 8083))

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Abstract

The hereto paper analyses the impact of the number of heterogeneous agents in an evolutionary agent-based model of the stock market when simulated through Adaptive Modeler simulation software application. The paper compares the returns, total wealth and distributions of wealth obtained from simulating the evolutionary agent-based model with 500, 1,000, 1,500 and 2,000 agents which create a virtual stock market using a double auction trading mechanism. Within the agent-based model the population of agents is continuously adapting and evolving by using genetic programming in order to generate new agents by using the trading strategies of the best performing agents and replacing the worst performing agents in a process called breeding.

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Dezsi, D., Mărieş, I., Bălu, FO. (2013). Heterogeneous Agents’ Interactions in a Double Auction Virtual Stock Market. In: Bǎdicǎ, C., Nguyen, N.T., Brezovan, M. (eds) Computational Collective Intelligence. Technologies and Applications. ICCCI 2013. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 8083. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-40495-5_21

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-40495-5_21

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-40494-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-40495-5

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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