Abstract
Among the most fundamental questions which epistemology has sought to answer are the following:
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1)
How ought we to arrive at our beliefs?
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2)
How do we arrive at our beliefs?
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3)
Are the processes by which we do arrive at our beliefs the ones by which we ought to arrive at our beliefs? (Kornblith 1985, p. 1)
Traditionally, the answers to these questions were as follows: both epistemology and psychology should carry out their research independently and separately, and then, once they have answered questions 1 and 2 respectively, they will attempt to answer question 3.
The present chapter is a modified version of Viale R. (1989), “Epistemologia, cognizione e razionalità deduttiva”, in R. Viale (a cura di), Mente Umana Mente Artificiale, Milano: Feltrinelli.
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Notes
- 1.
Stated simply probabilistic inference claims that whenever the two end-terms share the middle term in common, they will be assumed to be related to each other. In other words, if the end-terms are related positively then a positive conclusion will be drawn, while if they are related negatively then a negative conclusion will be drawn (Evans et al. 1993, p. 239).
- 2.
Conversion is a validating form of immediate inference for E (Negative Universal Proposition)—and I (Affirmative Particular Proposition)-type categorical propositions. To convert such a proposition is to switch the subject and predicate terms of the proposition, which is non-validating for the A (Affirmative Universal Proposition)—and O (Negative Particular Proposition) -type propositions. Hence, the fallacy of Illicit Conversion is converting an A- or O-type proposition (Edwards 1972). For example: “We like the beautiful and don't like the ugly; therefore, what we like is beautiful, and what we don't like ugly….”.
- 3.
According to some authors such as Bealer (1998) Sosa (1998) and Nagel (2007), the role and epistemic status of intuitions in philosophy are similar to those of perceptual evidence in science. Many unresolved problems still surround the status of intuition in philosophy. For example, whether treating intuitions as evidence involves treating psychological states as evidence, or treating the contents of those psychological states as evidence (Alexander 2012, p. 114). In any case as Hilary Kornblith (1998) states clearly, what all philosophers do is appeal to intuitions in constructing, shaping and refining their philosophical views.
- 4.
A possible solution to this problem is offered by an alternative theory which has given rise to a productive programme in terms of theoretical and empirical research. According to this theory, underlying the reasoning processes are informal but content-specific inference rules. Cheng and Holyoak (1985, 1989) have characterised it as a pragmatic theory of deductive reasoning. The individual constructs pragmatic schemes, namely a set of almost abstract but content-sensitive rules relating to actions that are important in terms of his/her own interests and personal aims. In some cases, the solution of a deductive reasoning task deriving from the application of these schemes corresponds to the foreseeable solution based on the application of formal inference schemes (as in some cases of the realistic selection task using familiar rules) whereas in other cases this does not happen.
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Viale, R. (2013). Deductive Rationality and Cognition. In: Methodological Cognitivism. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-40216-6_4
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