Advertisement

Allowing Non-identifying Information Disclosure in Citizen Opinion Evaluation

  • Francesco Buccafurri
  • Lidia Fotia
  • Gianluca Lax
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 8061)

Abstract

The continuous participation of citizens in the decisional processes of the community through the submission of their opinions is a key factor of e-democracy. To do this, it appears very promising the use of lightweight e-voting systems relying on existing social networks, as a good way to solve the trade-off among security, usability and scalability requirements. Among the other security features, anonymity of citizens (i.e., secreteness) should be guaranteed, at least to be sure that the action of people is actually free from conditioning. However, the decisional process would be better driven if the opinions of citizens were mapped to social, economic, working, personal, non-identifying attributes. In this paper, by extending a previous solution working on existing social networks, we overcome the above limit by re-interpreting the classical concept of secreteness in such a way that a preference expressed by a citizen can be related to a number of (certified) attributes chosen by the citizen herself, yet keeping her anonymity.

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. 1.
    Abe, M., Fujisaki, E.: How to date blind signatures. In: Kim, K.-c., Matsumoto, T. (eds.) ASIACRYPT 1996. LNCS, vol. 1163, pp. 244–251. Springer, Heidelberg (1996)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. 2.
    Ateniese, G., Camenisch, J., Joye, M., Tsudik, G.: A practical and provably secure coalition-resistant group signature scheme. In: Bellare, M. (ed.) CRYPTO 2000. LNCS, vol. 1880, pp. 255–270. Springer, Heidelberg (2000)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. 3.
    Bach, E.: Discrete logarithms and factoring. Computer Science Division, University of California (1984)Google Scholar
  4. 4.
    Bertino, E., Ferrari, E., Squicciarini, A.C.: Privacy-preserving trust negotiations. In: Martin, D., Serjantov, A. (eds.) PET 2004. LNCS, vol. 3424, pp. 283–301. Springer, Heidelberg (2005)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. 5.
    Blum, M.: Coin flipping by telephone a protocol for solving impossible problems. ACM SIGACT News 15(1), 23–27 (1983)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. 6.
    Boneh, D., Boyen, X., Shacham, H.: Short group signatures. In: Franklin, M. (ed.) CRYPTO 2004. LNCS, vol. 3152, pp. 41–55. Springer, Heidelberg (2004)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. 7.
    Brands, S.A.: An efficient off-line electronic cash system based on the representation problem (1993)Google Scholar
  8. 8.
    Brands, S.A.: Rethinking public key infrastructures and digital certificates: building in privacy. MIT Press (2000)Google Scholar
  9. 9.
    Brassard, G., Chaum, D., Crépeau, C.: Minimum disclosure proofs of knowledge. Journal of Computer and System Sciences 37(2), 156–189 (1988)MathSciNetCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. 10.
    Buccafurri, F., Fotia, L., Lax, G.: Allowing continuous evaluation of citizen opinions through social networks. In: Kő, A., Leitner, C., Leitold, H., Prosser, A. (eds.) EDEM 2012 and EGOVIS 2012. LNCS, vol. 7452, pp. 242–253. Springer, Heidelberg (2012)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. 11.
    Buccafurri, F., Fotia, L., Lax, G.: Privacy-preserving resource evaluation in social networks. In: Proceedings of the 2012 Tenth Annual International Conference on Privacy, Security and Trust, PST 2012, pp. 51–58. IEEE Computer Society (2012)Google Scholar
  12. 12.
    Buccafurri, F., Lax, G., Nocera, A., Ursino, D.: Discovering links among social networks. In: Flach, P.A., De Bie, T., Cristianini, N. (eds.) ECML PKDD 2012, Part II. LNCS, vol. 7524, pp. 467–482. Springer, Heidelberg (2012)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. 13.
    Burmester, M., Magkos, E.: Towards secure and practical e-elections in the new era. Secure Electronic Voting, 63–76 (2003)Google Scholar
  14. 14.
    Camenisch, J., Hohenberger, S., Lysyanskaya, A.: Compact E-cash. In: Cramer, R. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2005. LNCS, vol. 3494, pp. 302–321. Springer, Heidelberg (2005)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  15. 15.
    Camenisch, J., Lysyanskaya, A.: An efficient system for non-transferable anonymous credentials with optional anonymity revocation. In: Pfitzmann, B. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2001. LNCS, vol. 2045, pp. 93–118. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  16. 16.
    Camenisch, J., Lysyanskaya, A.: Signature schemes and anonymous credentials from bilinear maps. In: Franklin, M. (ed.) CRYPTO 2004. LNCS, vol. 3152, pp. 56–72. Springer, Heidelberg (2004)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  17. 17.
    Chaum, D.: Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms. Communications of the ACM 24(2), 84–90 (1981)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  18. 18.
    Chaum, D.: Blind signatures for untraceable payments. In: McCurley, K.S., Ziegler, C.D. (eds.) Advances in Cryptology 1981 - 1997. LNCS, vol. 1440, pp. 199–203. Springer, Heidelberg (1999)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  19. 19.
    Chaum, D.: Security without identification: Transaction systems to make big brother obsolete. Communications of the ACM 28(10), 1030–1044 (1985)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  20. 20.
    Chaum, D.: Elections with unconditionally-secret ballots and disruption equivalent to breaking RSA. In: Günther, C.G. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 1988. LNCS, vol. 330, pp. 177–182. Springer, Heidelberg (1988)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  21. 21.
    Chaum, D., Damgård, I.B., van de Graaf, J.: Multiparty computations ensuring privacy of each party’s input and correctness of the result. In: Pomerance, C. (ed.) CRYPTO 1987. LNCS, vol. 293, pp. 87–119. Springer, Heidelberg (1988)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  22. 22.
    Chaum, D., Evertse, J.-H.: A secure and privacy-protecting protocol for transmitting personal information between organizations. In: Odlyzko, A.M. (ed.) CRYPTO 1986. LNCS, vol. 263, pp. 118–167. Springer, Heidelberg (1987)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  23. 23.
    Chaum, D., van Heyst, E.: Group signatures. In: Davies, D.W. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 1991. LNCS, vol. 547, pp. 257–265. Springer, Heidelberg (1991)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  24. 24.
    Cordella, A.: E-government: towards the e-bureaucratic form? Journal of Information Technology 22(3), 265–274 (2007)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  25. 25.
    Cramer, R., Gennaro, R., Schoenmakers, B.: A secure and optimally efficient multi-authority election scheme. European Transactions on Telecommunications 8(5), 481–490 (1997)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  26. 26.
    Dobbertin, H., Bosselaers, A., Preneel, B.: RIPEMD-160: A strengthened version of RIPEMD. In: Gollmann, D. (ed.) FSE 1996. LNCS, vol. 1039, pp. 71–82. Springer, Heidelberg (1996)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  27. 27.
    Dunleavy, P., Margetts, H., Bastow, S., Tinkler, J.: Digital era governance: IT corporations, the state, and e-government. OUP Catalogue (2006)Google Scholar
  28. 28.
    Eastlake, D., Jones, P.: US secure hash algorithm 1 (SHA1). Technical report, RFC 3174 (September 2001)Google Scholar
  29. 29.
    Fiat, A., Shamir, A.: How to prove yourself: practical solutions to identification and signature problems. In: Odlyzko, A.M. (ed.) CRYPTO 1986. LNCS, vol. 263, pp. 186–194. Springer, Heidelberg (1987)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  30. 30.
    Fouque, P.-A., Poupard, G., Stern, J.: Sharing decryption in the context of voting or lotteries. In: Frankel, Y. (ed.) FC 2000. LNCS, vol. 1962, pp. 90–104. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  31. 31.
    Frankel, Y., Tsiounis, Y., Yung, M.: Fair off-line e-cash made easy. In: Ohta, K., Pei, D. (eds.) ASIACRYPT 1998. LNCS, vol. 1514, pp. 257–270. Springer, Heidelberg (1998)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  32. 32.
    Fujioka, A., Okamoto, T., Ohta, K.: A practical secret voting scheme for large scale elections. In: Zheng, Y., Seberry, J. (eds.) AUSCRYPT 1992. LNCS, vol. 718, pp. 244–251. Springer, Heidelberg (1993)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  33. 33.
    Goldreich, O., Micali, S., Wigderson, A.: Proofs that yield nothing but their validity or all languages in NP have zero-knowledge proof systems. Journal of the ACM (JACM) 38(3), 690–728 (1991)MathSciNetCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  34. 34.
    Goldwasser, S., Micali, S., Wigderson, A.: How to play any mental game, or a completeness theorem for protocols with an honest majority. In: Proc. of the Nienteenth Annual ACM STOC, vol. 87, pp. 218–229 (1987)Google Scholar
  35. 35.
    Hirt, M., Sako, K.: Efficient receipt-free voting based on homomorphic encryption. In: Preneel, B. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2000. LNCS, vol. 1807, pp. 539–556. Springer, Heidelberg (2000)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  36. 36.
    Holt, J.E., Seamons, K.E.: Selective disclosure credential sets (2002), Accessible as http://citeseer.nj.nec.com/541329.html
  37. 37.
    Jarvis, R.: Selective disclosure of credential content during trust negotiation. Master of Science Thesis, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah (2003)Google Scholar
  38. 38.
    Kiayias, A., Tsiounis, Y., Yung, M.: Traceable signatures. In: Cachin, C., Camenisch, J.L. (eds.) EUROCRYPT 2004. LNCS, vol. 3027, pp. 571–589. Springer, Heidelberg (2004)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  39. 39.
    Kiayias, A., Yung, M.: Secure scalable group signature with dynamic joins and separable authorities. International Journal of Security and Networks 1(1), 24–45 (2006)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  40. 40.
    Medaglia, R.: eParticipation research: Moving characterization forward (2006–2011). Government Information Quarterly (2012)Google Scholar
  41. 41.
    Naor, M.: Bit commitment using pseudorandomness. Journal of Cryptology 4(2), 151–158 (1991)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  42. 42.
    Naor, M., Pinkas, B., Sumner, R.: Privacy preserving auctions and mechanism design. In: Proceedings of the 1st ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, pp. 129–139. ACM (1999)Google Scholar
  43. 43.
    Park, C., Itoh, K., Kurosawa, K.: Efficient anonymous channel and all/nothing election scheme. In: Helleseth, T. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 1993. LNCS, vol. 765, pp. 248–259. Springer, Heidelberg (1994)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  44. 44.
    Persiano, P., Visconti, I.: User privacy issues regarding certificates and the TLS protocol: the design and implementation of the SPSL protocol. In: Proceedings of the 7th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pp. 53–62. ACM (2000)Google Scholar
  45. 45.
    Persson, A., Goldkuhl, G.: Government value paradigms-bureaucracy, new public management, and e-government. Communications of the Association for Information Systems 27(1), 4 (2010)Google Scholar
  46. 46.
    Pieprzyk, J., Hardjono, T., Seberry, J.: Fundamentals of computer security. Springer (2003)Google Scholar
  47. 47.
    Rose, J., Sæbø, Ø.: Establishing political deliberation systems: Key problems (2008)Google Scholar
  48. 48.
    Sæbø, Ø., Rose, J., Skiftenes Flak, L.: The shape of eParticipation: Characterizing an emerging research area. Government Information Quarterly 25(3), 400–428 (2008)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  49. 49.
    Sako, K., Kilian, J.: Receipt-free mix-type voting scheme. In: Guillou, L.C., Quisquater, J.-J. (eds.) EUROCRYPT 1995. LNCS, vol. 921, pp. 393–403. Springer, Heidelberg (1995)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  50. 50.
    Susha, I., Grönlund, Å.: eParticipation research: Systematizing the field. Government Information Quarterly (2012)Google Scholar
  51. 51.
    Viscusi, G., Mecella, M.: Information systems for eGovernment: A quality-of-service perspective. Springer (2011)Google Scholar
  52. 52.
    Zwierko, A., Kotulski, Z.: A light-weight e-voting system with distributed trust. Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 168, 109–126 (2007)CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Francesco Buccafurri
    • 1
  • Lidia Fotia
    • 1
  • Gianluca Lax
    • 1
  1. 1.DIIESUniversity Mediterranea of Reggio CalabriaReggio CalabriaItaly

Personalised recommendations