Abstract
This paper is study on executive compensation and company performance in Chinese private listed company. We use panel data multiple regression to analysis the data, which is from 2006 to 2010. The results indicate the number of man getting salaries in board of directors and board of supervisors is uncorrelated to company performance. Compensation of board of directors is positive correlation to revenue, net income and total assets. Compensation of executive is negative correlation to operation revenue and total assets, but is not significant to net income. In addition, the relationship between executive compensation and performance is non-liner. Further this study found that voting right of controlling stockholder and the quantity of CEO’s stocks had moderation effect to the compensation and performance.
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Wang, Yd., Lu, Lj. (2013). The Private Listed Company Executive Compensation and Company Performance: Based on Moderation Effect of Stock Rights. In: Qi, E., Shen, J., Dou, R. (eds) Proceedings of 20th International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-40072-8_18
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-40072-8_18
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