Abstract
The fund management is conducive to promoting the healthy development of the fund industry. Through the study of the internal governance incentive programs, and compared the incentive effect between fixed annual rate of management fee and a variable rate of fund managers, which found that the fixed rate incentive is incompatibility, but floating rates necessarily, and the key is to identify good parameters, and gradually introduce the reputation mechanism.
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Zhang, Jj., Xu, Y. (2013). The Incentive Programs Research of Fund Management. In: Qi, E., Shen, J., Dou, R. (eds) Proceedings of 20th International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-40063-6_58
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-40063-6_58
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