Abstract
Leonardo Martins’ article on the judiciary follows the trend of institutional reevaluation, and questions the longstanding assumption that the judiciary is weak and merely subject to the power of the executive and legislative branches of government. The article provides an overview of (i) the judiciary in the context of division of powers; (ii) the organization and structure of the courts of justice; and (iii) the reaction of the political system in response to the Constitution. Contrary to the assumptions made by traditional Brazilian checks and balances theorists, the judiciary is constantly acquiring more power and is thereby gradually moving into the center of the constitutional competencies.
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Notes
- 1.
Among the extensive German Literature I mention only Benda and Klein (2001: 542 et seq.). Amongst the persistent defenders of the status of the Constitutional Court as a constitutional body see Böckenförde (1999: 12 et seq.). Literature in Portuguese regarding the German discussion see Martins (2005: 36–39, 2011: 1–7) or in Spanish Martins (2012b: 1–7).
- 2.
The basic assumption in question is mainly held by defenders of a strong Supreme Court in relation to the Legislative, due to skeptical feelings towards representative democracy. See Figueiredo and Limongi (1999) and in their chapter in this book.
- 3.
A precise and at the same time relatively broad and in-depth analysis is provided by Neves (1992).
- 4.
Art. 97(I) of the German Basic law: “Die Richter sind unabhängig und nur dem Gesetze unterworfen” (Translation: The Judges are independent and subject only to the Law).
- 5.
Specific proceedings are usually initiated at the provincial court, which may later be appealed to the federal judiciary that acts as guardian of the federal law. In this respect, Brazil remained true to the spirit of the U.S. federal constitution of 1789.
- 6.
In addition, the organic law is pre-constitutional (dating from 1979) and in many respects obsolete, since it did not adapt to the terminology of the 1988 Brazilian Constitution.
- 7.
The term “master of its own procedure” refers to the role and importance of the German Federal Constitutional Court, i.e. a cross-cultural constitutional influence. See critically: Hillgruber and Goos (2004: 5 et seq.) and Schlaich and Korioth (2004: 23). See also Martins (2005: 35 et seq.) and Martins (2012b: 1 et seq.).
- 8.
See the monographic presentation of Yoshida in 2006.
- 9.
On the special role of the federal and state prosecutors, see Tavares (2010: 1350 et seq.).
- 10.
See also Adorno (1988), who has shown in this historically grounded legal-sociological treatise “Aprendizes do Poder” (in English: apprentices of power) that the young lawyers, who came from rich families, were more concerned with holding judgeships after their graduation, than going anywhere else to the state administration of private advocacy.
- 11.
Examples are not missing for this purpose. Finally, one could refer to the multiple ministry participations of Nelson Jobim, retired STF’s President.
- 12.
The concept of a symbolic character of a constitution dates back to the treaties of the Brazilian legal scholar and system theorist Marcelo Neves. Reference is also made to Neves (1998).
- 13.
The special literature of diffuse and collective interests gets out of hand and has already become a legal discipline. See, inter alia, Yoshida (2006).
- 14.
In addition to this type of action, popular action enables each Brazilian citizen a similar possibility to review the judiciary state (incl. legislation) and personal documents which refer to diffuse and collective rights. One could see this as a special contribution to the realization of participatory democracy, thereby overlooking the weakening of representative democracy. In Germany, the popular action that dates back to Roman Law is permitted—with good reasons—only in exceptional cases. The problem of establishing a popular act is based on the current abstract rule, adopted by the Parliament, that a single citizen, who does not have to be affected himself, currently and directly in this basic rights (main admission requirement of the German constitutional complaint), can be called into question. There is a danger that the validity of a norm is made subject of a general dispute process, which hides private interest. The purpose of the standard testing shall remain the preservation of the constitutional law—and thus of their internal consistency.
- 15.
On Brazilian literature on the critique of a jurisdictional state see Vieira (2008: 452 et seq.).
- 16.
The constitutional process in Brazil is not, in contrast to the German one, subject to an objective method. It instead enfolds as a typical subjective and contentious process in which the state authorities and civil society organizations, which are interested in specific results of the standard testing, shall or can defend the constitutionality of the disputed norm. Thus, it is not about the objective clarification of doubts as to the constitutionality of the disputed norms—as provided in German Constitution’s Art. 93(I) (2), and (2a) combined reflected in the Brazilian Constitution’s. See Martins (2008: 247, 249 et seq., 258 et seq.).
- 17.
This demand entered the Brazilian Code of Civil Procedure in 2006 through the amendment Law 11.382.
- 18.
The subject was not even mentioned, even though the abolition of the legal profession of the federal judge (a popular post amongst young lawyers) was a potential consequence. The job of a federal lawyer is strictly distinguished from that of a regional judge. There is no state examination in Brazil, but so-called “civil service exams” (Concursos Públicos). These exams to become a federal judge have nothing to do with the Concurso to become a regional judge and the former can earn three times more than the latter.
- 19.
Art. 475(I) of the Brazilian Code of Civil Procedure determines, inter alia, that first instance decisions against the Federation or a state can exert their effects only after their confirmation by the immediate higher instance. This means that the confirmation by the higher instance represents the indispensable condition (conditio sine qua non) to their validity.
- 20.
See the periodically published reports of the National Council of Justice (CNJ): http://www.cnj.jus.br/images/stories/docs_corregedoria/relatorios/relatorio_final_2005_2007.pdf (Accessed: 17/05/2010).
- 21.
The former President of Brazil’s most important Regional Labor Court of São Paulo, the TRT-SP, was, for example, sentenced because of defalcation during the construction of an imposing tower, which was meant to house the new headquarters of the Regional Labor Court. The new seat was known in public as the skyscraper of the judge “Lalau” (Nicolau dos Santos Neto). A very concise but precise statement of the case can be found on the following link: http://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicolau_dos_Santos_Neto (Accessed: 17/06/2013).
- 22.
Worth mentioning are recent initiatives of the Ministry of Justice, which aim to catalyze social calls against the structural corruption (focal point is the fight against “money laundering”), and the proposed legislation (supported by 1.3 million people) which in the future will only allow those candidates to the campaign, who do not show any conviction in the second instance.
- 23.
Folha de S. Paulo, 23/04/2003: “Lula critica ‘caixa-preta’ do Judiciário e defende controle”.
- 24.
See www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/unger/portuguese/docs/uol10.doc (Accessed: 18/11/2013).
- 25.
The commitment of the Ministry of Justice presents itself notably strong: today there is a permanent department called “reform of the judiciary”, which features a programmatic objective.
- 26.
Nonetheless, the National Council of Justice (CNJ) strives towards ambitious goals that have been announced in television extensively over the past few months. Afterwards, the processes older than 5 years need to be settled quickly. Whether the quality of final judicial decisions can be assured, is highly questionable.
- 27.
The criticism is based on the fact that the norm control system in Brazil loses its “nature” as a system in which the individual elements are in mutual references to each other due to so many unnecessary and improper complexities.
- 28.
A norm control proceeding can be accomplished in many different and sometimes contradictory ways. There is the abstract mode, in which the question of the validity of a norm, without reason for a concrete case, is the subject. The state bodies and private organizations, enumerated in Art. 103 of the Brazilian Constitution have five different types of lawsuits. By one of them one can even apply for the confirmation of the constitutionality of a norm, although, in comparative law perspective, each law disposes of the presumption of validity. In addition, there are other types of lawsuits of the concrete mode and the judicial incidental control (in Brazil, each judge has a competence to dismiss a norm) as well as the mixed forms of popular action and public civil action (See Martins, 2008: 258 et seq.)
- 29.
See footnote 30.
- 30.
The binding guiding principle says: “É ilícita a prisão civil de depositário infiel, qualquer que seja a modalidade do depósito” (the civil liability of the unfaithful trustee is illegal, no matter what type of fiduciary act it is).
- 31.
The last President, Gilmar Mendes, who received his doctorate in Germany, tries to defend in specialized literature the thesis that, for example, Art. 52(X) of the Brazilian Constitution, which allocates the Federal Senate the competence of repeal of validity of norms that were declared unconstitutional by the STF in a particular dispute, experienced a “constitutional mutation”. Accordingly, in Art. 52(X) the clearly regulated force of repeal may occur only of the decision of the STF. An amendment of Art. 52(X) of the Brazilian Constitution would be welcomed, but it requires a clear reformation of the norm control system in Brazil and not judicial decisionism.
- 32.
This “President identity” was introduced by the Amendment Act No. 61 in 2009.
- 33.
- 34.
See decision STF-ADI 4.277, rel. Min. Ayres Britto, DJe 198, 14/10/2011.
- 35.
See criticism by Martins (2013a).
- 36.
- 37.
See critical analysis by Martins (2014).
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Acknowledgment
The author would like to thank Guilherme Arruda, Jairo Moura and Dr. iur. Eric A. Engle for reviewing the translation from German to English.
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Martins, L. (2016). The Judiciary in Brazil. In: de la Fontaine, D., Stehnken, T. (eds) The Political System of Brazil. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-40023-0_8
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