Abstract
We can derive several inclusion and interference results between the minimum sets of quadratic functions and the pre-kernel. These results enable us to give a full characterization of the pre-kernel in terms of constrained minimum sets, or restricted sub-differential of the corresponding conjugations of quadratic functions, that is, we implicitly base the representation of the pre-kernel on the Fenchel-Moreau conjugation of the characteristic function. In a further step additional results related to the vector spaces of balanced excesses are attained which allow us to give a replication result. Having worked out these auxiliary results we then turn our attention to the issue whether it is possible to replicate any arbitrary payoff vector on the domain as a pre-kernel element of a game constructed from a payoff equivalence class that contains this payoff vector. There, we provide an impossibility theorem. Moreover, we also address the reverse issue if any pre-kernel solution of a default game can be supported as a pre-kernel element of a related game from the same game space. This issue can be partly affirmed. It is shown that any pre-kernel belonging to a payoff set which satisfies the non-empty interior property is replicable as a pre-kernel element of a related game. From the replication result further results on the structure of the pre-kernel are established, for instance, on its disconnectedness.
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Notes
- 1.
All these computation as well as the computation performed for the presented examples inside this section were accomplished with our MATLAB toolbox MatTuGames 2012b and our Mathematica package TuGames 2012a. Both software packages are available upon request by the author, whereas an older version 2005b of our Mathematica package can be downloaded from the following URL: http://library.wolfram.com/infocenter/MathSource/5709/
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Meinhardt, H.I. (2014). Characterization of the Pre-Kernel by Solution Sets. In: The Pre-Kernel as a Tractable Solution for Cooperative Games. Theory and Decision Library C, vol 45. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-39549-9_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-39549-9_7
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