Dispute Resolution in Accessible Voting Systems: The Design and Use of Audiotegrity

  • Tyler Kaczmarek
  • John Wittrock
  • Richard Carback
  • Alex Florescu
  • Jan Rubio
  • Noel Runyan
  • Poorvi L. Vora
  • Filip Zagórski
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7985)


We describe in detail dispute resolution problems with cryptographic voting systems that do not produce a paper record of the unencrypted vote. With these in mind, we describe the design and use of Audiotegrity—a cryptographic voting protocol and corresponding voting system with some of the accessibility benefits of fully-electronic voting systems and some of the dispute resolution properties of paper-ballot-based systems. We also describe subtle issues with coercion-resistance if accessible systems are not well-designed.

Audiotegrity was designed in response to a request by Takoma Park election officials, tested in a public test organized by the city in June 2011, and used in its municipal election in November 2011. We are not aware of any other precinct-based end-to-end independently-verifiable election for public office where the protocol enabled participation by voters with visual disabilities.


end-to-end voting systems accessible dispute resolution 


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Tyler Kaczmarek
    • 1
  • John Wittrock
    • 1
  • Richard Carback
    • 2
  • Alex Florescu
    • 1
  • Jan Rubio
    • 1
  • Noel Runyan
    • 3
  • Poorvi L. Vora
    • 1
  • Filip Zagórski
    • 4
  1. 1.Department of Computer ScienceThe George Washington UniversityUSA
  2. 2.Network and Information Concepts GroupCharles Stark Draper LaboratoriesUSA
  3. 3.Personal Data SystemsUSA
  4. 4.Institute of Mathematics and Computer ScienceWroclaw University of TechnologyPoland

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