Vote Casting in Any Preferred Constituency: A New Voting Channel

  • Jurlind Budurushi
  • Maria Henning
  • Melanie Volkamer
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7985)


In our society a rising number of people change their residence regularly. Insofar, mobility seems to be necessary even on Election Day, which is the reason why an increasing number of eligible voters use the opportunity of postal voting. Thereby, the abidance by the election principles, especially the freedom and secrecy of elections, is automatically transferred into the private sector. This would not be necessary if eligible voters had the possibility to cast their vote in any preferred constituency within the electoral area. Therefore, we investigate in this work if and how vote casting in any constituency can be constitutionally compliant, while maintaining the current electoral system. We also consider the integration of the new German electronic ID card for voter identification and authentication.


Electoral Register Federal Electoral Electoral District Electronic Vote Federal Constitutional 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jurlind Budurushi
    • 1
  • Maria Henning
    • 2
  • Melanie Volkamer
    • 1
  1. 1.CASEDTU DarmstadtGermany
  2. 2.provetUniversität KasselGermany

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