A Practical Coercion Resistant Voting Scheme Revisited

  • Roberto Araújo
  • Jacques Traoré
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7985)


The scheme of ABRTY (Araújo et al., CANS 2010) is one of the most promising solutions for internet voting nowadays. It fights realistic coercive attacks and can be applied in large scale voting scenarios as it has linear time complexity. However, this scheme has two intrinsic drawbacks. As it does not allow revocation of credentials of ineligible voters, voters need to obtain fresh credentials before each new election. Also, authorities could generate valid but illegitimate credentials unnoticed. In this work, we present solutions for these drawbacks and show a modified version of ABRTY’s scheme. In addition, we describe a weakness of a receipt-free voting scheme proposed by Acquisti in 2004.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Roberto Araújo
    • 1
  • Jacques Traoré
    • 2
  1. 1.Faculdade de ComputaçãoUniversidade Federal do ParáBelémBrazil
  2. 2.Orange LabsCaen CedexFrance

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