Abstract
The European Union’s (EU) use of the acquis communautaire as a model for free trade agreements (FTAs) is motivated by its desire to achieve in FTAs what it has failed to achieve in multilateral negotiations. While scholars are sounding a note of warning regarding the consequences on developing countries of TRIPS-plus commitments in FTAs, these countries are racing each other to make more FTA deals notwithstanding the level of intellectual property (IP) protection to which this commits them, provided market access is guaranteed and trade benefits are maintained. This chapter analyzes the IP obligations in EU FTAs on geographical indications, plant varieties, biodiversity and traditional knowledge and related IP issues under negotiation at the World Trade Organization (WTO) to show that the EU limits itself to IP concessions that reflect the EU level of protection, and hence does not make concessions on issues that have not yet been regulated at the Community level. It also shows that although such FTAs obligations do not set new IP rules which directly impact on the outcome of the negotiation process at the WTO, however they create a new state of play regarding these negotiations and changes in coalitions among WTO members. The chapter then concludes with the necessity for WTO Members to get back to the multilateral table before potentially conflicting bilateral or regional outcomes make future consensus in the WTO even more difficult.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
The Eighth Ministerial Conference was held in Geneva from 15 to 17 December 2011. See http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min11_e/min11_e.htm.
- 2.
- 3.
Available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min11_e/official_doc_e.htm. WTO members agreed by consensus on 11 June 2013 to extend the transition period until 1 July 2021, with a further extension possible when the time comes. See http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news13_e/trip_11jun13_e.htm.
- 4.
- 5.
For the purpose of this paper the term “free trade agreements” also designates economic partnership agreements (EPAs), association agreements (AAs), regional trade agreements (RTAs) and, in general, all bilateral or regional trade agreements whose purpose is to liberalize trade among the parties.
- 6.
It is worth noting here that the US proposals for stronger IP protection in several IP fields that were rejected during TRIPS negotiations (such as the inclusion of strong protection for data exclusivity) are now part of the new generation of FTAs, namely, those negotiated by the US, EFTA and the EU. See Mercurio (2006), p. 226.
- 7.
- 8.
- 9.
The Singapore issues are the four issues—trade and investment, trade and competition policy, transparency in government procurement and trade facilitation—that were introduced to the WTO agenda at the December 1996 WTO Ministerial Conference in Singapore.
- 10.
CARIFORUM is the Caribbean Forum of African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) States, which includes all members of the Caribbean Community (Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago) and the Dominican Republic. Cuba is also a member of CARIFORUM but is not part of the ACP Group and did not participate in negotiations.
- 11.
The US Trade Act of 2002, under which the US president is provided with the power to conclude trade agreements (“trade promotion authority”, or the so-called “fast track”), states that “the principal negotiating objectives of the United States regarding trade-related intellectual property are (A) to further promote adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights, including through … (i)(II) ensuring that the provisions of any multilateral or bilateral trade agreement governing intellectual property rights that is entered into by the United States reflect a standard of protection similar to that found in United States law”. See US Trade Act of 2002, Sec. 2102(b)(4), available at http://uscode.house.gov/download/pls/19C24.txt.
- 12.
- 13.
EPA negotiations are part of the implementation of the Cotonou Agreement, which has been the framework for the EU’s relations with ACP countries since 2000 and covered aid, trade and political cooperation. After the expiry on 31 December 2007 of the Cotonou trade regime and the WTO waiver that covered it, a comprehensive agreement was signed with the Caribbean countries and a series of interim agreements were made with the African and Pacific countries as transitory measures to secure the ACP-EU trade regime awaiting the signature of comprehensive regional EPA agreements. For more information about EPAs see http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/regions/africa-caribbean-pacific/.
- 14.
- 15.
While none of the interim (or “stepping stone”) EPAs initialed with other ACP regions and countries contains substantive provisions on IP, most of them include a “rendez-vous clause” in which the parties agree to negotiate a more comprehensive EPA including IP issues.
- 16.
According to a representative of the Directorate General for Trade at the European Commission, the EU’s trade agreements (IP chapters of FTAs/EPAs) are negotiated with the aim of helping European export businesses of all sizes to protect their IP, including geographical indications, from violations and maintain their competitiveness. They respect the EU acquis, fundamental rights and TRIPS flexibilities. They are negotiated—not imposed on the EU’s trading partners. In addition to the above, EPAs have a role of promoting trade between the Parties, through trade development, sustainable growth and reduction of poverty. This statement was made by Dominika Svozilova, Administrator and Policy Officer at the European Commission, Directorate General for Trade, Intellectual Property and Public Procurement Unit, during the workshop on “Economic Partnership Agreements of the EU: A Step Ahead in Reforming International IP Law?” organized by the Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property and Competition Law (MPI) and held in Frauenchiemsee from 25 to 27 June 2011. See Nadde-Phlix (2012), p. 958.
- 17.
The EU-CA AA was signed on 29 June 2012. Countries of the CA Region include Panama, Guatemala, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua. See http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=689.
- 18.
The EU-Col-Peru FTA was signed on 26 June 2012. Based on the principle of regional integration, the FTA remains open for signature by Bolivia and Ecuador, the other two members of the Andean Community. See http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/regions/andean/.
- 19.
The FTA between the EU and South Korea was initialled on 15 October 2009, signed on 6 October 2010 and entered into force in July 2011. See http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/countries/korea/.
- 20.
Other FTAs also contain provisions on sustainable development; however, they are of a general nature compared to the provisions on sustainable development in the EU-CARIFORUM EPA, which are incorporated as an objective of the agreement that should be “applied and integrated at every level of [the parties’] economic partnership, in fulfilment of the overarching commitments set out in Articles 1, 2 and 9 of the Cotonou Agreement, and especially the general commitment to reducing and eventually eradicating poverty in a way that is consistent with the objectives of sustainable development”. See Article 3(1) of the EU-CARIFORUM EPA. Here, a core question is whether such a high level of IP protection would help EPAs remain instruments to advance development objectives. For an analysis of the topic of sustainable development in international IP Law see Grosse Ruse-Khan (2010).
- 21.
See Khor (2005), p. 2.
- 22.
Market access is considered by developing countries as the main reward from FTAs. Developing countries attracted by market access find themselves with a level of IP protection they have to struggle at economic, social and judicial levels to implement. They also find themselves with IP concessions that are in obvious contradiction with their positions at multilateral fora.
- 23.
- 24.
See Article 1.1 of the TRIPS Agreement, which states that “Members may, but shall not be obliged to, implement in their law more extensive protection than is required by this Agreement, provided that such protection does not contravene the provisions of this Agreement”.
- 25.
For a discussion about “why the TRIPS Agreement allows members to give more extensive protection” see Frankel (2008), pp. 189–192.
- 26.
See Article 3.1 of TRIPS.
- 27.
Unlike other WTO agreements such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), the TRIPS agreement does not exempt FTAs from the application of the MFN principle, under which “any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by a Member [of the WTO] to the nationals of any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the nationals of all other [WTO] Members”. See Article 4 of TRIPS, Article XXIV of the GATT and Article V of the GATS.
- 28.
According to one scholar: “Flexibilities can be classified under four clusters: (a) flexibilities as regards transitional periods, (b) flexibilities as regards the method of implementation of TRIPS obligations, (c) flexibilities as regards standards of protection (upwards or downwards), and (d) flexibilities as regards enforcement. Beyond these four clusters of flexibilities, WTO members are free to protect fields of IP not covered by the TRIPS Agreement as they see fit (that is, without being obliged to comply with TRIPS provisions and principles)”. See Pires de Carvalho (2010), p. 62.
- 29.
See Kur and Grosse Ruse-Khan (2008), p. 45, who indicate that “[o]n the issue of operationalising ceilings under TRIPS, one may thus conclude that while Art.1:1 2nd sentence offers a workable general ceiling rule prohibiting additional protection which contravenes TRIPS, the specific provisions on IP limitations are not drafted in a way which allow to put this general rule into (effective) operation”.
- 30.
See Article 243 of the EU-CA AA and Article 207(b) of the EU-Col-Peru FTA.
- 31.
See Article 232 of the EU-Col-Peru FTA, Article 149(2) of the EU-CARIFORUM EPA and Article 15.1(2) of the FTA between the US and Central America and the Dominican Republic (CAFTA-DR FTA).
- 32.
See Yu (2009), p. 1046.
- 33.
It is worth mentioning here that IP is still a new area in developing countries, the impact of which is still to be defined in economic terms. Moreover, developing countries lack the financial and human resources necessary to assess the consequences of their FTAs’ IP commitments at the economic and societal levels.
- 34.
The EU is no longer the godfather of African countries (especially those which were former European colonies) seeking a fair distribution of wealth through preferential treatment as trading partners. The EU’s charitable episode ended with the signature of the first EPA, which sets the scene for a new trend of agreements putting African countries on similar footing as the rest of the world. However, it seems that the EU-CARIFORUM EPA has served as a lesson for the other African countries that have signed interim EPAs with the EU. In addition to lobbying political support in the EU, which resulted in the extension by the EU Parliament of the deadline for signing EPAs from January 2014 to January 2016, African countries are now claiming fair negotiations and a win-win situation. For the reaction of Namibia and other ACP countries on the EU Parliament decision see http://www.bilaterals.org/spip.php?article22087.
- 35.
See Bhala (2007), p. 83.
- 36.
See Taubman et al. (2012), pp. 196–219. See also http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/trips_e.htm.
- 37.
The door was left open under the TRIPS Agreement for negotiating a multilateral system of notification and registration of GIs for wines (Article 23.4 of TRIPS) and for reviewing the application of GI provisions of the Agreement by the TRIPS Council (Article 24.2 of TRIPS). The Doha Ministerial Declaration extended the mandate under Article 23.4 to also cover spirits, confirming a decision taken at the 1996 Singapore Ministerial Conference, and added to it the question of the possible extension of the higher level of protection for wines and spirits as provided by Article 23 of TRIPS to cover GIs for all products. See Taubman et al. (2012), pp. 90–91 and 200–201.
- 38.
- 39.
See Taubman et al. (2012), pp. 202–205. See also http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news11_e/trip_ss_13jan11_e.htm#current_proposals.
- 40.
See WTO document TN/C/W/52 of 19 July 2008.
- 41.
See WTO document TN/IP/W/10/Rev.4.
- 42.
See WTO document TN/IP/W/8.
- 43.
See the Doha Ministerial Declaration paragraphs 12 (Implementation Issues) and 18 (TRIPS). Available at: http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.htm#implementation.
- 44.
Paragraph 12 of the Doha Declaration, which deals with implementation issues, is interpreted differently by WTO Members. While the EU and other advocates of the GI extension argue that the “outstanding implementation issues” are part of the Doha “single undertaking”, the US and other opponents of the extension argue that these issues can only become negotiating subjects if the Trade Negotiations Committee (TNC) decides to include them in the talks. The TNC so far has not done so. For further information about this debate see http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/gi_background_e.htm. See also Taubman et al. (2012), pp. 204–205.
- 45.
- 46.
See Article 145 A(2) of the EU-CARIFORUM EPA.
- 47.
See Article 145 of the EU-CARIFORUM EPA.
- 48.
See Article 145 A of the EU-CARIFORUM EPA.
- 49.
See Article 145 B(2) of the EU-CARIFORUM EPA.
- 50.
See Articles 145 B(3) and 145 C(2) to (4) of the EU-CARIFORUM EPA.
- 51.
See Articles 244 and 245 of the EU-CA AA.
- 52.
See Article 246 of the EU-CA AA.
- 53.
See Articles 242 to 250 of the EU-CA AA.
- 54.
See Article 244 of the EU-CA AA.
- 55.
See Article 243 of the EU-CA AA.
- 56.
See Articles 10.18 to 10.26 of the EU-South Korea FTA.
- 57.
See Article 10.18(6) of the EU-South Korea FTA.
- 58.
See Article 10.21 of the EU-South Korea FTA.
- 59.
See Articles 207 to 214 of the EU-Col-Peru FTA.
- 60.
See Article 210 of the EU-Col-Peru FTA.
- 61.
Legislation relating to the protection of GIs in Colombia and Peru is available at: http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/results.jsp?countries=CO&cat_id=5 (for Colombia) and http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/results.jsp?countries=PE&cat_id=5 (for Peru).
- 62.
The Lisbon Agreement requires member states to protect the AO product “against any usurpation or imitation, even if the true origin of the product is indicated or if the appellation is used in translated form or accompanied by terms such as ‘kind,’ ‘type,’ ‘make,’ ‘imitation,’ or the like” (Article 3 of the Lisbon Agreement).
- 63.
See Article 1 of the Lisbon Agreement. Several countries of the EU are members of the Lisbon Agreement. See http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty_id=10.
- 64.
See Article 207 of the EU-Col-Peru FTA.
- 65.
All AOs are GIs but not all GIs are AOs.
- 66.
See Article 22.1 of the TRIPS Agreement.
- 67.
- 68.
For an analysis of the GI provisions in the EU-Col-Peru FTA, see Covarrubia (2011), pp. 330–338.
- 69.
The protection of non-agricultural GI products is ensured at the EU level through the Community trade mark (CTM) regime, which allows for the protection of geographical names under certain conditions. For more information about the protection of non-agricultural GI products see Insight Consulting, Origin and Agridea (2009).
- 70.
See Covarrubia (2011), pp. 330–338. It will be interesting to analyze whether such commitments are compliant with the EU legislation on the protection of non-agricultural products.
- 71.
See Article 207(b) of the EU-Col-Peru FTA.
- 72.
See Article 243 of the EU-CA AA and Article 207(b) of the EU-Col-Peru FTA. Under Article 145(A)(1) of the EU-CARIFORUM EPA and Article 10.21(4) of the EU-South Korea FTA the exception of TRIPS Article 24.9 is kept optional for the parties to the FTAs.
- 73.
See above discussion at p. 8.
- 74.
Such as in Article 145 B(2) of the EU-CARIFORUM EPA.
- 75.
- 76.
It is to be noted that the Doha Ministerial Declaration (paragraph 19) instructs the TRIPS Council “in pursuing its work programme including under the review of Article 27.3(b), the review of the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement under Article 71.1 and the work foreseen pursuant to paragraph 12 of this declaration, to examine, inter alia, the relationship between the TRIPS Agreement and the Convention on Biological Diversity, the protection of traditional knowledge and folklore, and other relevant new developments raised by members pursuant to Article 71.1. In undertaking this work, the TRIPS Council shall be guided by the objectives and principles set out in Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement and shall take fully into account the development dimension”. See http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.htm.
- 77.
See WTO document IP/C/W/368/Rev.1.
- 78.
See WTO document IP/C/W/369/Rev.1.
- 79.
See WTO document IP/C/W/370/Rev.1.
- 80.
See WTO document IP/C/W/369/Rev.1. See also Taubman et al. (2012), p. 206.
- 81.
See EC Regulation No. 2100/94 on community plant variety rights and EC Regulation No. 98/44 on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions.
- 82.
See WTO documents IP/C/W/383 and IP/C/W/369/Rev.1.
- 83.
See Article 149(2) of the EU-CARIFORUM EPA.
- 84.
See Article 149(1) of the EU-CARIFORUM EPA.
- 85.
Article 15(2) of UPOV 1991 provides for an optional exception: “Notwithstanding Article 14, each Contracting Party may, within reasonable limits and subject to the safeguarding of the legitimate interests of the breeder, restrict the breeder’s right in relation to any variety in order to permit farmers to use for propagating purposes, on their own holdings, the product of the harvest which they have obtained by planting, on their own holdings, the protected variety or a variety covered by Article 14(5)(a)(i) or Article 14(5)(a)(ii)”. For an analysis of the related UPOV clauses, see Pires de Carvalho (2010), pp. 308–315.
- 86.
According to one scholar, “even as regards protected plant varieties, there is no mechanism that may prevent small farmers from continuing their traditional practices of saving and re-sowing seeds. Small farmers are not seed traders, and therefore they are not affected by the limits imposed by Article 15(2) of the UPOV 1991. Anyway, UPOV Members may define those limits in the form of quantities of seeds saved or sizes of the pieces of land involved”. See Pires de Carvalho (2010), p 313.
- 87.
The impact of this provision is more problematic for the Dominican Republic, which is the only member among the CARIFORUM States to have joined UPOV 1991.
- 88.
See Musungu (2008).
- 89.
See WTO document IP/C/W/383, pp. 14–17 and WTO document IP/C/W/369/Rev.1, pp. 20–22.
- 90.
Idem.
- 91.
Idem.
- 92.
See Article 259(1) and (3) of the EU-CA AA.
- 93.
See Article 15.1(2) of the CAFTA-DR FTA.
- 94.
Peru became a party to UPOV 1991 on 8 August 2011, while Colombia has been a party to the 1978 Act of UPOV since 13 September 1996.
- 95.
See Article 232 of the EU-Col-Peru FTA.
- 96.
See Article 10.39 of the EU-South Korea FTA.
- 97.
See WTO document IP/C/W/368/Rev.1.
- 98.
See Taubman et al. (2012), pp. 207–210. See also WTO document IP/C/W/368/Rev.1.
- 99.
See WTO document TN/C/W/52.
- 100.
See Watal (2013) in this volume.
- 101.
See WTO document TN/C/W/59.
- 102.
See Article 150 of the EU-CARIFORUM EPA, Articles 196(4) and 201 of the EU-Colombia and Peru FTA, Article 229(4) and (5) of the EU-CA AA and Article 10.40 of the EU-South Korea FTA.
- 103.
- 104.
See Articles 8(j) and 16(5) of the CBD.
- 105.
See Article 150(4) of the EU-CARIFORUM EPA.
- 106.
See Article 150(2) of the EU-CARIFORUM EPA.
- 107.
See Article 150(5) of the EU-CARIFORUM EPA.
- 108.
See Article 150(6) of the EU-CARIFORUM EPA.
- 109.
See Articles 196(4) and 201(1), (2), (3) (4) and (6) of the EU-Col-Peru FTA.
- 110.
See Article 201(11) of the EU-Col-Peru FTA.
- 111.
See Article 201(9) of the EU-Col-Peru FTA.
- 112.
See Article 201(10) of the EU-Col-Peru FTA.
- 113.
See Article 201(12) of the EU-Col-Peru FTA.
- 114.
See Article 201(13) of the EU-Col-Peru FTA.
- 115.
See Article 201(7) of the EU-Col-Peru FTA.
- 116.
See Article 201(8) of the EU-Col-Peru FTA.
- 117.
See Vivas-Eugui and Oliva (2010), pp. 13–17
- 118.
See Drexl (2013) in this volume.
- 119.
See Article 10.40 of the EU-South Korea FTA.
- 120.
See Article 229(4) and (5) of the EU-CA AA.
- 121.
Saint Lucia and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines have not yet ratified the CBD.
- 122.
- 123.
An exception to this is available under the provisions on criminal enforcement in the EU-South Korea FTA and the EU-CA AA; cited in Drexl (2013) in this volume.
- 124.
The AA with Central American countries does not include such provisions.
- 125.
See Article 150(6) of the EU-CARIFORUM EPA, Article 201(13) of the EU-Colombia and Peru FTA and Article 10.40(3) of the EU-South Korea FTA.
- 126.
See above examples on EU and US FTAs concluded with the Dominican Republic and Central America.
- 127.
See the speech of WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy at the University of International Business and Economics in Beijing on 20 September 2012. Available at: http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl246_e.htm.
References
Aleman M (2013) Impact of TRIPS-plus obligations in economic partnership- and free trade agreements on international IP law. In: Drexl J, Grosse Ruse Khan H, Nadde-Phlix S (eds) EU bilateral trade agreements and intellectual property: for better or worse? Springer, Heidelberg (this volume)
Bhala R (2007) Competitive liberalization, competitive imperialism, and intellectual property. Liverpool Law Rev 28:77–105
Correa C (2013) The impact of the economic partnership agreements on WTO law. In: Drexl J, Grosse Ruse Khan H, Nadde-Phlix S (eds) EU bilateral trade agreements and intellectual property: for better or worse? Springer, Heidelberg (this volume)
Covarrubia P (2011) The EU and Colombia/Peru free trade agreement on GIs: adjusting Colombian and Peruvian national laws? J Intellect Prop Law Pract 6(5):330–338
Drexl J (2013) Intellectual property and implementation of recent bilateral trade agreements in the EU. In: Drexl J, Grosse Ruse Khan H, Nadde-Phlix S (eds) EU bilateral trade agreements and intellectual property: for better or worse? Springer, Heidelberg (this volume)
European Commission (2010) Communication: Trade, Growth and World Affairs – Trade Policy as a core component of the EU’s 2020 strategy. COM(2010) 612 final. http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/employment_and_social_policy/eu2020/em0043_en.htm
European Commission (2011) Communication: a single market for intellectual property rights. Boosting creativity and innovation to provide economic growth, high quality jobs and first class products and services in Europe. COM(2011) 287 final. http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/ipr_strategy/COM_2011_287_en.pdf
European Commission, Directorate General for Trade CARIFORUM(2008) Fact sheet CARIFORUM-EC EPA: Innovation and Intellectual Property. http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2008/october/tradoc_140978.pdf
Frankel S (2008) The legitimacy and purpose of IP Chapters in FTAs. In: Buckley R, Lo VI, Boulle L (eds) Challenges to multilateral trade: The impact of bilateral, preferential and regional agreements. Wolters Kluwer, Alphen aan den Rijn, pp 185–200
Grosse Ruse-Khan H (2010) Sustainable development in international intellectual property law – New approaches from EU economic partnership agreements? Issue Paper No. 29, International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) Programme on IPRs and Sustainable Development. http://ictsd.org/downloads/2011/12/sustainable-development-in-international-intellectual-property-law-e28093-new-approaches-from-eu-economic-partnership-agreements.pdf
Hilty R, Jaeger T (2010) Legal effects and policy considerations for free trade agreements: what is wrong with FTAs? Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property, Competition & Tax Law Research Paper No. 10-02. http://ssrn.com/abstract=1534486 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1534486
Insight Consulting, Origin and Agridea (2009) Study on the protection of geographical indications for products other than wines, spirits, agricultural products or foodstuffs. European Commission, Directorate General for Trade. http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/may/tradoc_147926.pdf
Khor M (2005) Bilateral/regional free trade agreements: an outline of elements, nature and development implications. Third World Network (TWN). http://www.twnside.org.sg/pos.htm
Kur A, Grosse Ruse-Khan H (2008) Enough is enough – the notion of binding ceilings in international intellectual property protection. Max Planck Papers on Intellectual Property and Competition & Tax Law, Research Paper No. 09-01). http://ssrn.com/abstract=1326429
Malpani R (2012) The EU-India free trade agreement: is it the end of the world as we know it? http://blogs.oxfam.org/en/blog/12-02-09-eu-india-free-trade-agreement-it-end-world-we-know-it
Mercurio B (2006) TRIPS-plus provisions in FTAs: Recent Trends. In: Bartels L, Ortino F (eds) Regional trade agreements and the WTO legal system. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 215–237
Musungu SF (2008) CARIFORUM EPA and beyond: Innovation and Intellectual Property in the EC-CARIFORUM EPA - Lessons for other ACP Regions – Working Paper – Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ, former GTZ) GmbH. http://www.giz.de/Themen/en/SID-4A112C28-F85DFCC4/dokumente/gtz2008-en-epa-CARIFORUM-and-beyond-innovation-and-intellectual-property.pdf
Nadde-Phlix S (2012) Economic partnership agreements of the EU: a step ahead in reforming international IP law? – Workshop of the Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property and Competition Law, June 2011. IIC 43(8):951–958
Pauwelyn J (2007) Legal avenues to multilateralizing regionalism: beyond Article XXIV. HEI, September 10–12 2007, Geneva
Pires de Carvalho N (2010) The TRIPS regime of patent rights, 3rd edn. Wolters Kluwer, Alphen aan den Rijn
Roffe P (2012) Intellectual Property, Preferential Trade Agreements and the Multilateral System. In: Meléndez-Ortiz R, Bellmann C, Rodriguez MM (eds) The future and the WTO: confronting the challenges. A collection of short essays. ICTSD Programme on Global Economic Policy and Institutions, Geneva, pp 58–62
Roffe P (2013) Intellectual property chapters in free trade agreements: their significance and systemic implications. In: Drexl J, Grosse Ruse Khan H, Nadde-Phlix S (eds) EU bilateral trade agreements and intellectual property: for better or worse? Springer, Heidelberg (this volume)
Santa Cruz M (2007) Intellectual Property Provisions in European Union Trade Agreements: Implications for Developing Countries. Issue Paper No. 20, ICTSD Programme on IPRs and Sustainable Development. http://www.iprsonline.org/resources/docs/Santa-Cruz%20Blue20.pdf
Seuba X (2013) Implementation issues arising from intellectual property chapters contained in trade agreements between the European Union and developing countries. In: Drexl J, Grosse Ruse Khan H, Nadde-Phlix S (eds) EU bilateral trade agreements and intellectual property: for better or worse? Springer, Heidelberg (this volume)
Shabalala D, Bernasconi N (2007) The European Approach to Intellectual Property in European Partnership Agreements with the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of Countries. Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL). http://62.58.77.233/library/files/CIEL_EN_180407_CIEL_EU-approach-to-IP-in-EPA.pdf
Shabalala D, Orellana M, Bernasconi-Osterwalder N, Plagakis S (2008) Intellectual Property in European Union Economic Partnership Agreements with the African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries: What way Forward after the CARIFORUM EPA and the interim EPAs? Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL). http://www.ciel.org/Publications/Oxfam_TechnicalBrief_5May08.pdf
Taubman A, Wager H, Watal J (eds) (2012) A handbook on the WTO TRIPS agreement. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Third World Network (2009) EU EPAS: economic and social development implications: The case of the CARIFORUM-EC Economic Partnership Agreement. http://twnside.org.sg/title2/par/CARIFORUM.Feb09.doc
Vivas-Eugui D, Oliva MJ (2010) Biodiversity related intellectual property provisions in free trade agreements. Issue Paper No. 4, ICTSD Project on Genetic Resources, Natural Resources, International Trade and Sustainable Development. http://ictsd.org/downloads/2011/12/biodiversity-related-intellectual-property-provisions-in-free-trade-agreements.pdf
Vivas-Eugui D, Spennemann C (2006) The treatment of geographical indications in recent WTO discussions and in regional and bilateral agreements. ICTSD, TRALAC and CIEL, Recent Multilateral and Bilateral Trends in IP Policy Making: Lessons and Challenges for Africa. http://ictsd.org/downloads/2009/01/gis20dv2020cs20rev2020sa20dialogue-pdf.pdf
Watal J (2013) Is TRIPS a balanced agreement as seen from the perspective of bilateral/plurilateral free trade agreements? In: Drexl J, Grosse Ruse Khan H, Nadde-Phlix S (eds) EU bilateral trade agreements and intellectual property: for better or worse? Springer, Heidelberg (this volume)
Woolcock S (2007) European Union policy towards Free Trade Agreements. ECIPE Working Paper No. 03/2007. http://www.felixpena.com.ar/contenido/negociaciones/anexos/2010-09-european-union-policy-towards-free-trade-agreements.pdf
Wright L (2004) Trade promotion authority: fast track for the twenty-first century. William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal 12:979-1006. http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj/vol12/iss3/18
Yu P (2009) The objectives and principles of the TRIPS agreement. Houston Law Rev 46:797–1046
Acknowledgment
The author would like to thank Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan for his valuable comments.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2014 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Nadde-Phlix, S. (2014). IP Protection in EU Free Trade Agreements vis-à-vis IP Negotiations in the WTO. In: Drexl, J., Grosse Ruse - Khan, H., Nadde-Phlix, S. (eds) EU Bilateral Trade Agreements and Intellectual Property: For Better or Worse?. MPI Studies on Intellectual Property and Competition Law, vol 20. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-39097-5_7
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-39097-5_7
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-39096-8
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-39097-5
eBook Packages: Humanities, Social Sciences and LawLaw and Criminology (R0)