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Developing Online Double Auction Mechanism for Fishery Markets

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Recent Trends in Applied Artificial Intelligence (IEA/AIE 2013)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 7906))

Abstract

In spot markets for trading fishes, single-sided auctions are used for clearing the market by virtue of its promptness and simplicity, which are important in dealing with perishable goods. However, in those auctions, sellers cannot participate in price-making process. A standard double auction market collects bids from traders and matches buyers’ higher bids and sellers’ lower bids to find the most efficient allocation, assuming that values of unsold items remain unchanged. Nevertheless, in the spot fish market, sellers suffer loss when they fail to sell the fish, whose salvage value is lost due to perishability. To solve the problem, we investigate the suitable design of an online double auction for fishery markets, where bids arrive dynamically with their time limits. Our market mechanism aims at improving traders’ profitability by reducing trade failures in the face of uncertainty of incoming/leaving bids. We developed a heuristic matching rule for the market to prioritize traders’ bids based on their time-criticality and evaluated its performance empirically.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Center for Service Research, AIST, 1-1-1 Umezono, Tsukuba, Ibaraki, 305-8568, Japan

    Kazuo Miyashita

Authors
  1. Kazuo Miyashita
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computer Science, Texas State University, 78666, San Marcos, TX, USA

    Moonis Ali

  2. Agent Systems Research Group, Department of Computer Science, Faculty of Sciences, VU University Amsterdam, De Boelelaan 1081, 1081, Amsterdam, HV, The Netherlands

    Tibor Bosse

  3. Interactive Intelligence Group, Department of Intelligent Systems, Faculty of Electrical Engineering, Mathematics and Computer Science, Delft University of Technology, Mekelweg 4, 2628 CD, Delft, The Netherlands

    Koen V. Hindriks  & Catholijn M. Jonker  & 

  4. Computational Intelligence Group, Department of Computer Science, Faculty of Sciences, VU University Amsterdam, De Boelelaan 1081, 1081 HV, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

    Mark Hoogendoorn

  5. Agent Systems Research Group, Department of Computer Science, Faculty of Sciences, VU University Amsterdam, De Boelelaan 1081, 1081 HV, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

    Jan Treur

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© 2013 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Miyashita, K. (2013). Developing Online Double Auction Mechanism for Fishery Markets. In: Ali, M., Bosse, T., Hindriks, K.V., Hoogendoorn, M., Jonker, C.M., Treur, J. (eds) Recent Trends in Applied Artificial Intelligence. IEA/AIE 2013. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 7906. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-38577-3_1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-38577-3_1

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-38576-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-38577-3

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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