VI. The Nazi State

Abstract

On January 30, 1933, the Hitler cabinet, on the outside a seemingly radical core surrounded by more moderate German Nationals and without a real majority, took over a virtually intact administrative apparatus. The civil service and the military, the leaders of the economy, and other bourgeois circles were in principle in agreement with the final abandonment of the parliamentary system, but they did not want to be delivered over to a “dictatorship of the street.” They took a wait-and-see attitude, hoped for a speedy return of normal conditions, and were ready to put up with “excesses.” Since the new regime was skillful at responding to their concerns, it won the loyalty of these groups, as well, especially after the spectacular murders that were part of the “Röhm putsch” in June of 1934, which were noted with a mixture of fear and relief. Moreover, there were few open differences as far as the content of policy was concerned. Even the approval for the programmatic points dealing with social hygiene extended well beyond the National Socialists. As for anti-Semitism, it was—of course, minus its murderous consequences—a more or less tolerated element of the bourgeois mindset, whose fear and envy in the economic crisis were now directed against a tiny minority. On foreign policy there was agreement over the struggle against the remnants of “Versaille”, domestically the National Socialists lacked both a program and the requisite experts in nearly all areas. That applied to a high degree also to social policy.

Previously published in English in the following publication: Stolleis: Origins of the German Welfare State (German Social Policy, Vol. 2), Springer, Berlin/Heidelberg, 2013.