Abstract
In the system of venture investment, there exists a kind of principal-agent relationship between the venture investor and venture capitalist, which will bring about a series of problems such as moral hazard. The organizational form of limited partnership is inclined to establish an incentive mechanism which can maximize the utility of both the venture investor and the venture capitalist with the coexistence of incentive and constraint. The paper establishes an incentive mechanism model in the organizational form of limited partnership and systematically discusses the effectiveness of the incentive pattern of limited partnership.
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Wang, Tj., Chen, Yn. (2013). Study on Limited Partnership Based on an Analysis of Incentive Mechanism Model of Venture Capitalist. In: Qi, E., Shen, J., Dou, R. (eds) The 19th International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-38442-4_70
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-38442-4_70
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