Skip to main content

Comparative Study of the Executive Compensation Validity Between the Entity Economy and Virtual Economy Listed Company

  • Conference paper
  • First Online:
The 19th International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
  • 1662 Accesses

Abstract

In modern economic system, the average of the virtual economy enterprise executive compensation was significantly higher than the entity economy enterprises, and it is prone to extreme high pay executives. In this paper, we make a correlation analysis and comparison between the agricultural listed companies and financial industry listed company executive compensation and performance of the company, and give some suggestions on the design and effective development of the executives’ incentives of listed companies.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 369.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 469.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

References

  • Balsam S, Miharjo S (2007) The effect of equity compensation on voluntary executive turnover. J Acc Econ 43:134

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chen ZG (2002) Senior management compensation of empirical studies. Contemp Econ Sci 24(5):58–63 (in Chinese)

    Google Scholar 

  • Du XJ, Wang LH (2007) Empirical study on the correlation of senior management authorities pay and performance of listed companies. Acc Res 1:21–22 (in Chinese)

    Google Scholar 

  • Guo LY (2008) The state-owned enterprise management research. China Sci Technol Univ Press 5:56–57 (in Chinese)

    Google Scholar 

  • Petron K, Safieddine A (1999) Ownership concentration and sensitivity of executive pay to accounting performance measures. J Acc Econ 8:117–125

    Google Scholar 

  • Rehbein K (2007) What drives compensation for China’s CEOs. Acad Manag Perspectives. 1:89–91

    Google Scholar 

  • Xie R, Guo LY (2011) Study on the correlation between executive pay and company performance of the financial industry listed companies. J Ji Lin Ind Commer College 1:32–33 (in Chinese)

    Google Scholar 

  • Zhang K, Gao K (2011) Study on the effectiveness of the Senior Managers’ Compensation Incentive of the listed companies in Shenzhen stock exchange. E-Business and E-Government (ICEE), 2011 International Conference on Shangai, China. May 2011, pp 1–4

    Google Scholar 

  • Zhang K, Qi CH (2010) Study on the influence of the senior managers’ compensation incentive on business performance in listed companies-based on the case analysis of whole sale and retail establishments in 2009. J Tianjin Inst Financ Commercial Manag, 30:44–47 (in Chinese)

    Google Scholar 

  • Zhang K, Yang X (2012) Empirical study on the Senior Managers’ Compensation Incentive on Business Performance in Listed Companies of real estate in 2010. In: 2012 international conference on computer and management, Wuhan, China. March 2012, vol.2 (in Chinese)

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Kun Zhang .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2013 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

About this paper

Cite this paper

Zhang, K., Cui, My. (2013). Comparative Study of the Executive Compensation Validity Between the Entity Economy and Virtual Economy Listed Company. In: Qi, E., Shen, J., Dou, R. (eds) The 19th International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-38442-4_7

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics