Abstract
Due to the non-consistency of the interests and objectives, confrontation and conflict will naturally occur between the accounting information providers of social security fund and regulators of the social security funds, and consequently the game will be generated. Applying the basic principles of game theory, the author firstly analyzes the mixed-strategy game between the social insurance fund management institutions and regulators; then conducts improvement and analysis on game model by regulatory measures like joining the civil regulatory and reporting; and finally concludes the relevant policy recommendations.
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Dai, Ss., Pan, K., Dai, Yy. (2013). Research on Financial Accounting Information Disclosure of China’s Social Security Fund Based on Game Analysis. In: Qi, E., Shen, J., Dou, R. (eds) The 19th International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-38391-5_47
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-38391-5_47
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