Abstract
Whenever possible, life and death decisions should be made autonomously. A decision is made autonomously when an agent calmly reflects over her preferences, which she had some role in developing, and determines that her decision is best for her, given her circumstances. When a medical patient makes a life and death decision autonomously, it is the best decision for her circumstances, as determined by her. If a medical professional pushes a patient to make a life and death decision non-autonomously, it would be severely morally problematic since the patient would not have the chance to make the decision she felt was best, which should be her right since her life is on the line.
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Rocha, J. (2013). Sour Clinical Trials: Autonomy and Adaptive Preferences in Experimental Medicine. In: Räikkä, J., Varelius, J. (eds) Adaptation and Autonomy: Adaptive Preferences in Enhancing and Ending Life. Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics, vol 10. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-38376-2_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-38376-2_7
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