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Hierarchies in Networks: Emerging Hybrids of Networks and Hierarchies for Producing Internet Security

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Cyberspace and International Relations

Abstract

Networked governance is the default modus operandi in Internet governance. Even the provisioning of Internet security heavily relies on non-hierarchical, networked forms of organisation. Responses to large-scale botnets show the prevalence of networked governance and provide insight into its strengths and limitations. Networked governance can be defined as a semi-permanent, voluntary negotiation system that allows interdependent actors to opt for collaboration or unilateral action in the absence of an overarching authority. This chapter analyses the ability of traditional powerful actors such as state authorities and large enterprises to provide Internet security and exert power in the cyber-domain. The chapter outlines potential anchor points for traditional powerful actors to introduce more elements of hierarchy and control into Internet security provisioning networks. Empirically, the chapter describes emerging hybrids of networks and hierarchies in Internet security provisioning.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    International security is here used in its narrow sense as the absence of violent conflict in contrast to e.g. the broader Galtungian notion of international peace as the absence of structural violence.

  2. 2.

    An example for networked organisation in the domain of Internet security is the anti-Spam London Action Plan. (Tabatabaie et al. 2012).

  3. 3.

    This article was written in late 2012, early 2013. An analysis after the PRISM revelations might come to different conclusions

  4. 4.

    Compare Ronfeldts blog entries on Michel Bouwens’ concept of the Partner State (http://twotheories.blogspot.com/2011/07/bauwens-partner-state-part-1-of-2-vis.html, http://twotheories.blogspot.com/2011/10/bauwens-partner-state-part-3-of-3-vis.html), and his TIMN framework and emerging hybrid organisational forms (http://twotheories.blogspot.com/2009/06/timn-and-emergence-of-collaborative.html, http://twotheories.blogspot.com/2009/05/organizational-forms-compared-my.html, http://twotheories.blogspot.com/2009/04/uick-comments-one-on-sta-other-on-timn.html).

  5. 5.

    According Joseph Nye, influence is usually used synonymic to power (Nye 2011b, p. 11).

  6. 6.

    The content of the table is partly based on (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2007, pp. 5–6).

  7. 7.

    The NSA reportedly has, however, installed traffic analysis systems at major US Internet exchange points. (American Civil Liberties Union 2006).

  8. 8.

    Michel van Eeten, a researcher with a long list of publications on quantitative dimensions of malware, estimated some 3 M infected machines. He assumes that the Dutch police did not take into account that temporary assignment of DNS number gives any infected machine several IP addresses over time and that therefore the number of unique IP addresses is not equal to the number of actually infected machines (van Eeten 2010).

  9. 9.

    “Politie overtrad wet bij oprollen botnet”, NU.NL, Oct 28, 2010, http://www.nu.nl/Internet/2366129/politie-overtrad-wet-bij-oprollen-botnet.html.

  10. 10.

    For a more extensive analysis of the Estonian cyber-security policies after 2007, cf. (Czosseck et al. 2011). The cyberattacks themselves and the defensive responses to them are described in greater depth in (Schmidt 2013).

  11. 11.

    Estonian Minister of Defense, Jaak Aaviksso, cited in (Landler and Markoff 2007).

  12. 12.

    Cp. the discussion on state responsibilities for non-state cyberattacks in (Healey 2012).

  13. 13.

    The Markle Foundation Task Force has been a broad and visible example (Markle Foundation-Task Force on National Security in the Information Age 2002).

  14. 14.

    Keith Alexander used the term of “bad packets” that need to be detected on the Internet by ISPs. Cheryl Pellerin, “Cybersecurity Involves Federal, Industry Partners, Allies”, defense.gov, November 8, 2012, http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=118479.

  15. 15.

    CSFI, “About CSFI”, http://www.csfi.us/?page=about (Retrieved June 1, 2011).

  16. 16.

    (CSFI, ibd.).

  17. 17.

    CCDCOE, “Recruiting Cyber Power Workshop”, 2011, http://www.ccdcoe.org/ICCC/CSFI_CCDCOE_Workshop.pdf.

  18. 18.

    DARPA, Research Announcement, Cyber Fast Track (CFT), DARPA-RA-11-52 August 3, 2011, https://www.fbo.gov/utils/view?id=48b671dacf69d07facc107e40840878d (Retrieved Jun 25, 2012).

  19. 19.

    The role of mentalities—not so much for the effects of governmental programs as they did not play a role here—is illustrated in the case of Wikileaks and Adrian Lamo. Lamo passed logs of private chats, which he had with Bradley Manning and in which the latter revealed self-compromising information, to U.S. authorities and the Wired magazine (Calabresi 2010). In January 2013, Lamo rationalized his actions, calling it “needful” and claims that it was “his duty” to “interdict the freedom of the man in the IM window.” His handing over of Manning to public authorities happened “in deference to the hubris of believing that the masses only await our touch in order to to be enlightened” (Lamo 2013).

  20. 20.

    Russia Today, “Wired’s Most Dangerous: Russia’s cyber-security mogul behind Flame virus downfall hits top 15”, December 22, 2012, http://rt.com/news/kaspersky-most-dangerous-people-606/.

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Correspondence to Andreas Schmidt .

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Schmidt, A. (2014). Hierarchies in Networks: Emerging Hybrids of Networks and Hierarchies for Producing Internet Security. In: Kremer, JF., Müller, B. (eds) Cyberspace and International Relations. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-37481-4_11

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