Abstract
The neurological explanation of consciousness has become in the last decades a widespread field of research among neurobiologists and philosophers of mind. The development of experimental models of consciousness involves a parallel search for a suitable ontological background. Although most researchers share anti-dualistic and naturalistic ideas, there are controversial claims about the ontological interpretation of phenomenological data. After sketching some historical premises of this issue, the paper focuses on two case studies: Dennett’s “multi-draft” model of consciousness, and Edelman’s theory of consciousness, included in his “theory of the selection of neuronal groups”. Edelman’s theory turns out to provide a better solution to the open issues of contemporary research, since it avoids speculative hypotheses and dismissive attitudes, while leaving room for experimental and conceptual developments in a classical, “Newtonian” methodological style.
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- 1.
The presence of Cartesian ideas in philosophy of mind and neuroscience has been noticed several times in the twentieth century. This has been often considered as a starting point for philosophical criticism, which has been advanced by quite different perspectives (just think of Ryle and Heidegger). Most recently the dependence of twentieth century neuroscience on Cartesian dualism has been investigated by Maxwell Bennett and Peter Hacker. These authors consider the Cartesian attribution of mental properties to the soul as the exemplar model of the “mereological fallacy” of attributing mental faculties to the brain, which would be widely present in neuroscience ([ 2 ], pp. 43–44, 68, 160–161). On this part-whole problem see § 5 below.
- 2.
According to Descartes, we have « clear and distinct » ideas of both the separate existence of the immaterial soul and the action of the soul on the body. The latter’s evidence therefore is not to be disputed or further analyzed. For a penetrating account see Garber [18], pp. 168–188.
- 3.
It must be observed that Descartes himself devoted a substantial part of his work to discussing the unity of body and soul in its metaphysical, medical and ethical aspects. This fact is usually not recognized in contemporary criticism against Cartesian dualism. For an overview of this aspect of Descartes’ philosophy, including an appraisal of its seminal role in grounding psycho-physical explanations in medicine, see Voss [29], pp. 186–196.
- 4.
For the latter argument see Dennett [11], pp. 1–10. I will elaborate on this problem in § 5 below.
- 5.
Dennett [9], p. 37: « There is a lurking suspicion that the most attractive feature of mind stuff is its promise of being so mysterious that it keeps science at bay forever. This fundamentally antiscientific stance of dualism is, to my mind, its most disqualifying feature, and it is the reason why in this book I adopt the apparently dogmatic rule that dualism is to be avoided at all costs. It is not that I think I can give a knock-down proof that dualism, in all its forms, if false or incoherent, but that, given the way dualism wallows in mystery, accepting dualism is giving up ».
- 6.
There are already several introductions to Dennett’s theory of consciousness. For an overview see Schneider [25] and the brief critical assessments by Andrew Brook and Paul Churchland in Brook/Ross [4], pp. 41–63, 64–80. For a useful historical survey of physicalistic and anti-physicalistic trends in twentieth century philosophy of mind see Moravia [21], which does not cover contemporary naturalism such as Dennett’s. For a more up to date account on contemporary issues see Velmans/Schneider [28] and McLaughlin [20].
- 7.
« Am I an eliminativist? I am a deflationist. The idea is to chip the phenomena of the mind down to size, undoing the work of inflationists who actively desider to impress upon themselves and everybody else just how supercalifragilisticexpialidocious consciousness is, so that they can maintain, with a straight face, their favourite doctrine: The Mind is a Mystery Beyond All Understanding » ([10], pp. 369–370).
- 8.
On this point it is very instructive to consider Dennett’s critical exchange with Maxwell Bennett and Peter Hacker, who defend a different development of Wittgenstein’s ideas ([3], for Dennett’s view see in part. pp. 77–89).
- 9.
See Edelman [14], pp. 39–41. I will consider here the most recent expositions of the theory (starting from Edelman/Tononi 2001), which probably take into account some philosophical criticism of previous expositions. See below note 10.
- 10.
Edelman [14], p. 125. This is possibly a reply to critical remarks advanced by John Searle with regference to Edelman’s previous books Remembered Present and Bright Air, Brilliant Fire [12, 13]. Searle considers Edelman’s theory as « the most thorough and profound attempt that I have seen in the neurobiological literature to deal with the problem of consciousness ». Nonetheless, he considers Edelman’s theory unsatisfactory, because it does not explain how qualia are produced by the neural activity: « Assuming that we understand how the reentrant mechanisms cause the brain to develop unconscious categories corresponding to its stimulus inputs, how exactly do the reentrant mechanisms also cause states of awareness? One might argue that any brain sufficiently rich to have all this apparatus in operation would necessarily have to be conscious. But for such a causal hypothesis the same question remains—how does it cause consciousness? And is it really the case that brains that have these mechanisms are conscious and those that do not are not? So the mystery remains » ([26], pp. 48, 50). Searle’s essay is a revised version of a review in « The New York Book Review », November 16, 1995.
- 11.
See e.g. Edelman [15], p. 145: « Indeed, at present, because we lack the means of fully detailing the hyperastronomical interactions of core neurons, C [the conscious system] provides the only indicator we have of any overall core state, C’ [the neural system]. Indeed, our methodological inability to reduce to cellular or molecular terms the mental or conscious events accompanying fields such as ethics and aesthetics that emerge when we speak “C language” to each other should not be construed as arising from the existence of some radically inaccessible domain ».
- 12.
- 13.
- 14.
- 15.
« Dennett denies the existence of the data to start with. But couldn’t we disprove the existence of these data by proving that they are only illusions? No, you can't disprove the existence of conscious experiences by proving that they are only an appearance disguising the underlying reality, because where consciousness is concerned the existence of the appearance is the reality » ([26], 112).
- 16.
See e.g. Damasio [7], pp. 184–220, 308n.
- 17.
Damasio [8], pp. 256–258. While « protocognition » would correspond to the synchronic activity of a nested hierarchy of neurons (p. 252), « protofeeling » would depend on the inherent « sensitivity » or « irritability » of single cells, itself corresponding to the ability to detect and respond to changes inside and outside the cell membrane, that simple organisms display in order to preserve the homeostasis and protect the integrity of the living tissue (pp. 31–60; 258).
- 18.
Penrose’s speculation involves the interpretation of some problematic features of Quantum mechanics, and therefore seems to add problems to problems. In quantum mechanics itself there is a similar (but, in a sense, reversed) epistemological problem: the standard theory includes a problematic interaction between observer and physical system, which has offered space for speculation and criticism; on the other hand, alternative theories (such as Bohmian Mechanics and Collapse models) are not supported by better empirical evidence and involve different conceptual and mathematical problems. For an overview see Pecere [24].
- 19.
Commenting on Damasio’s last book, Searle criticizes his distinction between mind and consciousness, and denies that Damasio’s book presents any advancement towards the solution of the « mystery of consciousness » [27]. I think that Searle, sticking to the « standard understanding of the causal relation between mind and brain », misses Damasio’s point, which is to radically object to this standard view and elaborate a monistic ontology, where mind and neural patterns are two aspects of the same process which underlies consciousness. This does not mean that Damasio’s theory of consciousness, which I cannot examine here in detail, is complete and free of argumentative problems (indeed, it is not). But I think that Searle’s reasons of dissatisfaction lead too hastily to the usual conclusion, repeated in reply to a reader of the quoted review: « the way neurons produce consciousness remains mysterious » and « we may never have a solution to the mystery of consciousness ».
- 20.
For Edelman’s own reply to the « charge » of epiphenomenalism see Edelman [14], pp. 81–85, 145. Edelman denies causal interaction between consciousness and brain processes, being consciousness « entailed » by these very processes. On the other hand, he denies that we are automata, because of the variability of consciousness as a reflection of the complex interaction of the plastic brain with the environment. Moreover he does not deny the role of secondary (language based) consciousness in long term planning.
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Pecere, P. (2014). Mechanism and Phenomenon of Consciousness. In: Magnani, L. (eds) Model-Based Reasoning in Science and Technology. Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics, vol 8. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-37428-9_9
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