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Bohr’s Theory of the Hydrogen Atom: A Selective Realist Interpretation

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Model-Based Reasoning in Science and Technology

Part of the book series: Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics ((SAPERE,volume 8))

Abstract

This paper proposes a reconstruction of 1913 Bohr’s theory of the hydrogen atom in the framework of the model-theoretic approach of theories. On the basis of this reconstruction, it is argued that Bohr’s theory is not internally inconsistent and can’t be qualified as fictitious. Then, a selective realist interpretation of Bohr’s theory can be defended according to which electrons occupy energy levels. An agnostic attitude however is recommended as far as the electron’s trajectories are concerned.

I wish to thank Alisa Bokulich, Jean Bricmont, Harvey R. Brown, Steven French and Peter Vickers for their comments on a previous draft of this paper.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    But see my recent paper [1].

  2. 2.

    I make the customary distinction between statements and propositions: propositions are the semantic content of statements.

  3. 3.

    Two structures M = <D, ri> and M* = <D*, r*i> are isomorphic if and only if there exists a one–one function f such that for all ri and for all n-uple (a1, … an) of elements of D which stand in relation ri, there exists a n-uple (a*1, … a*n) of elements of D* which stand in a r*i such that a*1 = f(a1), …, a*n = f(an) ([4], pp. 54–57).

  4. 4.

    Remember that we have Bohr’s model (which assumes that electrons move on circular orbits) in mind. Later on, Bohr’s model was refined by Sommerfeld who introduced elliptical orbits.

  5. 5.

    This appears to be redundant, even trivial. But see Suppes’ very simple example of a domain D of two natural numbers 1, 2 organized by the order relation ≥, namely D = <{1, 2}, ≥> which satisfies propositions such as 2 ≥ 1 ([4], p. 26).

  6. 6.

    I added the notion of phenomenal or observational model as the intermediary link between phenomena and data models to van Fraassen’s model-theoretical approach, which, as the reader noticed, is one of my main sources of inspiration (see [7]).

  7. 7.

    The subscripts K and R are chosen in honour of Kepler and Rutherford.

  8. 8.

    Bohr is quoted as having repeatedly said: “As soon as I saw Balmer’s formula, the whole thing was immediately clear to me.” (Rosenfeld’s Introduction to reprinting of Bohr’s papers [10], p. xxxix).

  9. 9.

    For a detailed discussion of the inconsistency charges that have been levelled against Bohr’s model, see Vickers [13], Chap. 3).

  10. 10.

    For more discussion on this, see (Ghins [1]).

  11. 11.

    Some telling examples are discussed by Vickers [19].

  12. 12.

    Several serious objections have been addressed to the so-called no-miracles argument and the truth-tropic strength of inference to the best explanation [25].

  13. 13.

    It is debatable however that all thirteen methods are independent from each other.

  14. 14.

    I here diverge from Bokulich ([23], p. 137) and the standard interpretation of the Heisenberg principle.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Centre Philosophie des Sciences et Sociétés (CEFISES), Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, Place du cardinal Mercier, 14, B-1348, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium

    Michel Ghins

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  1. Michel Ghins
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Correspondence to Michel Ghins .

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  1. Department of Humanities Philosophy Section, University of Pavia, Pavia, Italy

    Lorenzo Magnani

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Ghins, M. (2014). Bohr’s Theory of the Hydrogen Atom: A Selective Realist Interpretation. In: Magnani, L. (eds) Model-Based Reasoning in Science and Technology. Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics, vol 8. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-37428-9_22

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