Skip to main content

§ 4 The Shift from the Nineteenth to the Twentieth Century

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
A Modern History of German Criminal Law

Abstract

During the last third of the nineteenth century, ongoing modernisation propelled society into a state of crisis. While other countries besides Germany were affected, this crisis was felt particularly strongly there. Industrialisation, urbanisation, and a population boom made the traditional means of governing society appear inadequate. Economic activity became ever more frantic. The big bank and stock exchange crash of 1873 put an end to the boom of the Gründerjahre (the years that had seen the birth of modern industry in Germany), triggering the economic “Long Depression” that lasted well into the 1890s. This was accompanied by a shift from a liberal “night watchman state” to a social interventionist state. Increasingly, the state provided not only a framework system within which free economic agents could act, but developed means of controlling and steering economic processes. In legislative terms, this trend produced first spectacular results only a few years after the foundation of the Reich in the legislation on stock corporations, which formed a clear counterpoint to the laissez-faire views current up until that point. Anti-usury legislation followed the same direction. From 1879 onwards, an economic foreign politics of protective tariffs replaced free trade; its domestic counterpart can be seen in Bismarck’s coalition shift from the Liberals to the Conservatives, the Socialists Act (which we will return to shortly), and—not paradoxically, but rather complementarily—the social legislation that was to follow soon after. The intention was to domesticate the Fourth Estate using the carrot of social welfare and the stick of special laws. From a matter of religious and social charity, the “social question” thus became a matter for state regulation. The state increasingly took on the characteristics of the modern Anstaltsstaat (state of institutions). The liberal era was coming to an end.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    For basic information, see H. Rosenberg, Große Depression und Bismarckzeit. Wirtschaftsablauf, Gesellschaft und Politik in Mitteleuropa. 3rd edition, Berlin 1976; see also Id., Wirtschaftskonjunktur, Gesellschaft und Politik in Mitteleuropa 1873–1896, in: H.U. Wehler (Ed.), Moderne deutsche Sozialgeschichte. 3rd edition, Cologne, Berlin 1970, p. 225 ff.; Wolfgang Zorn, Wirtschafts- und sozialgeschichtliche Zusammenhänge der deutschen Reichsgründungszeit 1850–1879, ibid. p. 254 ff.; Karl Erich Born, Der soziale und wirtschaftliche Strukturwandel Deutschlands am Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts, ibid. p. 271 ff.

  2. 2.

    On changes to the laws governing stock corporations, especially the stock corporation amendment of 1884, see Bernhard Großfeld, Aktiengesellschaft, Unternehmenskonzentration und Kleinaktionär. Tübingen 1968, p. 143 ff.; Thomas Vormbaum, Die Rechtsfähigkeit der Vereine im 19. Jahrhundert. Berlin 1976, p. 121 ff.

  3. 3.

    Law on usury of 24 May 1880, RGBl. 1880, 109; Law regarding amendments to the rules on usury of 19 June 1893, RGBl. 1893, 197.

  4. 4.

    On this, incl. references, Thomas Vormbaum, Einführung, in: Id. (Ed.), Die Sozialdemokratie und die Entstehung des Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuchs. 2nd edition, Baden-Baden 1997, p. LI ff.

  5. 5.

    On this, see Rosenberg, Rationalismus, p. 18 ff.

  6. 6.

    Ernst Haeckel, Die Welträthsel. Gemeinverständliche Studien über Monistische Philosophie. First published Bonn,1899.

  7. 7.

    Friedrich Engels at Karl Marx’s grave: “Just as Darwin discovered the law of development of organic nature, so Marx discovered the law of development of human history: the simple fact, hitherto concealed by an overgrowth of ideology, that mankind must first of all eat, drink, have shelter and clothing, before it can pursue politics, science, art, religion, etc.”; Karl Marx/Friedrich Engels, Collected Works. Vol. 41. London 1985, p. 246.

  8. 8.

    On this, see Große-Vehne, p. 48 ff.

  9. 9.

    Cf. § 2 I.—The German Historical School, which in terms of legal policy originally had been an opponent of legal positivism, ended up merging with it, for that which has come to be (through legal history) ultimately coincides with that which is (in positive law); see for private law Wieacker, Privatrechtsgeschichte, p. 430 ff.

  10. 10.

    Amelung, Rechtsgüterschutz, p. 53.

  11. 11.

    Ibid.

  12. 12.

    Here responsibility itself was not seen as forming part of blameworthiness, but as its precondition. On Frank’s criticism, see below § 5 II. 2.

  13. 13.

    See the respective texts from 1818 (Vol. 1) and 1844 (Vol. 2) in Vormbaum, MdtStrD p. 110 ff. and 372 f.

  14. 14.

    Schopenhauer, Freedom of the Will, Cambridge 1999. The following quotes are taken from pages 46–47, 94.

  15. 15.

    The freedom of the will, that we experience as a sense of responsibility for the actions we have committed, according to Schopenhauer (who here refers to Kant) is “transcendental; i.e., it does not emerge in the appearance but is present only insofar as we abstract from the appearance and all its forms in order to reach that which, outside all time, is to be thought of as the inner essence of the human being in himself” (p. 86).

  16. 16.

    Beccaria, Crimes p. 68.

  17. 17.

    v. Liszt, Zweckgedanke, p. 37.

  18. 18.

    On Liszt’s biography, see Naucke, Kriminalpolitik, p. 229 incl. references.

  19. 19.

    Köhler, Einführung, p. VI.

  20. 20.

    For more details on Mittelstädt and Kraepelin: Schmidt-Recia / Steinberg, ZStW 2007, 195 ff., especially p. 200 ff.; also including information on further participants in this debate: Ernst Sichart (1833–1908) and Richard Sontag (born 1835); see also Arndt Koch, Binding vs. Liszt.—Klassische und moderne Strafrechtsschule, in: Hilgendorf / Weitzel, Strafgedanke, p. 127 ff., 131.

  21. 21.

    v. Liszt, Zweckgedanke, p. 6.

  22. 22.

    Vogel, Einflüsse p. 92.

  23. 23.

    Wetzell, Inventing, p. 33.

  24. 24.

    v. Liszt, Zweckgedanke, p. 8.

  25. 25.

    Op. cit., p. 11.—A few years later (1887), Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900) was also to develop an evolutionary theory of punishment and purposes of punishment in his “Genealogy of Morality” (Cambridge 2007; excerpt in Vormbaum, MdtStrD, p. 238 ff.), which has both similarities and differences to Liszt’s theory (it cannot be assumed that Nietzsche read Liszt; but it is well-known that he read Jhering): like Liszt, Nietzsche sees that a phenomenon extant in society, a procedure (the “stable”), is given meaning (the “fluid”) by the term punishment; of course, he states that no one meaning of punishment can be defined: “Only something which has no history can be defined”. He sees the sole purpose and effect of punishment—following Schopenhauer—as the “sharpening of intelligence, […] a lengthening of the memory” (Nietzsche, Genealogy p. 56). He considers a (moral) reform of the offender unlikely, as “he sees the same kind of action practised in the service of justice and given approval, practised with a good conscience: like spying, duping, bribing, setting traps, the whole intricate and wily skills of the policeman and prosecutor, as well as the most thorough robbery, violence, slander, imprisonment, torture and murder, carried out without even having emotion as an excuse, all practices that are manifest in the various kinds of punishment,—none of which is seen by his judges as a depraved and condemned act as such” (ibid., p. 55).—For a closer analysis of punishment in Nietzsche’s philosophy: Knut Engelhardt, Die Transformation des Willens zur Macht. Bemerkungen zum Verhältnis von Moral, Strafe und Verbrechen in Nietzsches Philosophie, in: ARSP 71 (1985), 499 ff.; Lucas Gschwend, Nietzsche und die Kriminalwissenschaften. Eine rechtshistorische Untersuchung der strafrechtsphilosophischen und kriminologischen Aspekte in Nietzsches Werk unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Nietzsche-Rezeption in der deutschen Rechtswissenschaft; in: ZRG.GA 119 (2002), 919 ff.; Jochen Bung, Nietzsche über Strafe, in: ZStW 119 (2007), 120 ff.

  26. 26.

    v. Liszt, Zweckgedanke, p. 21.

  27. 27.

    Op. cit., p. 23.

  28. 28.

    Op. cit., p. 40.

  29. 29.

    Köhler, Einführung, p. VII; similarly Kubink, Strafe, p. 94: what Liszt demands for the category of those incapable of reform, appears “at least at first glance as a precursor of later programmes of biological cleansing and ‘special treatment’”; see also Koch, Binding vs. Liszt, p. 135 f.

  30. 30.

    Naucke, Kriminalpolitik, p. 228.

  31. 31.

    Op. cit., p. 42.

  32. 32.

    v. Liszt, Die deterministischen Gegner, op. cit, p. 354.

  33. 33.

    This should not be confused with the various unification theories current today that attempt to combine different purposes of punishment, for example the so-called phase model, that sees each different stage of the criminal procedure as pursuing a different punitive purpose.

  34. 34.

    v. Liszt, Die deterministischen Gegner, op. cit, p. 342.

  35. 35.

    v. Liszt, Zurechnungsfähigkeit, op. cit., p. 219.

  36. 36.

    Of course, the Reich Criminal Code had not yet taken a stance on the question of free will. The phrasing (misleading in this regard) “prevention of the free exercise of will” in § 51 RStGB was chosen as the “relatively best” one, without intending that the “various metaphysical views on free will in its philosophical sense be included in criminal trials”; see references in Schwarze, StGB, p. 83.

  37. 37.

    Bohnert, Schulenstreit, p. 167: “Equating normal with average determinability uses statistics to gloss over the obvious question of evaluation”.

  38. 38.

    v. Liszt, Zurechnungsfähigkeit, op. cit., p. 221. Schopenhauer had referred to this thought as “correction of insight”.

  39. 39.

    Chr. Müller, Verbrechensbekämpfung, p. 40, 164.

  40. 40.

    v. Liszt, Zweckgedanke, p. 45 f.

  41. 41.

    v. Liszt, Gegner, p. 368.

  42. 42.

    This last term, which was actually introduced by Liszt (see Baumann, Verbrechen, p. 12), fell out of use after 1945.

  43. 43.

    On criminalistics at the turn of the century: Miloš Vec, Die Spur des Täters. Baden-Baden 2002.

  44. 44.

    v. Liszt, Verbrechen, p. 236; see also Holzhauer, p. 182.

  45. 45.

    Elisabeth Bellmann, Die Internationale Kriminalistische Vereinigung (1889–1933). Frankfurt am Main 1994.—The IKV forms part of a general internationalising trend in the theory and politics of criminal law; on this, see Sylvia Kesper-Biermann / Petra Overath (Eds.), Die Internationalisierung von Strafrechtswissenschaft und Kriminalpolitik (1870–1930). Deutschland im Vergleich. Baden-Baden 2007.

  46. 46.

    Naucke, Kriminalpolitik, p. 233.

  47. 47.

    v. Liszt, Gegner, p. 357; it remains unclear how the second principle fits in with Liszt’s demand for indeterminate punishment. On other occasions, Liszt distanced himself from it, cf. Liszt, Die deterministischen Gegner der Zweckstrafe, op. cit, p. 365 (included in Vormbaum, MdtStrD, p. 233 f.).

  48. 48.

    v. Liszt, Zweckgedanke, p. 49.

  49. 49.

    v. Liszt, Gegner, p. 367.

  50. 50.

    Koch, Binding vs. Liszt, p. 138.

  51. 51.

    The fact that Liszt wants to make how habitual offenders are treated dependent on a specific number of relapses, i.e. a formal criterion, seems to point in the same direction, but could also be interpreted as an attempt to prevent psychiatry encroaching on the monopoly of jurists in upholding criminal law.

  52. 52.

    Albrecht, Kriminologie. Munich 2002, p. 10 f. [including images]; Wetzell, Inventing, p. 28 ff.; Id., Kriminologie; Bernd-Dieter Meier, Kriminologie. Munich 2003, p. 17.

  53. 53.

    Gadebusch Bondio, Rezeption, p. 44.

  54. 54.

    This can be seen as a particular nub of legal positivism: one the one hand, it created a formal definition of wrong oriented at the positive legislator, and on the other, it examined the conditions of real, existing people—a “material” fact. Perhaps jurists’ preference for factors of predisposition is due to the fact that any research into the social conditions of crime (and thus processes of criminalisation) would have threatened this closed system. Furthermore, social conditions were seen as unchanging anyway; Chr. Müller, Verbrechensbekämpfung, p. 77; cf. also Wetzell, Inventing, p. 36.

  55. 55.

    Miloš Vec, Die Seele auf der Bühne der Justiz. Die Entstehung der Kriminalpsychologie im 19. Jahrhundert und ihre interdisziplinäre Erforschung (Literaturbericht), in: Berichte zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte 30 (2007), 235 ff. (also including a review of Ylva Greve, Verbrechen und Krankheit. Die Entdeckung der “Criminalpsychologie” im 19. Jahrhundert. Cologne 2004.

  56. 56.

    Peter Becker, Verderbnis und Entartung. Eine Geschichte der Kriminologie des 19. Jahrhunderts als Diskurs und Praxis. Göttingen 2002; in-depth review in Vormbaum, JJZG 8 (2006/2007), 229 ff.

  57. 57.

    All terms according to Becker, op. cit.

  58. 58.

    Also Liszt, Gegner, p. 332, who advocated a comprehensive investigation into all causal factors of crime. Liszt distanced himself from Lombroso and vehemently objected to being placed close to him. Of course, the offender typology of his Marburger Programm had encouraged this view.

  59. 59.

    More detail in Gadebusch Bondio, JJZG 8 (2006/2007), 280 ff.; Wetzell, Inventing, p. 39 ff.; Id., JJZG 2006/2007, 256 ff., especially on the leading criminology textbook by Gustav Aschaffenburg (born 1866, died 1944 in exile in the USA).

  60. 60.

    Immediately prior to the beginning of the 20th century, concrete discourse on types of criminals emerged (the poisoner, the infanticide, the sex murderer), reaching its climax in the Weimar Republic. Academic and non-academic publications (including aesthetic literature) that reinforced and reproduced each others’ content ensured that this discourse established itself as a firm part of the sociology of knowledge. On this topic, from the point of view of literary history and women’s history, see Hania Siebenpfeiffer, “Böse Lust”. Gewaltverbrechen in Diskursen der Weimarer Republik. Cologne, Weimar, Vienna 2005, p. 95 ff., 150 ff., 185 ff.; review by Vormbaum in JoJZG 1 (2007), 157 ff.; on the sociology of knowledge see § 1 II. 1. b) above.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2014 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Vormbaum, T., Bohlander, M. (2014). § 4 The Shift from the Nineteenth to the Twentieth Century. In: Bohlander, M. (eds) A Modern History of German Criminal Law. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-37273-5_4

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics