Abstract
In this paper, we consider medium access control of local area networks (LANs) under limited-information conditions as befits a distributed system. Rather than assuming “by rule” conformance to a protocol designed to regulate packet-flow rates (as in, e.g., CSMA windowing), we begin with a non-cooperative game framework and build a dynamic altruism term into the net utility. Our objective is to define a utility model that captures more closely the expected behavior of users, which according to recent results from behavioral and experimental economics should include a conditionally altruistic dimension. The effects of our proposed dynamic altruism are analyzed at Nash equilibrium in the quasi-stationary (fictitious play) regime. We consider either power or throughput based costs, and the cases of identical or heterogeneous (independent) users/players.
The work was supported by NSF CISE grants 0524202 and 0915928, by EINS, the Network of Excellence in Internet Science EC’s FP7 grant 288021, and by a Cisco Systems URP gift.
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Antoniadis, P., Fdida, S., Griffin, C., Jin, Y., Kesidis, G. (2013). Distributed Medium Access Control with Dynamic Altruism. In: Zheng, J., Mitton, N., Li, J., Lorenz, P. (eds) Ad Hoc Networks. ADHOCNETS 2012. Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, vol 111. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-36958-2_3
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