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Legal Spaces

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Legal Spaces

Abstract

This chapter seeks to make the spatial perspective fruitful for exploring hybrid, relational, and dynamic law. In concrete, it describes more precisely how the concept of space, the space-place dichotomy as well as topological considerations could serve to attain the goal of this study: to find a conceptual descriptive approach to contemporary law as well as methods for taking concrete perspectives on law. In this sense, the concept of space produces a conceptual perspective on law—the one of thinking law spatially. Moreover, based on the space-place dichotomy, we shall see in this chapter how reference frames can be embedded in law’s spatiality. This will be exemplified along a description of legal judgment. And finally, we will outline how a topological investigation in the context of law might look.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See Chap. 2, Sect. 2.3.2.

  2. 2.

    Similarly, Law, John (2002). Objects and Spaces. Theory Culture Society 19, pp. 91-105 (94).

  3. 3.

    See above Chap. 3, Sect. 3.2.3.

  4. 4.

    Of course the similarity in both, de Certeau’s approach and our approach to law’s normativity, mediated through the concept of practice, is no coincidence: because both approaches have foundations in Wittgenstein’s late philosophy. See only above Chap. 3, Sect. 3.2.3. and Chap. 2, Sect. 2.3.1.

  5. 5.

    Qualitative means here that it would differentiate different qualities of each element of the distinction.

  6. 6.

    If it did not exceed the scope of the present study, we would argue even in favour of the elements of the space of legal thinking having the same normative status as the other two spaces here: along the notion of passive normativity that was a result of our theoretical considerations in Chap. 2, we would try to show here that this being a passive part of the generating processes is to be identified with the passive normativity of any legal norms or decisions that are perceived. Again, concerning this moment of description of law, it is all a question of the perspective we are taking.

  7. 7.

    We are in the sphere of modeling here, because we have already seen that it is impossible to grasp a ‘real’ total perspective on law understood as space, as the concept of space involves this impossibility.

  8. 8.

    See only Hart, H. L. A. (1997). The Concept of Law. Oxford University Press: Oxford, p. 126: “In all fields of experience, not only that of rules, there is a limit, inherent in the nature of language, to the guidance which general language can provide. (…) Canons of ‘interpretation’ cannot eliminate, though they can diminish, these uncertainties; (…) They cannot, any more than other rules, provide for their own interpretation.”

  9. 9.

    This is the case with ‘systematic interpretation’, see e. g. Spaak, Torben (2008). Relativism in Legal Thinking: Stanley Fish and the Concept of an Interpretative Community. Ratio Juris 21/1, 157-171 (159).

  10. 10.

    See e. g. Schauer, Frederick (1987). Precedent. Stanford Law Review 39, pp. 571-606; Alexander, Larry (1989). Constrained by Precedent. Southern California Law Review 63/1, pp. 1-64.

  11. 11.

    See also Müller-Mall, Sabine (2010). Interpretation als Rechtserzeugung, in: Groh, Thomas & Lorenz, Jörn (eds.). Interpretatio Mundi. Wie deuten die Wissenschaften ihre Welt?, pp.235-251.

  12. 12.

    This is what Derrida calls the ‘aporia of decision’ (see Derrida, Jacques (1992). Force of Law: The “Mystical Foundation of Authority”, in: Cornell, Drucilla & Rosenfeld, Michel & Carlson, David Gray (eds.). Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice, New York: Routledge pp. 3-67 (pp. 24)) and what Luhmann calls the ‘paradox of decision’ (see Luhmann, Niklas (1995). Das Recht der Gesellschaft. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, p. 308 and Luhmann, Niklas (1993), Die Paradoxie des Entscheidens, Verwaltungsarchiv 84, pp. 287-310.).

  13. 13.

    See above, Chap. 2, Sect. 2.2.3.2.

  14. 14.

    Again, see above Chap. 2, Sect. 2.2.3.

  15. 15.

    See See e. g. Fischer-Lescano, Andreas & Teubner, Gunther (2004). Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unitiy in the Fragmentation of Global Law. Michigan Journal of International Law 25, 999-1046.

  16. 16.

    Koskenniemi, Martti (2005). Global Legal Pluralism: Multiple Regimes and Multiple Modes of Thought. http://www.helsinki.fi/eci/Publications/Koskenniemi/MKPluralism-Harvard-05d[1].pdf. Accessed 10 December 2012, p. 2.

  17. 17.

    See above Chap. 3, Sect. 3.3.1.

  18. 18.

    Again, see above Chap. 3, Sect. 3.3.3.

  19. 19.

    See above Chap. 2, Sect. 2.2.3.

  20. 20.

    See above Chap. 3, Sect. 3.3.3.

  21. 21.

    See e.g. Merryman, John H. (1954). The authority of authority: What the California Supreme Court cited in 1950. Stanford Law Review 6, 613-673; Merryman, John H. (1977). Toward a Theory of Citations: An Empirical Study of the Citation Practice of the California Supreme Court in 1950, 1960, and 1970. Southern California Law Review 50, 381-428; Friedman, Lawrence M. & Kagan, Robert A. & Cartwright, Bliss & Wheeler, Stanton (1981). State Supreme Courts: A Century of Style and Citation. Stanford Law Review 33, 773-818; Landes, William M. & Lessig, Lawrence & Solimine, Michael E. (1998). Judicial influence: A Citation Analysis of Federal Courts and Appeals Judges. Journal of Legal Studies 27, 271-332; Fowler, James H. & Jeon Sangick (2008). The Authority of Supreme Court Precedent. Social networks 30, 16-30; Chandler, Seth S. (2005). The Network Structure of Supreme Court Jurisprudence. University of Houston Public Law and Legal Theory Series 2005-W-01; Kosma, Montgomery N. (1998). Measuring the Influence of Supreme Court Justices. Journal of Legal Studies 27, 333-372; Caldeira, Gregory (1988). Legal Precedent: Structures of Communication Between State Supreme Courts. Social networks 10, 29-55; Caldeira, Gregory (1985). The Transmission of Legal Precedent: A Study of State Supreme Courts. American Political Science Review 79, 178-194; Johnson, Charles A. (1986). Follow-Up Citations in the U. S. Supreme Court. Western Political Quarterly 39, 538-547; Landes, William M. & Posner, Richard A. (1976). Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis. Journal of Law & Economics 19, 249-307; Sirico, Louis J. Jr. (2000). The Citing of Law Reviews by the Supreme Court: 1971-1999. Indiana Law Journal 75, 1009-1039 and Shapiro, Fred R. (1991). The Most-Cited Articles from The Yale Law Journal. Yale Law Journal 100, 1449-1514 ; see also above Chap. 2, Sect. 2.2.4.3.

  22. 22.

    As the citations in the previous note might prove.

  23. 23.

    See above Sect. 4.1.2.1.

  24. 24.

    See below Sect. 4.2.

  25. 25.

    Again, while extracting these principles as dimensions we are in the sphere of place, because any such concretization functions as a specific localization, which is only possible in the perspective of place.

  26. 26.

    See above Chap. 3, Sect. 3.3.3.

  27. 27.

    See above Chap. 3, Sect. 3.3.

  28. 28.

    See above Chap. 3, Sect. 3.3.1.

  29. 29.

    See above Chap. 3, Sects. 3.2.3 and 3.3.1.

  30. 30.

    See above Sect. 4.1.2.1 in this chapter.

  31. 31.

    See above Chap. 2, Sect. 2.2.3.

  32. 32.

    See above Chap. 3, Sect. 3.1.2.

  33. 33.

    See e. g. Lefebvre, Henri (1976). De l’État. Vol. 2. Paris: Union Générale d’Éditions, p. 68.

  34. 34.

    Among the extensive literature in human geography negotiating the concept of scale, see e.g. Smith, Neil (1993). Homeless/Global: Scaling Places, in: Bird, Jon & Curtis, Barry & Putnam, Tim & Robertson, George & Tickner, Lisa (eds.). Mapping the Futures: Local Cultures, Global Change. London: Routledge,, pp. 87-120; Brenner, Neil (2001). The limits to scale? Methodological Reflections on Scalar Structuration. Progress in Human Geography 25/4, 591-614; Marston, Sallie A. (2000). The Social Construction of Scale. Progress in Human Geography 24/2, 219-242.

  35. 35.

    Osofsky, Hari M. (2007). A Law and Geography Perspective on the New Haven School. Yale Journal of International Law 32, 422-453 (441).

  36. 36.

    Referring to ‘multiscalar governance’ as a solution to complex environmental problems, see e.g. Ruhl, J. B. & Salzman, James (2010). Climate Change, Dead Zones, and Massive Problems in the Administrative State: A Guide for Whittling Away, California Law Review 98, 59-120; Osofsky, Hari M. (2010). The Future of Environmental Law and Complexities of Scale: Federalism Experiments with Climate Change under the Clean Air Act. Journal of Law & Policy 32, 79-97.

  37. 37.

    Showing this for the New Haven School, see again Osofsky, Hari M. (2007). A Law and Geography Perspective on the New Haven School. Yale Journal of International Law 32, 422-453.

  38. 38.

    For a classical overview, see e. g. Raphael, D. D. (2003). Concepts of Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  39. 39.

    See above, Chap. 2, Sect. 2.2.3.

  40. 40.

    Hart, H. L. A. (1997). The Concept of Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 124-154.

  41. 41.

    Hart, H. L. A. (1958). Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals. Harvard Law Review 71/4, pp. 593-629 (607).

  42. 42.

    See for more detail concerning this issue: Müller-Mall, Sabine (2013). Fall und Urteil. Zur Rekonstruktion des Falles im Juridischen, in: Döhl, Frédéric & Feige, Daniel M. & Hilgers, Thomas & McGovern, Fiona. Konturen des Kunstwerks. Zur Frage von Relevanz und Kontingenz. München: Fink., pp. 249-262.

  43. 43.

    See above Sect. 4.1.2.3 in this chapter.

  44. 44.

    See above the beginning of Sect. 4.2 in this chapter.

  45. 45.

    See above Sect. 4.2.1.

  46. 46.

    See concerning the limitations of extracting dimensions above Sect. 4.1.2.1.

  47. 47.

    Similarly Derrida, who is differentiating ‘calculation’ and ‘justice’—e. g. Derrida, Jacques (1992). Force of Law: The “Mystical Foundation of Authority”, in: Cornell, Drucilla & Rosenfeld, Michel & Carlson, David Gray (eds.). Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice, New York: Routledge pp. 3-67 (48).

  48. 48.

    Of course any such judgment may contain the claim of being universally valid, of being objective in this sense, just as Kant exposes for reflective judgment in his Critique of Judgment (see Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Judgment, §§ 7,8). But the claim to universal validity has to be distinguished from universal validity itself.

  49. 49.

    See above Sect. 4.1.2.1.

  50. 50.

    See above Chap. 3, Sect. 3.3.3.

  51. 51.

    See above Chap. 3, Sect. 3.3.3.

  52. 52.

    See above Sect. 4.1.2.

  53. 53.

    See above Chap. 3, Sect. 3.3.2.

  54. 54.

    This analysis has been already published in a very similar version (in German): Müller-Mall, Sabine (2011). Verwaltungsrechtsraum Europa – Zur Möglichkeit seiner rechtswissenschaftlichen Erschließung, in: Debus et. al.(eds.). Verwaltungsrechtsraum Europa, Baden-Baden: Nomos, pp. 9-31.

  55. 55.

    Framework directive from 27 September 1996 on ambient air quality assessment and management (OJ EC L 296/55).

  56. 56.

    On the one hand this example, as an in the meantime classical problem of European Administrative Law (see e.g. Ruffert, Matthias (2007). Anmerkung zu BVerwG Beschl. v. 29.3.2007. Juristenzeitung, pp. 1102-1104)) seems to be clear enough for making visible the specifics of a spatial/topological perspective; and on the other hand it shows a sufficient degree of complexity for being examined in such a perspective in a profitable way.

  57. 57.

    Concerning these air quality limit values, see daughter directive 99/30/EC of 22 April 1999 (OJ EC L 163/41).

  58. 58.

    Directive 96/62/EC, Art. 7 (3): “Member States shall draw up action plans indicating the measures to be taken in the short term where there is a risk of the limit values and/or alert thresholds being exceeded, in order to reduce that risk and to limit the duration of such an occurrence. Such plans may, depending on the individual case, provide for measures to control and, where necessary, suspend activities, including motor-vehicle traffic, which contribute to the limit values being exceeded.”

  59. 59.

    Federal Emission Protection Act.

  60. 60.

    From 6 August 2010 on a new version of § 47 Federal Emission Protection Act entered into force that leaves in the discretion of the competent authority only whether to draw up action plans for the case of risk of exceeding air quality limit values, cf. § 47 (2) Federal Emission Protection Act.

  61. 61.

    Cf. e.g. Administrative Court (VG) of Munich, Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 2005, pp. 839; Administrative Court (VG) of Stuttgart, Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 2005, pp. 971 (; High Administrative Court of Munich (VGH), Neue Zeitschrift für VerwaltungsrechtNeue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 2005, pp. 1094; Administrative Court of Munich (VG), Neue Zeitschrift für VerwaltungsrechtNeue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 2005, pp. 1219; High Administrative Court of Munich (VGH), Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 2007, pp. 233; Federal Administrative Court (BVerwG), Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 2007, pp. 695; ECJ, Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 2008, pp. 984 (Janacek ECJ C-237/07).

  62. 62.

    Those are published in: Administrative Court of Munich (VG), Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 2005, pp. 1219; High Administrative Court of Munich (VGH), Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 2007, pp. 233; Federal Administrative Court (BVerwG), Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 2007, pp. 695; ECJ, Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 2008, pp. 984 (Janacek ECJ C-237/07).

  63. 63.

    See below Sect. 4.3.2.1.

  64. 64.

    See below Sect. 4.3.2.2.

  65. 65.

    See below Sect. 4.3.2.3.

  66. 66.

    For a better understanding see already in Chap. 3, Sect. 3.1.3.

  67. 67.

    These scales are a matter of choice, just as for instance a linear measure does not necessarily have to be expressed in meters and centimeters or in inches and feet, because scalings—in contrast to the axes that constitute any frame of reference—are arbitrary, while the axes are subject to and expression of an internal perspective. As I have termed it before: the dimension or the axes are extracted of the legal space, even if this extraction cannot be understood as a deductive procedure, as we have seen above (this chapter, Sects. 4.1.2 and 4.2.1). But despite the arbitrariness of scales, it is reasonable to adjust the scale to the particular research question—we probably would not measure a mile’s distance using a scale of millimeters.

  68. 68.

    To have the character of protecting individual rights of so-called third parties, which means not only and not necessarily to protect a general interest, but also individual rights of an at least definable person or constellation; for an important theoretical line of German administrative law this is a necessary precondition for assuming the existence of a (public) subjective right—this approach is called, in short, “Schutznormtheorie”, i.e. in a literal translation “theory of standard protection”.

  69. 69.

    Administrative Court (VG) of Munich, Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 2005, pp. 1219 (1221).

  70. 70.

    Administrative Court (VG) of Munich, Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 2005, pp. 1219 (1222).

  71. 71.

    High Administrative Court of Munich (VGH), Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 2007, pp. 233.

  72. 72.

    High Administrative Court of Munich (VGH), Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 2007, pp. 233 (233, 235).

  73. 73.

    High Administrative Court of Munich (VGH), Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 2007, pp. 233 (pp.235).

  74. 74.

    High Administrative Court of Munich (VGH), Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 2007, pp. 233 (236).

  75. 75.

    Federal Administrative Court (BVerwG), Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 2007, pp. 695.

  76. 76.

    Federal Administrative Court (BVerwG), Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 2007, pp. 695 (697).

  77. 77.

    Federal Administrative Court (BVerwG), Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 2007, pp. 695 (pp. 697).

  78. 78.

    Federal Administrative Court (BVerwG), Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 2007, pp. 695 (699).

  79. 79.

    ECJ, Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 2008, pp. 984 (Janacek ECJ C-237/07).

  80. 80.

    EuGH, Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 2008, pp. 984 (985) (Janacek ECJ C-237/07).

  81. 81.

    EuGH, Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 2008, pp. 984 (985) (Janacek ECJ C-237/07).

  82. 82.

    Similarly to this evaluation Couzinet, Daniel (2008). Die Schutznormtheorie in Zeiten des Feinstaubs. Deutsche Verwaltungsblätter, pp. 754-762 (pp.754).

  83. 83.

    See already Chap. 3, Sect. 3.1.3 with further references, and also Bühler, Ottmar (1914). Die subjektiven öffentlichen Rechte und ihr Schutz in der deutschen Verwaltungsrechtsprechung. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, p. 224.

  84. 84.

    See above Sect. 4.3.2.1.

  85. 85.

    ECJ, Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 2008, pp. 984 (985) (Janacek ECJ C-237/07) in reference to ECJ C-361/88 [1991] ECR I -2567 and ECJ C-59/89 [1991] ECR I-2607.

  86. 86.

    See Calliess, Christian (2006). Feinstaub im Rechtsschutz deutscher Verwaltungsgerichte. Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht, pp. 1-7 (3); Murswiek, Dietrich (2009). Anmerkung. Juristische Schulung, pp. 74-76 (75).

  87. 87.

    ECJ, Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 2008, pp. 984 (985).

  88. 88.

    Similarly Murswiek, Dietrich (2009). Anmerkung. Juristische Schulung, pp. 74-76 (75).

  89. 89.

    Administrative Court of Munich, Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 2005, pp. 1219 (1221).

  90. 90.

    Federal Administrative Court (BVerwG), Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 2007, pp. 695 (pp.697).

  91. 91.

    Federal Administrative Court (BVerwG), Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 2007, pp. 695 (pp.697). A claim for the drawing-up of an action plan would insofar be a foreign object to German administrative law; similarly also Faßbender, Kurt (2009). Neues zum Anspruch des Bürgers auf Einhaltung des europäischen Umweltrechts, Europarecht, pp. 400-409 (403), who argues still for the acceptance of the establishment of a claim, and Sparwasser, Reinhard (2006). Luftqualitätsplanung zur Einhaltung der EU-Grenzwerte – Vollzugsdefizite und ihre Rechtsfolgen, Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht, pp. 369-377.

  92. 92.

    High Administrative Court of Munich, Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 2007, pp. 233 (236).

  93. 93.

    ECJ, Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 1991, pp. 866 (867); Sparwasser, Reinhard (2006). Luftqualitätsplanung zur Einhaltung der EU-Grenzwerte – Vollzugsdefizite und ihre Rechtsfolgen,Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 1997, pp. 369-377 (370).

  94. 94.

    Cf. concerning this still Schoch, Friedrich (1999). Individualrechtsschutz im deutschen Umweltrecht unter dem Einfluss des Gemeinschaftsrecht. Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht, 457 -467 (463).

  95. 95.

    Wahl, Rainer (2010). Vorbemerkungen § 42 Abs. 2, in: Schoch, Friedrich & Schmidt-Aßmann, Eberhard &. Pietzner, Rainer. Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung. Kommentar. München: CH. Beck. 20th ed, no. 45; Scherzberg, Arno (1988). Grundlagen und Typologie des subjektiv-öffentlichen Rechts. Deutsche Verwaltungsblaetter, pp.129-134 (132).

  96. 96.

    See for example Schoch, Friedrich (1999). Individualrechtsschutz im deutschen Umweltrecht unter dem Einfluss des Gemeinschaftsrecht. Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht, 457-467 (465); Calliess, Christian (2006). Feinstaub im Rechtsschutz deutscher Verwaltungsgerichte. Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht, pp. 1-7 (4); Couzinet, Daniel (2008). Die Schutznormtheorie in Zeiten des Feinstaubs. Deutsche Verwaltungsblätter, pp. 754-762 (761).

  97. 97.

    Of course one could thoroughly doubt whether it is still meaningful to call cases in which legal protection is granted for reasons of European rules but not for these rules’ character of protecting third parties—whether it is meaningful to call such cases ‘applications of the Schutznormtheorie (theory of standard protection)’.

  98. 98.

    Similarly Murswiek, Dietrich (2009). Anmerkung. Juristische Schulung, pp. 74-76 (75).

  99. 99.

    See above Chap. 3, Sect. 3.3.2 and in the present chapter, Sect. 4.3.1.

  100. 100.

    See above Sect. 4.2 of this chapter.

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Müller-Mall, S. (2013). Legal Spaces. In: Legal Spaces. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-36730-4_4

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