On the Feasibility of Extending Oblivious Transfer

  • Yehuda Lindell
  • Hila Zarosim
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7785)


Oblivious transfer is one of the most basic and important building blocks in cryptography. As such, understanding its cost is of prime importance. Beaver (STOC 1996) showed that it is possible to obtain poly(n) oblivious transfers given only n actual oblivious transfer calls and using one-way functions, where n is the security parameter. In addition, he showed that it is impossible to extend oblivious transfer information theoretically. The notion of extending oblivious transfer is important theoretically (to understand the complexity of computing this primitive) and practically (since oblivious transfers can be expensive and thus extending them using only one-way functions is very attractive).

Despite its importance, very little is known about the feasibility of extending oblivious transfer, beyond the fact that it is impossible information theoretically. Specifically, it is not known whether or not one-way functions are actually necessary for extending oblivious transfer, whether or not it is possible to extend oblivious transfers with adaptive security, and whether or not it is possible to extend oblivious transfers when starting with O(logn) oblivious transfers. In this paper, we address these questions and provide almost complete answers to all of them. We show that the existence of any oblivious transfer extension protocol with security for static semi-honest adversaries implies one-way functions, that an oblivious transfer extension protocol with adaptive security implies oblivious transfer with static security, and that the existence of an oblivious transfer extension protocol from only O(logn) oblivious transfers implies oblivious transfer itself.


Security Parameter Random String Oblivious Transfer Extended View Real Execution 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© International Association for Cryptologic Research 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Yehuda Lindell
    • 1
  • Hila Zarosim
    • 1
  1. 1.Dept.of Computer ScienceBar-Ilan UniversityIsrael

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