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Below the Salt

The Dangers of Unfulfilled Physical Media Assumptions
  • Matt Blaze
  • Patrick McDaniel
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7028)

Introduction

The physical access media communication traverses is increasing in diversity. Users now access data and services from wired computers, wireless laptops, PDAs, cell phones, and any number of embedded devices. All of these devices now share the same network — the Internet. Of course the Internet itself consists of many media including traditional long haul, ISP, home, and telecommunication networks. Uncertainty introduced by the media diversity has historically led to insecurity simply because the threat models upon which a protocol or security technique may depend, make false or unfulfilled assumptions about the attacker. This has direct consequences on security protocol requirements.

Keywords

Text Message Short Message Service Telecommunication Network Threat Model Access Layer 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Matt Blaze
    • 1
  • Patrick McDaniel
    • 2
  1. 1.Computer Science DepartmentUniversity of PennsylvaniaUSA
  2. 2.Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security Laboratory, Department of Computer Science and EngineeringPennsylvania State UniversityUSA

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