Trust*: Using Local Guarantees to Extend the Reach of Trust

  • Stephen Clarke
  • Bruce Christianson
  • Hannan Xiao
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7028)


We propose a new concept called trust* as a way of avoiding the necessity to transitively trust others in a range of distributed environments. The trust* approach uses guarantees based upon already established trust relationships. These localised guarantees are then used to extend trust to a new relationship (which we call trust*) which can hold between principals which are unknown to and do not trust one another. Such chains of guarantees enable the risk involved to be shifted to another party (in a similar way to real world guarantees). If a guarantee is broken, some kind of ‘forfeit’ is imposed, either to compensate the client or to deter the server from doing it habitually. Due to trust (and hence also forfeits) being localised, the specific micro-payment and trust management mechanisms that are used to implement the protocol can be heterogeneous. This paper describes the concept of trust* and some possible applications within a domain where the service being provided is also electronic.


Security Protocol Trust Relationship Trust Management Reputation System Spot Price 
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Stephen Clarke
    • 1
  • Bruce Christianson
    • 1
  • Hannan Xiao
    • 1
  1. 1.School of Computer ScienceUniversity of HertfordshireUK

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