Pretty Good Democracy

  • Peter Y. A. Ryan
  • Vanessa Teague
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7028)


Code voting seeks to address the issues of privacy and integrity for Remote Internet Voting. It sidesteps many of the inherent vulnerabilities of the Internet and client platforms but it does not provide end-to-end verification that votes are counted as cast. In this paper, we propose a simple technique to enhance the verifiability of code voting by ensuring that the Vote Server can only access the acknowledgement codes if the vote code is correctly registered by a threshold set of Trustees. The mechanism proposed here therefore adds an extra level of verifiability in registering and counting the vote. Voter-verification is simple and direct: the voters need only check that the acknowledgement code returned to them agrees with the value on their code sheet. To ensure receipt-freeness we propose the use of a single acknowledgement code per code sheet, rather than individual acknowledgement codes for each candidate with usual code voting.


Serial Number Vote System Cyclic Shift Electronic Vote Alternative Code 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Peter Y. A. Ryan
    • 1
  • Vanessa Teague
    • 2
  1. 1.Dept. Computer Science and CommunicationsUniversity of LuxembourgLuxembourg
  2. 2.Dept. Computer Science and Software EngineeringUniversity of MelbourneAustralia

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