Abstract
We introduce an allocation rule for measuring power in voting situations defined by a TU-game, a cooperation index and a coalition structure, and characterize it axiomatically. This rule is an extension of the Owen coalition value; in fact, also a variety of previously studied game situations is embodied and unified by our model. Two numerical examples illustrate the application of the new value.
Earlier versions of this article appeared in 2000 in Homo Oeconomicus 17, 11–29, and in 2001 as a chapter of Power Indices and Coalition Formation (M. J. Holler and G. Owen, eds), Kluwer, 153–173.
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Acknowledgments
Research supported by Grant SGR 2009-01029 of the Catalonia Government (Generalitat de Catalunya) and Grant MTM 2012-34426 of the Economy and Competitiveness Spanish Ministry.
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Amer, R., Carreras, F. (2013). Power, Cooperation Indices and Coalition Structures. In: Holler, M., Nurmi, H. (eds) Power, Voting, and Voting Power: 30 Years After. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35929-3_13
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35929-3_13
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