Abstract
The quantification of information leakage provides a quantitative evaluation of the security of a system. We propose the usage of Markovian processes to model and analyze the information leakage of deterministic and probabilistic systems. We show that this method generalizes the lattice of information approach and is a natural framework for modeling refined attackers capable to observe the internal behavior of the system. We also use our method to obtain an algorithm for the computation of channel capacity from our Markovian models. Finally, we show how to use the method to analyze timed and non-timed attacks on the Onion Routing protocol.
The research presented in this paper has been partially supported by MT-LAB, a VKR Centre of Excellence for the Modelling of Information Technology.
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Biondi, F., Legay, A., Malacaria, P., Wąsowski, A. (2013). Quantifying Information Leakage of Randomized Protocols. In: Giacobazzi, R., Berdine, J., Mastroeni, I. (eds) Verification, Model Checking, and Abstract Interpretation. VMCAI 2013. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7737. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35873-9_7
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