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Core Stability in Hedonic Coalition Formation

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SOFSEM 2013: Theory and Practice of Computer Science (SOFSEM 2013)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNTCS,volume 7741))

Abstract

In many economic, social and political situations individuals carry out activities in groups (coalitions) rather than alone and on their own. Examples range from households and sport clubs to research networks, political parties and trade unions. The underlying game theoretic framework is known as coalition formation.

This survey discusses the notion of core stability in hedonic coalition formation (where each player’s happiness only depends on the other members of his coalition but not on how the remaining players outside his coalition are grouped). We present the central concepts and algorithmic approaches in the area, provide many examples, and pose a number of open problems.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Mathematics and Computer Science, TU Eindhoven, Netherlands

    Gerhard J. Woeginger

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  1. Gerhard J. Woeginger
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Mathematics and Computer Science, University of Amsterdam, Plantage Muidergracht 24, 1018 TV, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

    Peter van Emde Boas

  2. Informatics Institute, Intelligent Systems Lab Amsterdam, University of Amsterdam, Science Park 904, 1098 XH, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

    Frans C. A. Groen

  3. Department of Civil Engineering and Computer Science, University of Rome Tor Vergata, Via del Politecnico 1, 00133, Rome, Italy

    Giuseppe F. Italiano

  4. Institute of Computing Science, Poznan University of Technology, ul. Piotrowo 2, 60-965, Poznan, Poland

    Jerzy Nawrocki

  5. Hasso-Plattner-Institute for Software Systems Engineering, Prof.-Dr.-Helmert-Str. 2-3, 14482, Potsdam, Germany

    Harald Sack

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Woeginger, G.J. (2013). Core Stability in Hedonic Coalition Formation. In: van Emde Boas, P., Groen, F.C.A., Italiano, G.F., Nawrocki, J., Sack, H. (eds) SOFSEM 2013: Theory and Practice of Computer Science. SOFSEM 2013. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7741. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35843-2_4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35843-2_4

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-35842-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-35843-2

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