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Unidirectional Traffic Flow to Protect Wireless Sensor Networks against Byzantine Attacks

  • Björn Stelte
Part of the Communications in Computer and Information Science book series (CCIS, volume 314)

Abstract

Due to its cheap costs and data processing ability it is expected that sensor networks will be widely used for monitoring environments. But it is also well known that Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) are vulnerable to many different kind of attacks. Especially insider attacks are very harmful and is not easy to defend a wireless sensor network against such attacks, because it is much easier to perform insider attacks in WSNs than in classical computer network. Securing WSNs with traditional cryptographic is not sufficient because available resources are limited and nodes have no hardware tampering protection. In this paper, we propose a concept of a cluster-based sensor network with cluster heads equipped with data diodes. These data diodes will defeat malicious code spreading and build a containment of the degree of attack damage. The presented cluster head nodes are build based on a low-voltage FPGA chip. The benefits of the partitioning of the network in clusters are shown next to the usage of the Byzantine Generals’ Problem to detect node tampering. Through a smart positioning of nodes of different clusters, compromised and misbehaving nodes will be limited in their harmful impact on the network.

Keywords

Wireless sensor network FPGA Data diode Insider attack Byzantine attack 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Björn Stelte
    • 1
  1. 1.Universität der Bundeswehr MünchenNeubibergGermany

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