Attack Interference: A Path to Defending Security Protocols

  • Maria-Camilla Fiazza
  • Michele Peroli
  • Luca Viganò
Part of the Communications in Computer and Information Science book series (CCIS, volume 314)


Traditionally security protocol analysis relies on a single Dolev-Yao attacker. This type of attacker is so powerful that overall attack power does not change if additional attackers cooperate. In this paper, we take a fundamentally different approach and investigate the case of multiple non-collaborating attackers. We show how non-collaboration between attackers gives rise to interference between ongoing attacks and that it is possible to actively exploit attack interference to mitigate security breaches and provide partial protection to weak protocols.


Security Protocol Intended Receiver Network Dataset Honest Agent Attack Power 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Maria-Camilla Fiazza
    • 1
  • Michele Peroli
    • 1
  • Luca Viganò
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Computer ScienceUniversity of VeronaVeronaItaly

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