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Good Intentions, Bad Results: The Effects of Newspaper Subsidies on Journalistic Quality

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Book cover State Aid for Newspapers

Part of the book series: Media Business and Innovation ((MEDIA))

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Abstract

News media play an irreplaceably important role in the successful working of democratic societies: they guarantee that citizens have access to information, are accurately informed, and actively take part in the political process. A crucial factor for the effective fulfillment of these democratic functions is an adequate level of journalistic quality.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Another issue of cultural concern is thequalityof programming defined from the perspective of the local community. […] If an objective such as protecting community identity is valued, then it would presumably need special protection (or subsidy) when faced with a lowest common denominator type programming of mass appeal. The appropriate policy stance in this regard remains an open research issue” (Anderson and Gabszewicz 2006, p. 606).

  2. 2.

    A table summarizing all variables used in our model is provided later in the text (Table 5.1).

  3. 3.

    We denote first- and second-order derivatives with prime and double prime, respectively.

  4. 4.

    The introduction of the negative third term, –nh(q), constitutes the most important difference to models based on conventional quality definitions (e.g., Spence 1975), where the relationship between quality and “dollar benefits for the marginal consumer” is strictly positive.

  5. 5.

    Recall that the higher n, the less consumption capital the individual possesses and thus the less he or she is willing to pay for the newspaper, given a certain amount of quality.

  6. 6.

    Although marginal printing costs could be thought of as decreasing due to fixed costs, e.g., for printing machines, we assume marginal distribution costs to be increasing since reaching an additional reader becomes more and more costly as, e.g., sales points have to be opened in more remote areas and distributors have to drive longer distances.

  7. 7.

    We also omit an indirect network effect from the advertising market to the recipient market, since it will not affect our general findings. The sign of this effect is disputed (Sonnac 2000) and the positive impact of the number of readers on the demand for advertisement space can be considered to be the decisive link between the two markets (Corden 1953; Blair and Romano 1993).

  8. 8.

    Recall again that n → 0 represents the consumer with the highest level of consumption capital and n → N the consumer with the lowest.

  9. 9.

    See Appendix 1 for the derivation of this result.

  10. 10.

    These findings are in line with those of Spence and Owen (1977), who analyzed television markets from an allocation efficiency perspective and an overview of program choice models by Owen and Wildman (1992). They find that biases against minority programs—characterized by small demand groups with relatively high willingness to pay—are greater in a free advertising environment (where the media product is available to the consumer for free and revenues are only generated on the advertising market). Although these authors do not explicitly address quality issues, our model is based on a similar concept: that high-quality content is more likely to be consumed by a small portion of the population with high willingness to pay. Additionally, a lack of minority programs implies negative effects on diversity and completeness of arguments which are important journalistic quality criteria.

  11. 11.

    See Appendix 2 for the formal derivation of this result.

  12. 12.

    This is in accord with the findings from Spence and Owen (1977) who argue that programs that are inefficiently not provided by the market (e.g., due to information asymmetries or cross-financing) should receive subsidies. Although we do not argue along market efficiency arguments, but rather apply the normative need to have high-quality media, our results appear to support those of Spence and Owen.

  13. 13.

    In the case of a newspaper duopoly, similar outcomes to those derived in Peitz and Valletti (2008) should be expected. Although they analyze a Hotelling model, the basic assumptions are very similar: consumers have different tastes and the less their tastes are met, the less the consumption probability or the less they are willing to pay for the product. Peitz and Valletti (2008) predict separating equilibria for the case of two competing media firms. That is, one firm will choose to provide relatively high quality whereas the competitor will choose to provide relatively low quality. These findings would also go in line with empirical observations, as regional newspaper markets with more than one media firm tend to split up the market, one firm offering a high-quality newspaper, and the other being rather down-market. Germany’s largest cities Berlin, Hamburg, Munich, and Cologne, for example, each have at least two major regional newspapers, at least one always clearly being yellow press and one being considered good quality (Wellbrock 2011, p. 28).

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Acknowledgements

We thank David Waterman, Paul Murschetz, Matthew Braham, and two anonymous referees for valuable comments and advice on earlier versions of this paper.

This contribution is based on Leroch and Wellbrock (2011). Saving Newspapers with Public Grants—The Effect of Press Subsidies on the Provision of Journalistic Quality. Information Economics and Policy, 23, 281–286. Permission to reuse is granted by Elsevier

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Correspondence to Christian M. Wellbrock .

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Appendices

Appendix 1

Equation (5.6) is an implicit function of the optimal level of quality, q*. We define this function as

$$ f(q):=\frac{\partial \pi }{\partial q}=n{g}^{\prime }(q)- n \mathit{^2}{h}^{\prime }(q)-{c}^{\prime }(q)=0. $$
(5.12)

Before proceeding, it may be helpful to state the second-order condition for a profit maximization is that the Hessian be negative semi-definite. This will be the case if

$$ \frac{\partial^2\pi }{\partial n \mathit{^2}}\frac{\partial \mathit{^2\pi }}{\partial q \mathit{^2}}-{\left(\frac{\partial \mathit{^2\pi }}{\partial n\partial q}\right)}^2>0, $$
(5.13)

because, under given assumptions, (∂2 π/∂n 2) = − 2h − k″(n) + r″(n) < 0. It thus follows, if an interior maximum exists, that (∂2 π/∂q 2) < 0.

By application of the Implicit Function Theorem to Eq. (5.12), we therefore find that

$$ \frac{\partial q*}{\partial n}=-\frac{\frac{\partial f}{\partial n}}{\frac{\partial^2\pi }{\partial {q}^2}}=-\frac{g\prime (q)-2 nh\prime (q)}{\frac{\partial^2\pi }{\partial {q}^2}}. $$
(5.14)

Clearly, Eq. (5.14) is negative if g′(q) < 2nh′(q) or n > (g ′ (q *)/2h ′ (q *)).

Appendix 2

Quality-related taxes change the first-order condition of profit maximization with respect to the choice of quality to:

$$ f(q):=\frac{\partial \pi }{\partial q}=n{g}^{\prime }(q)- n \mathit{^2}{h}^{\prime }(q)-{c}^{\prime }(q)+\gamma =0. $$
(5.15)

Again, Eq. (5.15) constitutes an implicit function of the optimal level of quality. Applying the Implicit Function Theorem yields:

$$ \frac{\partial q*}{\partial \gamma }=-\frac{\frac{\partial f}{\partial \gamma }}{\frac{\partial 2\pi}{\partial q2}}=-\frac{1}{\frac{\partial 2\pi}{\partial q2}}>0. $$
(5.16)

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Wellbrock, C.M., Leroch, M.A. (2013). Good Intentions, Bad Results: The Effects of Newspaper Subsidies on Journalistic Quality. In: Murschetz, P. (eds) State Aid for Newspapers. Media Business and Innovation. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35691-9_5

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